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ENFORCING CORPORATE FIDUCIARY DUTIES
THROUGH CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
OF HONEST SERVICES FRAUD
BY LISA L. CASEY
ABSTRACT
This article examines the federal government's growing use of 18
U.S.C. § 1346 to prosecute public company executives for breaching their
fiduciary duties. Section 1346 is a controversial but under-examined statute
making it a felony to engage in a scheme "to deprive another of the
intangible right of honest services." Although enacted by Congress over
twenty years ago, the Supreme Court repeatedly declined to review the
statute, until now. In 2009, Justice Antonin Scalia pointed to the numerous
interpretive questions dividing the federal appellate courts and proclaimed
that it was "quite irresponsible" to let the "current chaos prevail." Since
then, the Court has granted certiorari in no fewer than three separate cases
construing the honest services law.
The questions before the Supreme Court are ofparticular interest to
public company executives and their professional advisors. Following rev-
elations ofmassive fraud and management wrongdoing at Enron and other
public companies, the Justice Department employed § 1346 to indict execu-
tives accused of breaching their fiduciary duties. Former Enron CEO
Jeffrey Skilling andformer Hollinger CEO Conrad Black are just two of the
corporate fiduciaries found guilty of breaching their duties and convicted
under the statute. Traditionally, Delaware law has governed the content
and enforcement of executives' legal duties, largely protecting public
company fiduciaries from civil liability. Now, with the emergence ofhonest
services fraud as a weapon against corporate wrongdoing, and pressure
from Congress for more prosecutions, civil and criminal law are trending in
opposite directions. Corporate fiduciaries may become criminally liable for
conduct that would not subject them to civil sanctions. Furthermore,
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because these fiduciaries look to state law for the standards governing their
conduct, this anomalous development has profound implications forpublic
company governance.
This article analyzes the issues before the Supreme Court in light of
these contradictory enforcement trends. Spill-over from federal criminal
jurisprudence to state fiduciary duty doctrine is one concern, but over-
criminalization and prosecutorial abuse also must be considered. I con-
clude this article by proposing a statutory amendment that may advance
Congress's interest in prosecuting public company executives for serious
fraud while limiting federal interference with potentially conflicting
fiduciary obligations arising under state law.
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I. INTRODUCTION
If lawyers for the notorious corporate kleptocrat' Lord Conrad Black
can persuade the United States Supreme Court to reverse their client's
convictions for honest services mail fraud, the former media executive may
have Justice Antonin Scalia to thank for his good fortune. Over the past two
decades, the Court refused persistent appeals imploring the Justices to
invalidate the federal honest services statute-§ 1346-which criminalizes
fraudulent schemes "to deprive another of the intangible right of honest
services." 2 Notwithstanding sharp disagreements among the circuit courts
over its proper scope, the Supreme Court had declined every opportunity to
construe the twenty-eight-word statute. Indeed, just one month after Black
filed his petition, the Court denied certiorari in Sorich v. United States,3 an
honest services challenge from the Seventh Circuit (the same appellate court
that had affirmed Black's convictions) raising very similar questions about
the statute's reach. The Court's denial in Sorich, however, prompted a
surprising dissent from Justice Scalia. Adding his voice to a chorus of other
jurists and scholars, Justice Scalia complained that honest services fraud had
become a "potent federal prosecutorial tool," "invoked to impose criminal
penalties upon a staggeringly broad swath of behavior, including misconduct
not only by public officials and employees but also by private employees and
corporate fiduciaries." 4 After all, what is the "intangible right of honest
services"? Read literally, § 1346 criminalizes conduct ranging from a mayor
using his influence to get a restaurant table without a reservation to a public
servant recommending an unqualified friend for a public contract. In the
private sphere, the statute could prohibit "any self-dealing by a corporate
officer" as well as "a salaried employee's phoning in sick to go to a ball
'A special committee of the board of directors of Hollinger International determined that
under Black's leadership as chairman and CEO, the firm was a "corporate kleptocracy." See
Hollinger Int'l, Inc., Report of Investigation by the Special Committee of the Board of Directors of
Hollinger International Inc. (Form 8-K), at 4 (2004) [hereinafter Breeden Report], available at
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webusers.htn; see also Posting of Jonathan Kay to Full
Comment, http://network.nationalpost.com/np/blogs/fullcomment/archive/2007/07/13/jonathan-kay-
on-conrad-black-his-crimes-do-not-fit-him.aspx (July 13, 2007, 13:28 EST) (describing Black as a
corporate kleptocrat).
218 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006). Section 1346 provides that the "scheme[s] or artifice[s] to
defraud" proscribed by the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes, id. §§ 1341, 1343, include schemes or
artifices "to deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." In full, the statute reads: "For
the purposes of this chapter, the term 'scheme or artifice to defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to
deprive another of the intangible right of honest services." Id. § 1346.
'129 S. Ct. 1308 (2009).
41d at 1309 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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game."5 Justice Scalia urged the Court to review both the meaning of the
statute and its constitutionality, admonishing his colleagues that it was "quite
irresponsible to let the current chaos prevail."6 Still, legal prognosticators
anticipated that the Court would reject Black's petition as it had rejected
every other challenge to § 1346,7 leaving Black, a sixty-five-year-old British
baron, to complete the remaining five and a half years of his prison sentence
at a Florida minimum security camp located not far from his former Palm
Beach mansion.8
The pundits were wrong. Apparently persuaded by Justice Scalia's
entreaty, the Supreme Court granted Black's petition9 and then, just a month
later, also accepted a second petition to construe the scope of § 1346.10 In
the latter case, the Court agreed to review a Ninth Circuit decision applying
the statute to prosecute an elected state legislator. The petitioner, former
Alaska Representative Bruce Weyhrauch, allegedly deprived the state of his
honest services by voting on legislation while concealing a material conflict
of interest.' Although neither Black nor Weyhrauch attacked the honest
services statute on constitutional grounds, the Court waited just a week after
beginning the new Term before granting yet a third petition-this one filed
by former Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling--directly challenging the
constitutionality of § 1346.12 In an unexpected about-face, then, the
Supreme Court now is likely to resolve not only long-standing controversies
about the government's application of § 1346 to convict public and private
officials, but the Court also will hear arguments that the compact law lacks
the specificity necessary to survive constitutional scrutiny.
The Supreme Court's decision to examine the honest services statute
for the first time comes as criticism of the law-and, more broadly, criticism
of the discretion the statute gives federal prosecutors-is mounting. Over
51d.
61d at 1311.
7See, e.g., Romina Maurino, In Last-Ditch Appeal, Conrad Black Asks High Court to
Reverse Fraud Conviction, LAW.COM, Jan. 12, 2009, http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=
1202427355542.
sTheresa Tedesco, Black Rolls up to Prison in Cadillac; "Not a Scary Place "; Ex-media
Baron Expects "Boring" Time Behind Bars, NAT'L PosT (Ontario), Mar. 4, 2008, at A3.
9United States v. Black, 530 F.3d 596 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2379 (U.S.
May 18, 2009) (No. 08-876).
1oSee United States v. Weybrauch, 548 F.3d 1237 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct.
2863 (U.S. June 29, 2009) (No. 08-1196).
"Id. at 1239.
12United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct 393 (U.S.
Oct. 13, 2009) (No. 08-1394). Skilling also argues that the Court must reverse his convictions for
honest services fraud because the government failed to prove that his conduct was intended to
achieve private gain rather than to advance Enron's interests. See infra Parts V.B.3.c., V.C.
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the past several years, judges and scholars have expressed growing concern
that the ambiguous language in § 1346 has enabled the Department of
Justice (DOJ) to prosecute public corruption cases for political purposes. 3
Although Congress may not have intended to "grant carte blanche" to federal
prosecutors to define "'honest services' from case to case for themselves,"' 4
the federal courts of appeals have allowed precisely that result.
Commentators recognize, too, that the Supreme Court's decisions in Black,
Weyhrauch, and Skilling could defuse or even eliminate a powerful weapon
often employed by the DOJ to attack public corruption.' 5
Less studied, but also significant, is how the outcomes of these
appeals might weaken the federal government's reinvigorated war on
corporate corruption.1 6 In the past decade, Justice Department prosecutors
have employed the honest services statute increasingly to charge, convict,
and sentence corporate fraudsters, including not only notorious CEOs like
Conrad Black, Enron's Skilling and Kenneth Lay, and Adelphia's John
Rigas, but also scores of other lesser-known senior executives and their
professional advisors.' 7 In many cases, § 1346 has been a stealth count,
operating as a backup charge that won guilty verdicts and jailed corporate
executives when proof of other allegations fell short. Each conviction for
honest services fraud carries a maximum sentence of twenty years in prison.
If the Supreme Court upholds the convictions of Black and Skilling,
honest services fraud charges are certain to appear in forthcoming indict-
ments of corporate executives for wrongdoing connected to last year's
financial crisis. The Obama Administration has made prosecuting corporate
fraud a top priority for the DOJ under new Attorney General Eric Holder. 8
Federal law enforcement authorities already have devoted vast resources to
investigating allegations of senior management's deception and self-dealing
13See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors:
Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 STAN. L. REV. 869 (2009); Bruce A. Green & Fred C.
Zacharias, "The U.S. Attorneys Scandal" and the Allocation ofProsecutorial Power, 69 OHIO ST.
L.J. 187, 188 (2008).14United States v. Rybicki (Rybicki ll), 354 F.3d 124, 138 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc).
5See, e.g., Lynne Marek, Fitzgerald and "Honest Services,"NAT'L L.J., June 15,2009, at
1.
161 refer to officers and directors collectively as "executives," "managers," or "management."
17See Marek, supra note 15, at I (noting that § 1346 was the "lead charge" asserted against
79 defendants in 2007, up from 63 in 2005, and 28 in 2000); infra Part IV.A.
1n recent testimony before Congress, the DOJ committed to "prosecute the wrongdoers,
seek to put them in jail, work tirelessly to recover assets and criminally derived proceeds, and strive
to make whole the victims of such crimes." Federal and State Enforcement ofFinancial Consumer
and Investor Protection Laws: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Fin. Servs., Illth Cong. 2(2009)




at some of the nation's largest (or formerly largest) financial institutions.
Government lawyers also have launched criminal investigations to determine
whether representations by CEOs about their firms' financial condition were
deceptive in light of the companies' subsequent failures or near failures. 9
Understandably focused on restoring public confidence in the capital
markets, Congress, too, has demanded prosecution of corporate officers and
directors for any crimes that contributed to the economic downfall. But will
the honest services fraud statute still be available to prosecute corporate
executives for fraud and related wrongdoing?
Assuming that the Court dispenses with Skilling's constitutional
challenge, the answer will depend on how the Justices interpret the twenty-
eight seemingly unobjectionable words that Congress added to the mail
fraud statute in 1988. Paradoxically, the potency of § 1346 derives from its
innocuous language. The statute simply defines a "scheme to defraud" under
the mail and wire fraud statutes to include conduct that "deprive[s] another
of the intangible right of honest services."20 The government, then, may
prosecute mail and wire frauds without proof that victims lost money or
property. Yet, read literally, § 1346 reaches most dishonesty, as Justice
Scalia illustrated in his dissent.
Courts have attempted to cabin the reach of honest services fraud by
construing the statute more restrictively. In order to "deprive another of the
intangible right of honest services," the courts reason, the defendant must
owe some duty to provide honest services to some person who has the
intangible right to receive the honest services.2 1 Such rights and duties
generally obtain from special relations, such as those between fiduciaries and
their beneficiaries.2 2 Whether the requisite rights and duties arise under state
law, federal law, or both is just one of the many questions that have divided
the federal circuit courts.23 By linking criminal liability to proof of a
9See Gretchen Morgenson, Ex-ChiefAccused ofStock Fraud at a Big Lender, N.Y. TIMES,
June 5, 2009, at Al; Linda Sandier & Christopher Scinta, Lehman Collapse Probed by Three
Federal Grand Juries, BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 17, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?
pid=20601087&refer-home&sid=a5oUolV5pBTk.
2018 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006); see infra Part V.
21See United States v. Williams, 441 F.3d 716, 723 (9th Cir. 2006) ("The undifferentiated
term'another' has led a number of circuits to question whether Congress really meant to give § 1346
unlimited breadth.").
22Id. ("At a minimum, we and other circuits have recognized the viability of the 'intangible
rights' theory when the private defendant stands in a fiduciary or trust relationship with the victim of
the fraud.").
23See Lisa L. Casey, Class Action Criminality, 34 J. CORP. L. 153, 189-90 (2008) (raising
numerous questions regarding interpretation and application of § 1346, including "[flrom what
sources do such rights arise? State law? Federal law?").
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fiduciary breach-a finding that, in and of itself, requires fact-sensitive
boundary drawing-the analysis becomes more complex and less reliable.
The courts, ex post, must define and interpret fiduciary principles; in some
cases, federal courts have gone so far as to recognize original duties, creating
novel fiduciary theories. The variation and even contradiction evident in the
case law also exposes the considerable discretion vested in federal prose-
cutors to determine the line between unethical behavior and criminal
conduct.
Prosecutors' reliance on, and possible expansion of, fiduciary duties as
the basis for honest services fraud has potentially far-reaching consequences
for persons already recognized as fiduciaries under state law, particularly for
corporate executives facing prospective liability in the wake of the economic
crisis. My thesis is that the government's increased use of § 1346 to crimi-
nalize fiduciary breaches contrasts sharply with the decline in fiduciaries'
accountability under civil law for the same conduct. The threshold for
indicting corporate executives for honest services fraud seems at least as
low, if not lower, than either the threshold for enforcing breach of fiduciary
duty claims under Delaware law or the threshold for pursuing civil securities
fraud claims. In fact, civil law and criminal law are trending in opposite
directions: as it has become more difficult to hold a corporate executive
civilly liable for breaching her fiduciary duties, it has become easier to hold
her criminally liable for the same conduct. Fiduciary betrayals-which,
before Enron, likely would have exposed corporate managers to a slight risk
of civil liability-have become the foundation upon which the government
prosecutes the same individuals criminally, charging them with the felony of
honest services fraud. This developing anomaly, while largely unrecognized
in the literature, upsets our traditional expectation that criminal charges are
more serious, and more difficult to prove, than civil claims.
I also contend that greater use of criminal sanctions is driven, at least
in part, by the growing perception that civil law does not adequately deter,
let alone punish, wrongdoing by corporate executives. Criminal enforce-
ment responds to the perceived need for greater punishment and deterrence
of corporate malfeasance. Disloyal and dishonest behavior by corporate
fiduciaries injures not only the company that employed the corrupt
executive, damaging its shareholders and employees, but these breaches
harm the economy more broadly. As we have repeatedly witnessed this
decade, executives may engage in deceitful conduct of such a magnitude that
its revelation not only destroys their firms but also jeopardizes investors'
confidence in public companies, financial institutions, and the securities
markets. This fallout leads to even greater demand for effective law enforce-
ment. That demand, however, cannot be met by civil law because as the
8 [Vol. 35
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civil doctrine has developed over the past several decades, corporate
executives have become increasingly insulated from liability.
Since the Supreme Court's forthcoming decisions likely will limit the
continuing availability of honest services fraud as a weapon to deter
executives, this article also examines the questions before the Court and how
the Court's rulings might impact directors and officers of public companies.
While the Supreme Court's construction may provide some order to
prosecutions under § 1346, the decision also could create further chaos.
My analysis, then, is organized as follows. Part II briefly considers
why directors and officers are fiduciaries and describes their duties as
fiduciaries.24 The next two sections compare and contrast civil enforcement
of executives' fiduciary duties with their criminal enforcement under § 1346.
Part III examines private enforcement of executives' fiduciary duties. This
part identifies the significant legal obstacles preventing shareholders from
enforcing management's fiduciary duties in state court or federal court,
whether shareholders bring their claims derivatively or as class actions. As
verified empirically, public company executives rarely incur liability for
breaching their fiduciary duties.25
Part IV chronicles the government's use of § 1346 to prosecute corpo-
rate executives and provides original evidence of the Justice Department's
increasing use of the statute as a weapon against corporate crime. As this
account shows, Congress and the White House strongly encouraged criminal
prosecutions of culpable executives following the collapses of Enron and
WorldCom. Part IV concludes by explaining how federal criminal law em-
powers prosecutors to indict and convict corporate executives using § 1346.
Part V analyzes the questions raised by the honest services fraud cases
before the Supreme Court in the October 2009 Term. As background for
this analysis, the section begins by examining the evolution of the intangible
rights doctrine and Congress's enactment of § 1346.26 Most of Part V
24Executives of most public companies look to Delaware law for the content and
enforcement of their fiduciary duties. Since this article examines civil and criminal enforcement
actions brought against executives of large public companies, it will review and analyze Delaware
corporate and fiduciary law. Other states also rely on Delaware decisions because of the large num-
ber of companies incorporated there and the special expertise of Delaware courts.
25Indeed, even academics who favor state competition for charters concede that public
companies incorporate in Delaware to minimize directors' and officers' exposure to personal liability
for breaching their fiduciary obligations. See, e.g., Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some
Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 225 (1985).
26See United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 519 (5th Cir. 2006) ("[Section 1346] can be
understood only in the light of the long history of the mail- and wire-fraud statutes, which were
intentionally written broadly to protect the mail and, later, the wires from being used to initiate
fraudulent schemes.").
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considers the important interpretive problems that have bedeviled the appel-
late courts, focusing particular attention on those issues that the Supreme
Court may resolve presently.
Part VI explores how the Supreme Court's decisions in Black,
Weyhrauch, and Skilling could impact the government's reinvigorated efforts
to fight corporate fraud following the recent financial crisis. I conclude by
offering a specific suggestion as to how Congress might promote the federal
interest in prosecuting dishonest public company fiduciaries while curbing
the threats of overcriminalization, prosecutorial abuse, and spill-over from
federal criminal jurisprudence to Delaware's corporate doctrine.
II. CORPORATE EXECUTIVES' FIDUCIARY DUTIES,
ACCORDING TO DELAWARE
Executives who engage in serious misconduct are subject to discipline
under multiple, overlapping liability regimes 2 7 -Civil and criminal, private
and public, state and federal. Because these legal rules apply simul-
taneously, the same misconduct exposes accused managers to concurrent
enforcement actions, and adjudicated wrongdoers face a range of potential
sanctions, from monetary damages to regulatory penalties such as debarment
to imprisonment. For example, opportunistic misconduct by corporate
executives may give rise to liability for breach of a fiduciary duty, fraud
(both statutory and common law), other intentional torts, and violations of
various criminal laws. Effective disciplinary rules not only punish past
wrongdoing but also provide appropriate incentives to deter future
wrongdoing.
Fiduciary law, the "most mandatory inner core" of corporate doc-
trine,28 regulates the conduct of corporate directors and officers. Yet, the
fusion of substantive tenets deferential to public company management with
procedural rules devised to dispose of shareholder lawsuits as cheaply as
possible has produced a system of fiduciary duties practically incapable of
civil enforcement. Shareholder litigation, once the principal judicial device
for addressing fiduciary corruption, no longer disciplines most directors and
officers who have breached their fiduciary duties to the corporation. As the
270f course, non-legal mechanisms also serve disciplinary functions. For example, the firm
may terminate the wrongdoer (or request that she resign her position) rather than pursue the
company's rights in litigation; and the firm's stockholders may choose to sell their shares rather than
initiate litigation.
23John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate Law: An Essay on
the Judicial Role, 89 COLuM. L. REv. 1618, 1621 (1989).
10 [Vol. 35
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civil law has developed over time, private enforcement has become
exceptionally expensive, and the resulting benefits are questionable. Public
enforcement of fiduciary dutieS29-specifically, criminal prosecutions
charging honest services fraud-may better punish serious infidelity while
providing superior deterrence.
Before analyzing criminal liability, however, it is important to review
the fiduciary duties of corporate executives and the predominant legal
reasons that public company managers rarely incur civil liability for breach-
ing those obligations. Part II synopsizes managers' fiduciary duties under
state law. Then, Part III identifies the important procedural rules and sub-
stantive doctrines that make civil enforcement so complicated, burdensome,
and ineffective, regardless of whether the action is brought in state or federal
court. Part III concludes by briefly surveying empirical evidence on
corporate executives' civil liability for fiduciary breach.
It is well-settled that corporate executives are bound by fiduciary
principles. 3 0  Classic fiduciary law regulates self-serving behavior in
relationships where one party undertakes to serve another party's interests
and requires access or control over the other party's assets in order to
perform the undertaking.3' Like trustees of trusts (the archetypal fiduciary),
corporate executives are entrusted by statute with power over assets to be
used in the interest of others; specifically, general corporation laws enacted
by state legislatures invest corporate directors and their officer-delegees with
full discretion to manage their company's business.3 2 Recognizing that man-
agers may divert company assets or take firm benefits for themselves without
authorization, the law seeks to deter such opportunism. For seventy years,
the Delaware Supreme Court has stated that
29The public enforcement actions considered in this article are criminal proceedings insti-
tuted by the DOJ. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) institutes civil enforcement
actions against public company managers which also discipline executives in important ways.
However, because the SEC's authority is limited to the securities laws, and it cannot directly enforce
state fiduciary law, SEC enforcement actions are not considered here.
"oSee Koehler v. Black River Falls Iron Co., 67 U.S. 715, 720-21 (1862) ("[Directors] hold
a place of trust, and by accepting the trust are obliged to execute it with fidelity, not for their own
benefit, but for the common benefit of the stockholders of the corporation.").
3
'See Robert Flannigan, The Economics ofFiduciary Accountability, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L.
393, 393-95, 399 (2007) (explaining conventional fiduciary accountability as a general form of
default civil liability concerned with opportunism, the specific mischief that arises in limited access
arrangements).
32See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2006) ("The business and affairs of every
corporation .. . shall be managed by or under the direction of a board of directors.").
2010] I1I
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[w]hile technically not trustees, [directors and officers] stand in
a fiduciary relation to the corporation and its stockholders. A
public policy, existing through the years, and derived from a
profound knowledge of human characteristics and motives, has
established a rule that demands of a corporate officer or
director, peremptorily and inexorably, the most scrupulous
observance of his duty ... [in order] to protect the interests of
the corporation committed to his charge.. .. The rule that
requires an undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation
demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-
interest.
Universally, as in Delaware, directors and officers owe fiduciary duties to
their firms in order to discipline managers' self-interested conduct.34
Corporate law further delineates that executives bear two principal
duties as fiduciaries: loyalty and care. 35 The duty of loyalty, described as
"the most important fiduciary duty of corporate officers and directors"36 and
"the one accepted constant in the various corporate law debates,"3 7 functions
especially to control managers' opportunism. Loyal executives may not use
their positions to further their private interests, and they must refrain from
doing anything to benefit themselves that would injure their firm.38 Further-
more, executives may not stand on both sides of a company transaction nor
"
3 Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939), quoted in Schoon v. Smith, 953 A.2d
196, 206 (Del. 2008).
34Black's Law Dictionary defines the phrase "fiduciary duty" as:
A duty of utmost good faith, trust, confidence, and candor owed by a fiduciary
(such as a lawyer or corporate officer) to the beneficiary (such as a lawyer's client
or a shareholder); a duty to act with the highest degree of honesty and loyalty
toward another person and in the best interests of the other person (such as the duty
that one partner owes to another).
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (9th ed. 2009).
35Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695, 708-09 (Del. 2009) (holding explicitly, for the first
time, that "officers of Delaware corporations, like directors, owe fiduciary duties of care and loyalty,
and .. . the fiduciary duties of officers are the same as those of directors."). Few Delaware decisions
distinguish between directors and non-director officers.
3 6Joel Seligman, The New Corporate Law, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 1, 3 (1993).37 Flannigan, supra note 31, at 428 ("We have made a choice to reduce the costs of
opportunism by incurring the costs of fiduciary regulation.. . . [T]he universal assumption appears
to be that the conventional duty of loyalty is an efficient mechanism to control opportunism in
limited access arrangements.").
38Guth, 5 A.2d at 510 (explaining, in prose regularly quoted, that "undivided and unselfish
loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest");
see also Schoon, 953 A.2d at 206 (quoting Guth for the enduring proposition that "corporate
executives cannot use their positions of trust and confidence to further their private interests").
12 [Vol. 35
TWENTY-EIGHT WORDS
derive any personal benefit through self-dealing.39 Simply put, managers
may not engage their self-interest without consent from the corporation.4 0 In
contrast to the duty of loyalty, the duty of care requires corporate executives
41to make lawful decisions, employing well-informed, deliberate processes.
The duty of care compels executives to be adequately informed and diligent
when making corporate decisions and to protect the interests of the firm.42
In order to exercise informed business judgment, each director must devote
adequate time to board activities, review materials prepared for board
meetings in advance of those meetings, and, with due consideration, candid-
ly and deliberately decide matters brought before the board.43
Although the fiduciary duties of corporate executives generally orga-
nize into two broad classes, loyalty and care, Delaware courts have identified
another duty as well, a duty of good faith." In the controversial 1996 deci-
sion in In re Caremark International Inc. Derivative Litigation,4 5 Chancellor
William Allen instructed that corporate directors could incur liability if they
failed to exercise appropriate attention to the firm's on-going operations and
employees in good faith.46 However, Chancellor Allen also noted in dicta
that
[g]enerally where a claim of directorial liability for corporate
loss is predicated upon ignorance of liability creating activities
within the corporation . .. only a sustained or systematic failure
of the board to exercise oversight-such as an utter failure to
attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system
exists-will establish the lack of good faith that is a necessary
condition to liability.47
39Anadarko Petrol. Corp. v. Panhandle E. Corp., 545 A.2d 1171, 1174 (Del. 1988).
4Non-director officers, as agents of the corporation, are obligated by agency law and cor-
porate law to act loyally for the benefit of the firm in matters connected with their agency. See
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.01 (2006).
41See Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Director's Duty ofAttention:
Time for Reality, 39 BUS. LAW. 1477 (1984).
42See Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 44 (Del. 1994).
43See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872-73 (Del. 1985).
"In 1993, the Delaware Supreme Court stated, in dictum, that corporate directors incur a
"triad[]" of fiduciary duties, including the traditional duties of loyalty and care as well as a third duty
of "good faith." Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993).
45698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996).
46Id. at 967-70.
47Id. at 971. For over a decade, the corporate law academy parsed Caremark and other
relevant judicial opinions and debated the potential boundaries of this good faith duty to monitor.
See, e.g., Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Duty of Good Faith in Corporate Law, 31 DEL. J. CORP. L. I
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Relying on this dicta, courts came to recognize so-called "Caremark claims,"
actions addressed to directors' "utter failure" and "systematic failure" to take
minimal steps to monitor legal compliance.48 Chancellor Chandler's 2003
decision denying the Walt Disney directors' motion to dismiss suggested that
Delaware courts might advance management's duty of good faith as a
discrete fiduciary obligation, potentially exposing outside directors to greater
risk of liability for oversight failures. 49 This development generated con-
siderable commentary,o especially in light of revelations in 2002 that the
directors managing Enron and WorldCom may "have willfully shut their
eyes" to executives' wrongdoing until it was too late and the firms failed.5'
Then, in 2006, the Delaware Supreme Court in Stone v. Ritter clari-
fied that the duty of good faith is an aspect of the duty of loyalty rather than
a distinct fiduciary duty or an obligation arising under the duty of care.5 2 As
Professor Bainbridge and his co-authors recently argued, "Acknowledging
good faith to be an independent fiduciary duty risked tipping that balance too
far toward director accountability."S3 Nonetheless, the court in Stone did
acknowledge that corporate executives may incur liability for failing to
exercise oversight, and it established the elements of such claims. As Justice
Holland explained:
We hold that Caremark articulates the necessary conditions
predicate for director oversight liability: (a) the directors utterly
failed to implement any reporting or information system or
controls; or (b) having implemented such a system or controls,
consciously failed to monitor or oversee its operations thus
disabling themselves from being informed of risks or problems
requiring their attention. In either case, imposition of liability
requires a showing that the directors knew that they were not
discharging their fiduciary obligations. Where directors fail to
(2006); Hilary A. Sale, Delaware's Good Faith, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 456 (2004).
48See, e.g., In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27,67 n.111 (Del. 2006); Globis
Partners, L.P. v. Plumtree Software, Inc., No. 1577-VCP, 2007 WL 4292024, at *7 n.50 (Del. Ch.
Nov. 30, 2007).
49See In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 825 A.2d 275,278 (Del. Ch. 2003) (holding that
facts as alleged raised sufficient doubt that directors' actions were taken in good faith).50See, e.g., Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in
Corporate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DuKE L.J. 1 (2005); Sale, supra note 47.
5 1JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
15-16 (2006).52Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369-70 (Del. 2006). Thus, corporations cannot exonerate
their directors from liability for Caremark claims pursuant to Delaware's exculpation statute. See
infra Part Ul.A.4.
13Stephen M. Bainbridge et al., The Convergence of Good Faith and Oversight, 55 UCLA
L. REv. 559, 562 (2008).
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act in the face of a known duty to act, thereby demonstrating a
conscious disregard for their responsibilities, they breach their
duty of loyalty by failing to discharge that fiduciary obligation
in good faith.54
Although the obligation to act in good faith is not an independent fiduciary
duty, a director could be liable for bad faith conduct nonetheless, because
failure to act in good faith would breach the director's duty of loyalty. Stone
also clarified that a corporate fiduciary acts in bad faith when she:
"intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of advancing
the best interests of the corporation, where ... [she] acts with
the intent to violate applicable positive law, or where ... [she]
intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to act,
demonstrating a conscious disregard for his duties."5
Furthermore, executives breach their duty of loyalty by knowingly causing
the corporation to use illegal means in the pursuit of profit, by exposing the
corporation to penalties from criminal and civil regulators, or by consciously
causing the corporation to act unlawfully.56
Candor is closely associated with good faith and the duty of loyalty as
well. The obligation of candor applies to communications among the firm's
executives.57 As agents of the corporation, officers must use their reasonable
efforts to provide the board of directors with information relevant to affairs
entrusted to them and which the officers have notice that the directors would
want. Without receipt of truthful and complete information material to its
decisions, the board cannot manage the firm profitably. As fiduciaries of the
firm, all executives also have an "unremitting obligation" to deal candidly
with the corporation and their fellow executives when advancing their own
54Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (footnotes omitted).
"Id. at 369 (quoting In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 67 (Del. 2006)).
56Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 934-35 (Del. Ch. 2007).
57Some Delaware decisions use the term "duty of candor" to describe the obligation of
corporate executives to provide full and fair disclosure to shareholders (the duty of disclosure),
although the Delaware Supreme Court has urged the Court of Chancery to avoid such imprecision.
See Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 84 (Del. 1992).
5See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 381 (1958).
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is subject to a duty to use reasonable efforts to
give his principal information which is relevant to affairs entrusted to him and
which, as the agent has notice, the principal would desire to have and which can be
communicated without violating a superior duty to a third person.
Id
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interests (i.e., self-dealing transactions).59 While classic doctrine strictly
prohibits fiduciaries from acting in conflict with their beneficiaries and
proscribes the receipt of personal benefits, traditional principles do provide a
defense: opportunism is not actionable as breach if the fiduciary obtained
consent to enjoy the benefit or act despite the conflict. To be effective, how-
ever, consent must be fully informed.6 o The inquiry, then, is whether the
company-typically acting through fully informed and disinterested
independent directors-validly approved the executive's conflict or benefit.
To obtain operative consent, the conflicted executive must fully disclose (1)
the existence of a conflict of interest, and (2) material facts concerning the
subject transaction that may not be known to the company (i.e., the directors
qualified to make the decision).
The duty of candor should not be confused with managers' duty of
disclosure. The latter obligation requires corporate executives to disclose all
material information when communicating publicly or directly with share-
holders about the firm's affairs.62 Regardless of whether the communication
seeks shareholders' approval or ratification of some action, "'[c]orporate
fiduciaries can breach their duty of disclosure ... by making a materially
false statement, by omitting a material fact, or by making a partial disclosure
that is materially misleading.'"63  The Delaware Supreme Court recently
clarified that the duty of disclosure also is not an independent duty; rather, it
is part of the duty of loyalty owed by directors to the corporation.
Having summarized the fiduciary duties of corporate executives under
state law, I turn to the legal rules impeding effective enforcement of those
duties in civil proceedings.
seSee Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1283 (Del. 1989) (explain-
ing how CEO deceived disinterested directors).
60See 1 AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND REC-
OMMENDATIONS § 5.02, at 215 (1994) (stating that an interested director must "affirmatively ...
disclose the material facts known to the director" and "explain the implications of a transaction");
see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 8.06(1)(a) (2006) (stating that an agent's conduct
does not constitute breach if principal consents to conduct and, in obtaining consent, agent acts in
good faith and discloses all material facts, and otherwise deals fairly with principal).
61See infra Part III.B.6; see also STEPHEN B. PRESSER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LAW OF
BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS 242 (2005) (quoting IOWA CODE § 496A.34 (2005)).
62See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 10 (Del. 1998) ("Whenever directors communicate
publicly or directly with shareholders about the corporation's affairs, with or without a request for
shareholder action, directors have a fiduciary duty to shareholders to exercise due care, good faith
and loyalty.").
63Pfeffer v. Redstone, 965 A.2d 676, 684 (Del. 2009) (quoting O'Reilly v. Transworld
Healthcare, Inc., 745 A.2d 902, 916 (Del. Ch. 1999)).
6Id at 690.65This high-level account of Delaware's corporate fiduciary doctrine necessarily glosses over
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III. OBSTACLES TO ENFORCING EXECUTIVES' FIDUCIARY DUTIES
UNDER CIVIL LAW
In theory, the threat of personal liability for a fiduciary breach has two
important functions. First, the threat deters managers from exploiting their
position through, among other disloyal acts, insider transactions and diver-
sion of corporate profits, property, and opportunities. Second, the risk of
personal liability encourages outside directors to exercise their authority and
oversight capabilities to detect, and even prevent, self-interested misconduct
by inside executives.
In practice, however, directors and officers seldom face civil liability
for breaching their fiduciary duties, regardless of the forum in which share-
holders bring suit and despite corporate law rhetoric emphasizing the impor-
tance of executives' fiduciary responsibilities. For one thing, corporate
boards seldom choose to pursue the firms' claims against executive male-
factors for breaches of fiduciary duty, at least not publicly.66 Professors
Johnson and Millon have focused attention on the relative paucity of private
litigation claiming that public company officers (as opposed to directors)
breached their fiduciary duties.67 When shareholders sue corporate fidu-
ciaries for breach, the defendants usually win early dismissal of the litiga-
tion, and the defendants very rarely are adjudicated liable, much less pay
monies to resolve the lawsuits. The following sections identify the legal
obstacles that thwart shareholders' efforts to hold executives accountable as
fiduciaries.
A. Obstacles to Civil Enforcement in State Court
A fiduciary's dereliction of her duties generally gives rise to one or
more causes of action. 8 Although the board of directors must authorize any
areas of confusion and continuing development.
66One explanation for non-enforcement is structural bias. Another is directors' concern
about negative publicity and risk that the corporation's public pursuit of claims against the executive
will give rise to shareholder litigation. A third possibility, however, is that the board disciplines the
executive by demanding her resignation or by terminating her. If the board cannot reach agreement
with the executive on the appropriate severance arrangement, the parties likely will arbitrate the
dispute-including, perhaps, the firm's claims that the executive breached her fiduciary duties-in
the confidential forum agreed to under the executive's employment contract.
6See Lyman P.Q. Johnson & David Millon, Recalling Why Corporate Officers Are Fidu-
ciaries, 46 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1597, 1611 (2005) ("[A]lthough officers and directors occupy
distinctive roles in corporate governance, most corporate law authority uncritically obliterates that
distinction when it comes to fiduciary duties.").
6sSee Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin, & Jenrette, Inc., 845 A.2d 1031, 1035 (Del. 2004)
(explaining that the distinction between derivative and direct claims rests solely on who suffered
alleged harm and who would receive benefit of the recovery).
2010] 17
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
claim filed on behalf of the corporation, courts of equity recognize that
directors would not vote to sue themselves. Nor, in the main, would direc-
tors sue their own colleagues or even non-director members of the senior
management team. Therefore, corporate law allows one or more of the
corporation's shareholders to assume "the legal managerial power to maintain
a derivative action to enforce the corporation's claim."69 Still, Delaware's
legislature and its courts have installed significant procedural and
substantive obstacles, derailing shareholders' efforts to enforce executives'
fiduciary duties through derivative litigation. A large literature examines
these legal rules. For our purposes, a brief summary suffices to explain why
civil actions holding corporate executives liable are so uncommon.
1. Standing to Enforce
Although an executive's fiduciary breach may affect the corporation's
employees, bondholders, and other creditors, only shareholders have stand-
ing in most cases to assert derivative claims on the company's behalf.70
Plaintiffs not only must own stock when they initiate their derivative com-
plaint, but their complaint also must aver that they owned stock in the
corporation at the time of the subject transaction.7 1 Additionally, plaintiffs
must hold their shares throughout the litigation. 72 Even involuntary dispo-
sitions of shares, such as through a merger, can deprive the plaintiff of
standing to continue prosecuting the lawsuit.73
69Levine v. Smith, 1987 WL 28885, at *2 (Del. Ch. Dec. 22, 1987); see also Zapata Corp.
v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 (Del. 1981) (holding that derivative suits allow shareholders to
sue on behalf of the corporation when 'it is apparent that material corporate rights would not
otherwise be protected"' (quoting Sohland v. Baker, 141 A. 277, 282 (Del. 1927))).
7oThe principal exception to this rule is that creditors of insolvent corporations may assert
derivative claims, though not direct claims, on behalf of the corporation for breach of fiduciary duty.
See N. Am. Catholic Educ. Programming Found., Inc. v. Gheewalla, 930 A.2d 92, 101, 103 (Del.
2007) ("When a corporation is insolvent ... creditors take the place of shareholders as the residual
beneficiaries of any increase in value." (emphasis omitted)).
nDEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 327 (2006). For criticism of the contemporaneous ownership
requirement, see generally J. Travis Laster, Goodbye to the Contemporaneous Ownership Require-
ment, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 673 (2008) (arguing that the rule is unnecessary and incoherent, and
proposing that an alternative standard be adopted).
7Lewis v. Anderson, 477 A.2d 1040, 1046 (Del. 1984) ("[A] derivative shareholder must
not only be a stockholder at the time of the alleged wrong and at time [sic] of commencement of suit




2. The Demand Rule and Pleading Demand Futility
According to Delaware law, before shareholders can initiate a deriva-
tive action, they either must make a demand on the board that the corpora-
tion pursue its claims against the executives,74 or they must plead facts
sufficient to demonstrate that demand on the board would have been futile.75
Whether demand is made or not, derivative suit pleadings must comply with
"stringent requirements" and allege "particularized factual statements that are
essential to the claim."7 6 In practice, plaintiffs plead demand futility rather
than make a demand on the company's board. The corporation, acting
through a special litigation committee (SLC) of disinterested directors, if
necessary, will respond by moving to dismiss the plaintiffs complaint for its
failure to make a demand.78 In most cases, defendants will prevail. Not only
are Delaware courts loath to excuse demand, but plaintiffs must satisfy an
onerous pleading standard. To establish demand futility, plaintiffs must
allege particularized factual allegations which raise reasonable doubt that:
"(1) the directors are disinterested and independent [or] (2) the challenged
transaction was otherwise the product of a valid exercise of business
judgment."79  In practice, Delaware courts rarely find that plaintiffs have
74Although shareholders are plaintiffs, they prosecute derivative claims on behalf of the
corporation. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 784-86. Disinterested directors--non-defendant directors who are
not otherwise disabled from exercising independent business judgment-maintain their authority to
control the litigation. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984).
7 Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 366-67 (Del. 2006). If the reviewing court determines that
demand would have been futile, the court will excuse demand. Zapata, 430 A.2d at 784.
76Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000).
nPlaintiffs who make demand on the board are deemed to have conceded the directors'
independence and disinterestedness for purposes of the lawsuit. E.g., Levine v. Smith, 591 A.2d
194, 212 (Del. 1991), overruled on other grounds by Brehm, 746 A.2d at 253.
"See ARTHUR R. PINTO & DOUGLAS M. BRANSON, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE LAW
465 (2d ed. 2004) ("[N]o SLC has ever recommended that derivative litigation continue against
sitting officers, as opposed to former directors or senior executive officers."); see also Robert B.
Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public andPrivate Faces ofDerivative Lawsuits, 57 VAND.
L. REv. 1747, 1776, 1783 (2004) (reviewing all corporate litigation filed in Delaware in 1999 and
2000, authors found that courts dismissed 60% of derivative actions against public corporations and
plaintiffs obtained no relief; further, the courts excused demand in only one of eight cases where the
parties litigated demand futility). "The limited data that has been collected on [SLC behavior]
supports the view that the appointment of a special litigation committee almost always leads to
dismissal of the case." Id. at 1791 n.147.
7 9Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814. This requirement "exists to preserve the primacy of board
decisionmaking regarding legal claims belonging to the corporation." In re Am. Int'l Group, Inc.
Deriv. Litig., 965 A.2d 763, 808 (Del. Ch. 2009). When the case involves the board's failure to take
action, the second prong is inapplicable and the court only asks whether the plaintiff has alleged
with particularity facts which "create a reasonable doubt that ... the board of directors could have
properly exercised its independent and disinterested business judgment in responding to a demand."
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satisfied this heightened pleading standard,so and the courts' published
decisions sometimes display an aversion toward shareholder litigation.8 ' The
upshot is that the board's decision not to sue is protected by the business
judgment rule and "will be respected unless it is wrongful."8 2
3. The Business Judgment Rule
Claims for breach of the duty of care generally are subject to the
business judgment rule. This central corporate law doctrine establishes "a
presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation
acted on an informed basis, in good faith and in the honest belief that the
action taken was in the best interests of the company. "3 To promote risk
taking, the business judgment rule protects directors from civil liability for
their decisions in all but the most extreme circumstances. 4 Furthermore, the
rule, when applicable, also creates a presumption against judicial review of
most claims that executives breached their duty of care. Simply put, courts
Rales v. Blasband, 634 A.2d 927, 934 (Del. 1993).
soDelaware presumes that directors are independent and disinterested until shown otherwise,
and "[i]ndependence is a fact-specific determination made in the context of a particular case." Beam
ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia, Inc. v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040, 1049 (Del. 2004).
Specifically, the court considers not only "whether the director is disinterested in the underlying
transaction" but also, "even if disinterested, whether the director is otherwise independent." Id.
Commentators have criticized this presumption and the limited nature ofjudicial inquiries testing it.
See, e.g., Antony Page, Unconscious Bias and the Limits ofDirector Independence, 2009 U. ILL. L.
REv. 237, 242-46.
8t See, e.g., Brehm, 746 A.2d at 255 (holding that higher pleading standards are needed to
prevent shareholders from causing "the corporation to expend money and resources in discovery and
trial in the stockholder's quixotic pursuit of a purported corporate claim based solely on conclusions,
opinions or speculation").
82Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 & n.10 (Del. 1981).
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812; see also id. at 815-16 (holding that despite chairman's owner-
ship of controlling interest in corporation and his selection of each director, the presumption of
independence will stand unless plaintiffs allege facts demonstrating "that through personal or other
relationships the directors are beholden to the controlling person").
8See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985) ("The business judgment rule
exists to protect and promote the full and free exercise of the managerial power granted to Delaware
directors."); see also Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982) ("Whereas an automobile driver
who makes a mistake in judgment ... injuring a pedestrian will likely be called upon to respond in
damages, a corporate officer who makes a mistake in judgment ... will rarely, if ever, be found
liable for damages suffered by the corporation.").
"The business judgment rule does not apply if the directors have not exercised judgment
(i.e., made no decision). See, e.g., Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873. Nor will the business judgment
rule protect decisions by conflicted directors. See, e.g., Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 769
(2d Cir. 1980) ("[T]he business judgment rule presupposes that the directors have no conflict of
interest.").
"See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention
Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REv. 83 (2004).
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will not hear complaints challenging management's business decisions
87
provided that the decisions are based on any rational business purpose.
The business judgment rule imposes a nearly insurmountable barrier to
executives' liability in order to "prevent[] judicial second guessing of the
decision if the directors employed a rational process and considered all
material information reasonably available-a standard measured by concepts
of gross negligence." 8  But even if plaintiffs somehow rebut the business
judgment rule with facts sufficient to demonstrate gross negligence, courts
nonetheless dismiss duty of care claims without reviewing their merits,
provided that the directors did not act in bad faith and that the corporation's
charter includes an exculpatory provision. 90
4. Exculpatory Charter Provisions
Public corporations generally agree to indemnify their executives to
the fullest extent permitted by law. Usually, indemnity agreements cover the
directors' litigation expenses and attorneys' fees, as well as judgments, fines,
and settlement amounts.91 Delaware companies also may have charter
87See Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 264 (Del. 2000) ("Irrationality is the outer limit of the
business judgment rule. Irrationality may be the functional equivalent of the waste test or it may
tend to show that the decision is not made in good faith, which is a key ingredient of the business
judgment rule.") (footnote omitted); see also In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959,
967 (Del. Ch. 1996) ("[W]hether a ... decision [is] substantively wrong, or degrees of wrong
extending through 'stupid' to 'egregious' or 'irrational,' provides no ground for director liability, so
long as the court determines that the process employed was either rational or employed in a good
faith effort to advance the corporate interests." (emphasis omitted)).
88In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 122 (Del. Ch. 2009). The
Citigroup court reasoned that the fiduciary duty of care and business judgment rule "properly focus
on the decision-making process rather than on a substantive evaluation of the merits of the decision."
Id. at 124.
89The Delaware Supreme Court has described gross negligence as reckless indifference to or
a deliberate disregard for stockholders, or actions outside the bounds of reason. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d at 873 & n.B.
9oEven without an exculpatory provision, proof of gross negligence is not necessarily
determinative of liability. Although defendants will not be shielded from liability by the business
judgment rule, they will not be liable for breaching their duty of care if they can demonstrate the
entire fairness of their decision. See McMullin v. Beran, 765 A.2d 910, 917 (Del. 2000).
'State indemnification statutes, such as section 145 ofthe Delaware General Corporation
Law, typically permit corporations to indemnify their executives for expenses, judgments, and the
like that are reasonably incurred in actions against them because they are executives, but only if the
executives act in "good faith" and in a manner they reasonably believe to be "in or not opposed to the
best interests of the corporation." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145 (2006). These statutes also
authorize corporations to advance the litigation expenses their directors and officers (D&Os) incur in
such actions. Id. In practice, corporations routinely advance such expenses. Companies also
routinely purchase D&O liability insurance to cover the corporation's obligation to indemnify its
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provisions exculpating their directors from personal liability for monetary
damages arising from a breach of the duty of care.92 Importantly, section
102(b)(7) does not permit corporations to absolve directors for breaches of
their duty of loyalty.93 Nor may corporations release directors from liability
for breaching their fiduciary duties intentionally, knowingly, or in bad faith.
Nevertheless, because most public companies have adopted exculpatory
provisions in their certificates of incorporation,94 directors are protected from
claims for monetary damages based solely on their lack of care. 95
Accordingly, even if plaintiffs rebut the business judgment rule and
successfully allege a duty of care violation, the director defendants need not
prove entire fairness provided that the company's charter exculpates its
directors.96 Instead, plaintiffs must establish that the director defendants
wasted corporate assets-an extremely rare claim that is nearly impossible to
prove. For executives to incur liability, then, plaintiffs must state a claim
that, by law, cannot be exculpated, i.e., a duty of loyalty breach or a claim of
bad faith oversight. However, public company executives do not risk
substantial personal liability for even non-exculpated claims.
5. Pleading Non-exculpated Claims with Particularity
To plead a cognizable, non-exculpated claim against corporate execu-
tives-for example, a Caremark-type claim for bad faith failure of over-
sight-shareholders must allege particularized facts giving rise to a serious
executives and to cover losses that cannot be indemnified. However, D&O policies exempt losses
for adjudicated dishonesty, disloyalty, or criminal acts.
92See, e.g., id. § 102(b)(7); Malpiede v. Townson, 780 A.2d 1075, 1095-96 (Del. 2001)
(affirming dismissal of duty of care claims where corporation's charter included exculpatory
provision). Notably, the statute does not permit corporations to insulate their directors from liabil-
ities under other laws, such as the federal securities statutes.
9 3See, e.g., McMullin, 765 A.2d at 926.
9 4Celia R. Taylor, The Inadequacy ofFiduciary Duty Doctrine: Why Corporate Managers
Have Little to Fear and What Might Be Done About It, 85 OR. L. REv. 993, 1022 & n.131 (2006)
(detailing a study of firms making SEC filings between July 2001 and July 2002, finding that
"virtually every firm" had an exculpation clause in its charter). All fifty states have enacted laws
limiting directors' liability for breach of the duty of care or allowing corporations to adopt
exculpatory charter provisions. Id. at 1022.
95Emerald Partners v. Berlin, 787 A.2d 85, 94 (Del. 2001).
96Id at 92.
97See In re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 748-49 (Del. Ch. 2005) ("Cor-
porate waste is very rarely found in Delaware courts because the applicable test imposes such an
onerous burden upon a plaintiff-proving 'an exchange that is so one sided that no business person
of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the corporation has received adequate
consideration."' (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. 2000))), affd, 906 A.2d 27 (Del.
2006). Waste occurs only in the "rare, 'unconscionable case[ I where directors irrationally squander
or give away corporate assets."' Id. at 749 (quoting Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263).
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threat of liability.9 8 Plaintiffs must plead specific facts (for example, that
defendants ignored explicit "red flags") demonstrating that defendants'
behavior exhibited more than gross negligence; typically, that defendants'
conduct was so egregious as to establish bad faith.99 Essentially, share-
holders must plead particularized facts proving, among other things, the
defendants' unlawful state of mind.'00
6. Approval by Disinterested Board Members and Shareholders
The duty of loyalty is implicated when a fiduciary has engaged in self-
dealing or takes for herself some asset or opportunity that properly belongs
to the firm.' 0 While the corporation cannot exculpate directors for such
claims, Delaware courts nonetheless have extended considerable deference
to independent and disinterested board members in duty of loyalty cases,
arguably as much deference as in duty of care cases.
Furthermore, Delaware courts have relaxed their oversight of execu-
tives' conflicts of interest considerably over the past several decades. 102 At
one time, courts scrutinized self-dealing and other conflict of interest trans-
actions using the entire fairness test, a standard that is far more rigorous than
the business judgment rule.10 3 Under the entire fairness test, it is the defen-
dant fiduciary's burden, rather than the plaintiffs' burden, to prove that the
challenged transaction was entirely fair to the corporation.'04 To satisfy this
"Wood v. Baum, 953 A.2d 136, 141 (Del. 2008).
99See Desimone v. Barrows, 924 A.2d 908, 935 (Del. Ch. 2007) (holding that to plead
failure-of-oversight liability sufficiently, plaintiffs must show "that the directors acted with the state
of mind traditionally used to define the mindset of a disloyal director").
00See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 369 (Del. 2006); see also In re Am. Int'l Group, Inc.
Deriv. Litig., 965 A.2d 763, 800-01 (Del. Ch. 2009) (holding that the plaintiffs had sufficiently
pleaded particularized facts to show that defendants knew about material, non-public information to
support plaintiffs' insider trading claims).
'
0oSee In re Walt Disney Co., 907 A.2d at 751 ("The classic example ... is when a fidu-
ciary either appears on both sides of a transaction or receives a personal benefit not shared by all
shareholders.").
102Historically, courts treated conflicted transactions as voidable, irrespective of fairness to
the corporation. However, "[o]ver time, that approach gave way to a more workable rule requiring
that the transaction be fair." J. Robert Brown, Jr., Disloyalty Without Limits: "Independent" Direc-
tors and the Elimination ofthe Duty ofLoyalty, 95 KY. L.J. 53, 54 (2006).
03See Seligman, supra note 36, at 8 (noting that executives "very rarely lose lawsuits" when
courts apply the business judgment rule, but "[t]he odds are considerably less favorable" when the
executives themselves must prove the fairness of self-dealing transactions).
1See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1375-76 (Del. 1993) ("[T]he defendants are on
both sides of the transaction. For that reason ... defendants have the burden of showing the entire
fairness of those transactions.").
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evidentiary burden, the fiduciary must demonstrate both the substantive and
procedural fairness of the bargain.' 05
Although the entire fairness test appears to create a difficult burden of
proof for fiduciaries, well-counseled corporate managers can, and do, avoid
its application. Executives shield self-dealing transactions by utilizing statu-
tory procedures that, if followed, may obviate the need for judicial exami-
nation under the entire fairness test. Relying on these state safe harbor statu-
tes, executives generally direct decisions or transactions involving conflicts
of interest to disinterested directors or shareholders for their approval.106
Assuming that fully-informed, disinterested directors or shareholders sanc-
tioned the transaction, Delaware courts may apply the business judgment
rule.10 7 The courts then limit their review of the decisions authorizing such
transactions; the shareholders attacking the transaction will have the burden
to prove that the transaction amounted to a gift or waste.'08 Commentators
have criticized this approach:
The courts have never provided an adequate justification for
applying the business judgment rule to a conflict of interest
transaction approved by a board that contains a majority of
independent directors. Section 144(a) does not, as some courts
have suggested, compel applying the outcome. Nor does it
result from expungement of the conflict. In fact, the approach
makes no effort to ensure that a decision-making process is free
of the conflict of interest.109
Not only do the Delaware courts generally refuse to consider how structural
bias and social relationships disqualify purportedly "independent"
'
05Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 710 (Del. 1983) ("When directors of a Delaware
corporation are on both sides of a transaction, they are required to demonstrate their utmost good
faith and the most scrupulous inherent fairness of the bargain.").
1o6See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(l)-(2) (2006) (providing business judgment
protections to interested transactions approved by either a fully-informed disinterested board or the
disinterested shareholders).
07See Oberlyv. Kirby, 592 A.2d 445, 466 (Del. 1991) ("[S]ection 144 allows a committee
of disinterested directors to approve a transaction and bring it within the scope of the business
judgment rule.").
10 See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 366 n.34 (Del. 1993) ("Under this
statute, approval of an interested transaction by either a fully-informed disinterested board of
directors or the disinterested shareholders provides business judgment protection." (citation omit-
ted)), modified in part, 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1994).
"9Brown, supra note 102, at 69.
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directors," 0 but because plaintiffs must satisfy heightened pleading standards
without access to any discovery, the courts have no way to determine wheth-
er the "independent" directors were fully informed and what influence, if
any, the interested executive had on their decisions. In light of disturbing
revelations that interested executives withheld material information and even
intentionally deceived the outside directors at Enron, WorldCom, and many
other public companies, relaxed judicial oversight of insiders' conflict-of-
interest transactions is especially troubling. I will return to this point later.'
Given the gauntlet of procedural and substantive obstacles plaintiffs
must navigate under Delaware law, it is not surprising that shareholders'
suits against directors and officers rarely proceed past the pleading stage.
Courts dismiss many civil actions filed against corporate executives early in
the litigation. Shareholder plaintiffs cannot enforce fiduciary duties through
derivative litigation because they cannot sufficiently plead, without dis-
covery, facts that excuse board demand (i.e., facts showing that a majority of
the board was not truly independent or was interested in the decision). Nor
can shareholders establish, without discovery, a cognizable claim that the
defendant executives breached their fiduciary duties and did so in such a
way (intentionally or at least in bad faith) that they can be held liable to the
corporation.
Thus, as the ultimate outcome of the Disney litigation made clear,
corporate executives will not incur fiduciary liability under Delaware law
even where their conduct "fall[s] far short of what shareholders expect and
demand from those entrusted with a fiduciary position" and "does not com-
port with how fiduciaries of Delaware corporations are expected to act."I12
Illustrative of such judicial opinions is the recent decision by Delaware
Chancellor William Chandler dismissing all but one of the state law claims
asserted against Citigroup's management in In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder
Derivative Litigation.13
B. Enforcing Fiduciary Duties in Delaware: The Citigroup Example
Many large financial institutions engaged in excessive risk taking in
the years preceding the subprime mortgage crisis and the bursting of the real
1 oSee, e.g., Beam ex rel. Martha Stewart Living Omnimedia v. Stewart, 845 A.2d 1040,
1050-51 (Del. 2004).
"'See infra Part VI.E.
1l21n re Walt Disney Co. Deriv. Litig., 907 A.2d 693, 763 (Del. Ch. 2005), afd, 906 A.2d
27 (Del. 2006).
13964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009).
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estate bubble. Despite long odds against success, shareholders have filed
derivative lawsuits against the directors and officers of financial institutions
that failed or nearly failed in 2008, alleging that the companies' executives
breached their fiduciary duties. For example, shareholders sued the execu-
tives of Citigroup, one of "the poster children for the excesses that created
[the financial] crisis," 1l4 after massive investments in subprime mortgages
and complex debt instruments imperiled the giant bank and threatened its
survival. Citigroup posted a $27 billion loss-and its stock price fell some
77% '5-before the federal government rescued it in 2008.' 16 Having
determined that the bank was too big to fail, the Treasury Department bailed
out the firm, spending approximately $45 billion of taxpayers' money to
infuse Citigroup with capital under the controversial Troubled Asset Relief
Program (TARP).'17
Before the government came to Citigroup's rescue, several share-
holders sued the responsible executives, seeking to recover some of the more
than $25 billion in losses incurred by the company in subprime mortgages
and related assets." 8 Alleging that demand on Citigroup's board was ex-
cused, plaintiffs instituted a derivative action in the Delaware Court of
Chancery against the thirteen then-current members of Citigroup's board,
several former directors, and certain current and former officers and senior
managers.l 9 The complaint alleged that the defendants breached their fidu-
ciary duties by failing to oversee and manage Citigroup's massive subprime
mortgage investments, assets that ultimately comprised some 43% of
Citigroup's equity.120 Despite many red flags warning them that the real
estate and credit markets were collapsing, the defendants' alleged failures to
monitor Citigroup's subprime portfolio exposed the firm to enormous losses
and resulted in billions of write-downs.121 The complaint also asserted that
the defendants failed to ensure the accuracy of Citigroup's financial reporting
ll4Colin Barr, Citi's Vikram Pandit on the Hot Seat, FORTUNE, June 5, 2009, http://money.
cnn.com/2009/06/05/news/pandit.crosshairs.fortune/index.htm.
15See CNNMoney.com, Fortune 500 2009, http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/
fortune500/2009/snapshots/2927.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2009).
1See David Enrich et al., U.S. Agrees to Rescue Struggling Citigroup-Plan Injects $20
Billion in Fresh Capital, Guarantees $306 Billion in Toxic Assets, WALL ST. J., Nov. 24, 2008, at
Al.
"'See id. (explaining that the Department of Treasury gave Citigroup $20 billion in addition
to the $25 billion previously provided).
"8See Consolidated Second Amended Derivative Complaint, In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder
Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (No. 3338-CC).
""See id. at 7-14 (listing the defendants).
2
oSee id. at 1-3.
12Id. at 114.
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and other disclosures.12 2 Finally, plaintiffs maintained that certain defen-
dants wasted Citigroup's assets by approving a controversial, multimillion
dollar exit package for the company's outgoing chairman and CEO, Charles
Prince.123  The board ultimately forced Prince to resign after he recom-
mended to them that Citigroup write down billions of dollars in bad sub-
prime investments. 124
The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint in its entirety, arguing
that the plaintiffs failed to plead demand futility with the particularity
required under Delaware law.12 5 Plaintiffs countered that the court should
excuse demand because a majority of Citigroup's board members faced a
substantial likelihood of liability. 126 According to plaintiffs, the defendants
faced a substantial likelihood of liability for violating their duty of loyalty in
failing to discharge their oversight obligation in good faith by consciously
ignoring Citigroup's enormous exposure to risky subprime investments.12 7
Chancellor Chandler disagreed. While acknowledging Citigroup's
"staggering" losses, the court refused to excuse demand and granted the
defendants' motion to dismiss all but one of the shareholders' claims.12 8
Significantly, the court determined that plaintiffs' allegations against the
Citigroup executives did not even give rise to Caremark-type claims for
oversight failure.129 The court purposely distinguished the allegations in
Caremark (that the defendant-directors' failure to monitor allowed illegal
activity to transpire) from the allegations pled against the Citigroup
defendants (that the defendant-directors failed to monitor Citigroup's
business risk adequately, resulting in the firm's overexposure to risk from
subprime mortgage investments):
While it may be tempting to say that directors have the same
duties to monitor and oversee business risk, imposing
1221r e Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 114.
12 3Under Prince's leadership, Citigroup overinvested in risky subprime assets, refusing to
liquidate or hedge against the risks. Several months before the board demanded his resignation,
Prince famously justified the strategy, explaining to reporters, "When the music stops, in terms of
liquidity, things will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you've got to get up and
dance. We're still dancing." Michiyo Nakamoto & David Wighton, Bullish Citigroup Is "Still
Dancing" to the Beat of the Buy-Out Boom, FIN. TIMES (London), July 10, 2007, at 1.
124See Eric Dash, Fixing Citigroup Will Test Rubin, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2007, at Al.




'In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 123 ("Plaintiffs' theory of how the director defendants will
face personal liability is a bit of a twist on the traditional Caremark claim.").
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Caremark-type duties on directors to monitor business risk is
fundamentally different.. . . Oversight duties under Delaware
law are not designed to subject directors . . . to personal
liability for failure to ... properly evaluate business risk.13 0
Chancellor Chandler characterized the complaint as "essentially amount[ing]
to a claim that the director defendants should be personally liable to the
Company [for breach of fiduciary duty] because they failed to fully
recognize the risk posed by subprime securities."' 3 1 The court sharply
criticized this attempt to hold the Citigroup executives personally liable.132
By rejecting plaintiffs' theory and applying the business judgment rule
to their failure-of-oversight claims, the court protected Citigroup's directors.
How did the court rationalize its novel approach? According to Chancellor
Chandler, to allow plaintiffs' claims to go forward would be to "abandon ...
bedrock principles of Delaware fiduciary duty law" and engage in the "kind
ofjudicial second guessing" about the firm's investments that "the business
judgment rule was designed to prevent." 33 As the court emphasized, "Over-
sight duties under Delaware law are not designed to subject directors, even
expert directors, to personal liability for failure to predict the future and to
properly evaluate business risk." 34 Although the business community prais-
ed Chancellor Chandler's decision, the result in Citigroup sends the message
that state law immunizes corporate executives from liability. Indeed, share-
holders' claims will not even get a hearing.13 5
What allegations are sufficient to withstand early dismissal?
Allegations of criminal wrongdoing, as Vice Chancellor Leo Strine decided
shortly before Citigroup came down. Vice Chancellor Strine denied the
motions to dismiss filed by certain former executives of AIG, including its
deposed former-CEO Hank Greenberg.' 3 6 Explaining his unusual decision
to allow the suit to go forward, Strine remarked that the "diversity, perva-
siveness, and materiality of the alleged financial wrongdoing at AIG is extra-





'See id at 126 ("To impose liability on directors for making a 'wrong' business decision
would cripple their ability to earn returns for investors by taking business risks.").
In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 126.
1Id. at 131.
13sSee Posting of J. Robert Brown to TheRacetotheBottom.org, http://www.theracetothe
bottom. org/ shareholder-rights/delaware-courts-and-exonerating -the-board-from-supervising-r-
4.html (Mar. 12, 2009, 9:00 EST) (criticizing the Citigroup decision).




and underscored that the alleged corruption within the company was not
confined to certain business areas but, rather, permeated the entire firm. 3 9
Moreover, the complaint alleged that Greenberg and his executive co-
defendants were, themselves, directly responsible for the business units
engaged in the alleged misconduct.14 0 Thus, Strine emphasized, the com-
plaint included sufficient facts to support plaintiffs' claim that AIG's execu-
tives had personal knowledge of the wrongdoing.141
Read both separately and together, the decisions in Citigroup and AIG
illustrate the exceptionally high threshold that shareholders must surpass
merely to advance a Delaware derivative suit past the pleadings stage.
Unless public company executives managed a firm engaged in pervasive
wrongdoing, or they appear to have committed some grievously dishonest
and disloyal act themselves, the defendant directors and officers will not be
adjudicated liable for breaching their state law fiduciary duties.142
C. Obstacles to Civil Enforcement in Federal Court
Shareholders of public companies also may attempt to remedy man-
agement's fiduciary duty breaches by litigating civil claims in federal court.
Before Congress imposed substantial limits on private securities enforce-
ment, plaintiffs sometimes included state law claims in their putative class
action complaints filed in federal court.143 Specifically, shareholders alleged
that the defendant executives violated one or more federal antifraud statutes
(typically, section 10(b) and Rule I Ob-5 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934144) and that one or more of the defendant executives breached their
fiduciary duties under applicable state law.14 5 While Congress enacted the
federal antifraud statutes to protect shareholders rather than the corporation,
harm to the corporation's shareholders usually, if not inevitably, results in
injury to the corporation. Rarely is harming the corporation beneficial to its
'
391d. at 774-75.
14oSee In re AIG, 965 A.2d at 780-81.
1411d. at 799.
142See id.; In re Citigroup Inc. S'holder Deriv. Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 125 (Del. Ch. 2009).
143See, e.g., In re Donald J. Trump Casino Sec. Litig. (Taj Mahal Litig.), 7 F.3d 357 (3d
Cir. 1993).
'"See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
145See, e.g., Taj MahalLitig., 7 F.3d at 366 (relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (2006) to assert
jurisdiction over state law breach of fiduciary duty claim). Federal courts have supplemental juris-
diction over state law claims brought in connection with, and forming the same case or controversy
as, claims over which the courts have original jurisdiction, like federal securities claims. See id.; cf
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2006) (permitting district courts to dismiss pendent state law claims where
there are novel or complex issues of state law or when the court has dismissed all federal claims).
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shareholders, nor is defrauding the shareholders beneficial to the corpora-
tion. In fact, one wrong often begets the other. A fiduciary-duty-breaching
executive will injure the firm and then mislead the firm's shareholders about
the damage, thereby directly harming the shareholders as well.
While analytically distinct, executives' breaches of fiduciary duty to
the corporation and their misrepresentations or omissions to investors often
occur in tandem. Before 1998, shareholders could invoke the federal courts'
supplemental jurisdiction over pendent state law claims in order to bypass
the burdensome procedural obstructions associated with derivative litigation,
such as the demand requirement. But Congress cut off this detour in the late
1990s when it passed two laws designed to curb the filing of"abusive and
meritless" securities litigation. The first, the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA), limited the rights of shareholders to file
federal class action lawsuits and proceed with discovery.1'" The PSLRA
also reduced the civil liability of companies, as well as their directors,
officers, and advisors, under the federal securities laws. As a result, it
became more difficult, expensive, and risky for shareholders to sue corporate
officers and directors in federal court for violating the federal antifraud
provisions.
Less than three years later, public company executives returned to
Capitol Hill, seeking additional protections from shareholder lawsuits. They
testified that plaintiffs' lawyers were evading federal reforms by filing their
securities fraud complaints in state courts. 14 7 When successful, this tactic
enabled shareholders to obtain discovery from defendants in state court,
frustrating Congress's intent.148 Congress reacted by enacting a second
statute, the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
(SLUSA).1 49
SLUSA stopped shareholders' attempts to end-run the PSLRA, but the
law also effectively halted shareholders' ability to obtain redress for
14 6Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and
18 U.S.C.).
147Congress gave federal courts exclusive jurisdiction for violations of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, but it gave federal and state courts concurrent jurisdiction to hear investors'
claims under the Securities Act of 1933. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78aa (2006); Securities Act of 1933 § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (2006).
148See H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 14 (1998) (Conf. Rep.); see also Lisa L. Casey, Shutting
the Doors to State Court: The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, 27 SEC. REG.
L.J. 141, 142 (1999) (providing an in-depth analysis of SLUSA, its legislative history, and object-
tives).




securities fraud under state law and through the state courts. 50 With limited
exceptions, SLUSA preempts shareholders' state law breaches of fiduciary
duty if plaintiffs assert such causes of action as independent claims and the
alleged breaches are in connection with the purchase or sale of a "covered
security."' 5' By preempting their state law claims, SLUSA substantially
disabled shareholders from prosecuting fiduciary duty claims in federal
court.152 When a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against a public com-
pany is rooted in misrepresentations or omissions, SLUSA may preempt its
prosecution as a stand-alone claim.'53 In fact, SLUSA actually sweeps more
broadly than section 10(b).s 4 If the fiduciary's alleged breach "'coincide[s]'
with a securities transaction-whether by the plaintiffor by someone else,"
that coincidence is enough to preempt the state law claim. 55 As a result,
even if the plaintiff shareholder is a "holder" and did not actually purchase or
sell the company's security, that plaintiff would have no claim under federal
law. 5 6 SLUSA even "pre-empts state-law class-action claims for which
federal law provides no private remedy." 57
Shareholders still may attempt to hold corporate fiduciaries liable
under the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws-typically,
section 10(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5.'15  Although conduct violating the antifraud
'soSee Casey, supra note 148, at 142.
'See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f) (2006). Specifically, SLUSA provides that
[n]o covered class action based upon the statutory or common law of any State or
subdivision thereof may be maintained in any State or Federal court by any private
party alleging--(A) a misrepresentation or omission of a material fact in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of a covered security; or (B) that the defendant used
or employed any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in connection
with the purchase or sale of a covered security.
Id; see id. § 78bb(f)(5)(B) (defining "covered class action"); id. § 78bb(f)(5)(E) (defining "covered
security"). For securities traded on a national exchange, an independent state law claim for breach
of fiduciary duty is preempted if it alleges any misstatements, omissions, or deception in connection
with the purchase or sale of the company's securities. See Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc. v. Dabit, 547 U.S. 71, 82-83 (2005).
152See David M. Levine & Adam C. Pritchard, The Securities Litigation Uniform Standards
Act of 1998: The Sun Sets on California's Blue Sky Laws, 54 BUS. LAW. 1, 31 (1998).
1s3See 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(f).
154See Dabit, 547 U.S. at 84-86.
'"See id at 85 (emphasis added).
'"See id
'Id at 74. In Dabit, "holders" of various securities asserted breach of fiduciary duty
claims in connection with the dissemination of misleading research. Id at 75. Even though the
class consisted of shareholders who had not purchased during the relevant time period, their claims
also were preempted. Id. at 88-89.
"See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009). The prototype class action
complaint alleges that the defendant issuer, through its senior management and/or advisors, misrep-
resented or fraudulently failed to disclose material information about the company to the market,
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statutes is only a subset of the conduct that offends the duties of care and
loyalty, Professors Thompson and Sale have demonstrated empirically that
plaintiffs can reformulate fiduciary breach allegations as actionable securities
fraud claims. 9 Either way, the law favors early dismissal of plaintiffs'
claims. Federal courts dismiss many civil securities fraud complaints on the
pleadings, before discovery.160 Indeed, because the PSLRA established the
most stringent pleading standards in civil litigation,16 ' its 1995 enactment
practically guaranteed that defendants would move to dismiss, rather than
answer, shareholders' complaints. The PSLRA mandates that plaintiffs
plead with particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference of the
defendants' required state of mind; for actions under section 10(b) and Rule
1 Ob-5, this means knowledge or recklessness.162 In addition, plaintiffs must
specify "each statement alleged to have been misleading, the reason or
reasons why the statement is misleading, and, if an allegation regarding the
statement or omission is made on information and belief, the complaint shall
state with particularity all facts on which that belief is formed."'16  Finally,
plaintiffs must plead loss causation adequately.'1 Again, plaintiffs must
satisfy this extraordinary pleading standard without the benefit of any
discovery from the firm or the individual defendants. 65
Major decisions from the Supreme Court over the past 35 years also
make federal civil liability unlikely. First and foremost, the Court has inter-
preted the federal securities laws narrowly, precluding federal liability for
inflating the company's stock price artificially. When truthful information about the company is
revealed to the market, the price of the securities corrects to its "proper" level, damaging investors
who traded in the interim.
IsSSee Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate Governance:
Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859 (2003) (comparing class actions alleging Rule
lob-5 violations with shareholder actions filed in Delaware).
60See Stephanie Plancich & Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action
Litigation: 2009 Year-End Update (NERA Econ. Consulting, New York, N.Y.), Dec. 2009, at 9-10
(finding dismissal rates between 14% and 45% from 2000-2008).
"'See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 313 (2007).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(2) (2006); see Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 314 (construing scienter
requirement). In order to survive a defendant's motion to dismiss after Tellabs, the pleadings of both
the plaintiff and the defendant when read together must set forth a "cogent and compelling"
inference that it is at least equally as likely that a knowing or reckless misrepresentation was
committed as not. Id. at 324.
16315 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1).
'"See id. § 78u-4(b)(4) ("[T]he plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the act or
omission of the defendant alleged to violate [the Securities Exchange Act] caused the loss for which
the plaintiff seeks to recover damages."); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336,341-42 (2005)
(holding that a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating that defendants' material misrepresentation
caused plaintiffs actual economic loss, not simply purchase price inflation).
1Practically, plaintiffs' firms must engage in costly private investigators and rely on
confidential informants to uncover enough non-public information about the defendants' wrongdoing
to satisfy the threshold pleading standards.
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conduct regulated by well-established state law.16 In Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green, the Court held that mere breaches of fiduciary duty are not
cognizable claims under section 10(b) and Rule 1 Ob-5.' 67 In so deciding, the
Court expressed concern that applying federal law to claims of fiduciary
breaches by corporate management, an area traditionally governed by state
law, would create problems. 1s According to the Court, the logic that would
permit such a result "could not be easily contained."169 Allowing a breach of
fiduciary duty to satisfy section 1 0(b)'s "manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance" language would expand the scope of the prohibited conduct
impermissibly. According to the Court, it would be difficult to distinguish
that conduct from "other types of fiduciary self-dealing involving
transactions in securities" and, as a result, "bring within. . . [Rule 1 Ob-5] a
wide variety of corporate conduct traditionally left to state regulation.' 70
The Court also asserted that allowing federal courts to create and
apply a "federal fiduciary principle" via the securities laws would "overlap
and quite possibly interfere" with "established" state corporate law.' 7' With-
out a "clear indication of congressional intent," the Court opted to leave the
regulation of corporate internal affairs to state law.172 Overarching federal-
ism concerns, substantive questions about the scope of corporate managers'
fiduciary duties, and basic notice concerns all supported the Court's decision
to restrict the implied private right of action under section 10(b) to com-
plaints alleging misrepresentations or omissions. 7 3 Reading Santa Fe and
Dabit together, executives' fiduciary duty breaches that coincide with secu-
rities transactions seem to be insulated from liability.
The Court's 2008 decision in Stoneridge Investment Partners, LLC v.
Scientific-Atlanta, Inc. followed a similar analysis.' 74 The majority again
interpreted section 10(b) narrowly to restrict expansion of private antifraud
enforcement to disputed contractual transactions, another area traditionally
See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 478 (1977).Id. at 471-75.
id. at 478-79.
Id at 478.
'Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 478.171 d. at 478-79. The Court worried that Rule 10b-5 could be interpreted to "impose a
stricter standard of fiduciary duty than that required by the law of some States." Id. at 479 n. 16.
172 d. at 479.
'
73This is a substantive difference, not simply a semantic distinction. Plaintiffs cannot
"'bootstrap' a claim of breach of fiduciary duty into a federal securities claim by alleging that [a
defendant] failed to disclose that breach of fiduciary duty." Kas v. Fin. Gen. Bankshares, Inc., 796
F.2d 508, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
174See Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 161-62
(2008).
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regulated by state law. 175  As in Santa Fe, the Court considered extra-
statutory principles counseling against extending the statute to reach the
conduct alleged.' 76 Writing for the majority, Justice Kennedy first examined
federalism concerns and respect for state law.177 The Court declined to apply
section 10(b) to ordinary business transactions because such a reading would
risk "that the federal power would be used to invite litigation beyond the
immediate sphere of securities litigation and in areas already governed by
functioning and effective state-law guarantees."' 7 8 Second, Justice Kennedy
wrote that separation of powers concerns constrained the Court.17 9 The
decision to extend the reach of a judicially-created, implied right of action
"beyond its present boundaries" belonged to Congress, not the Court. 80
Third, the Court found that the existence of other enforcement vehicles
addressing the secondary actors' alleged misconduct-namely, criminal
securities fraud, SEC enforcement, and sometimes express private rights of
action-counseled against section 10(b) liability.' 8 ' Finally, the Court noted
that after Central Bank, Congress declined to reinstate aiding and abetting
liability by including an express private right of action in the PSLRA.18 2 As
in Santa Fe, consideration of these combined factors compelled the Court to
restrict the statute's reach.
The Supreme Court's prior securities law jurisprudence highlights
some important normative judgments about the ill-defined border between
state and federal regimes governing the liability of corporate executives,
perhaps foreshadowing how the Court will analyze the honest services
statute. Prosecuting executives under § 1346 federalizes enforcement of
corporate executives' fiduciary duties, affecting these same interests, as I
explain in Part V. While most appellate courts interpreting § 1346 have
ignored the decision model utilized by the Court in Santa Fe and Stoneridge,
competing constructions of § 1346 necessarily implicate federalism, respect
for state law, separation of powers, and the enforcement mechanisms
available under state corporate law.
17 5According to the Court, section 10(b) "does not reach all commercial transactions that are
fraudulent and affect the price of a security in some attenuated way." Id (citing SEC v. Zandford,
535 U.S. 813, 820 (2002), in which the Court stated that section 10(b) "must not be construed so
broadly as to convert every common-law fraud that happens to involve securities into a violation").
176Id at 161.
177Id





182Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 157-58, 162.
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D. Empirical Evidence: Directors and Officers Rarely Liable
for Breaching Their Fiduciary Duties
Rarely is civil liability imposed on public company executives. Not
surprisingly, boards seldom authorize such lawsuits. In the exceptional cir-
cumstance that directors approve such litigation, they previously terminated
the executive, yet the firm avoided bankruptcy after the executive's wrong-
doing became public.'83 Empirical research also demonstrates that share-
holders rarely obtain judgments holding executives liable for fiduciary duty
violations. A well-publicized study by Professor Bernard Black and col-
leagues determined that, from 1980 through 2005, only five derivative suits
against outside directors of public companies went to trial, and plaintiffs
won just two of them.'8 Professors Robert Thompson and Randall Thomas
examined all Delaware derivative suits filed during 1999 and 2000 and
found that, out of the fifty lead cases resolved, only six resulted in any
monetary recovery for the corporations.' 85 This past year, Professor Black
and his colleagues published another article, this time comparing shareholder
litigation against public company directors in the United States and the
United Kingdom.'86 Searching nationwide in the United States for lawsuits
filed between 2000 and 2007 alleging a breach of duty, they found that only
a small percentage of such cases were sufficiently contentious that the U.S.
courts issued written decisions, and a substantial fraction of those cases were
dismissed.' 87 When the researchers matched their U.S. lawsuit data to the
data from Thompson and Thomas' Delaware studies, they determined that
only one in seven complaints filed against directors in Delaware produced a
written decision.'8 8  Most written decisions favored the defendants, but,
more often than not, judges dismissed the complaints without any written
'
3The shareholders' derivative action filed against former HealthSouth chairman and CEO
Richard Scrushy exemplifies such a lawsuit. See, e.g., Valerie Bauerlein & Mike Esterl, Judge
Orders Scrushy to Pay $2.88 Billion in Civil Suit, WALL ST. J., June 19, 2009, at Bl.
184Bernard Black et al., Outside Director Liability, 58 STAN. L.REV. 1055, 1064-66 (2006).
185Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The Public and Private Faces ofDerivative
Lawsuits, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1747, 1775-76 (2004). Professors Thompson and Thomas examined
certain lawsuits in more detail in a separate article. Robert B. Thompson & Randall S. Thomas, The
New Look ofShareholder Litigation: Acquisition-Oriented Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 133
(2004). Critics of derivative litigation emphasize that even if the plaintiff-shareholder recovers
money damages on behalf of the corporation, the proceeds may come from the corporation's D&O
liability policy, and increases to the company's premiums may offset much of the recovery.
15John Armour et al., Private Enforcement ofCorporate Law: An Empirical Comparison
ofthe UK and US, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 1, available at
http://ssm.com/abstract-l 105355).
I871d (manuscript at 12, 18).
'
88See id. (manuscript at 15).
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opinion.' 89 Indeed, the researchers located just ten written decisions (3% of
all written decisions) entering judgments against defendants and awarding
damages following trials on the merits.' 90 In those cases, D&O insurance
likely covered almost all payments owed by the defendants. '9
Empirical studies also confirm that, applying the PSLRA's heightened
pleading standards, courts have dismissed more securities fraud class actions
on pre-discovery motions by the defendants, as Congress intended. After
enactment of the PSLRA, securities class action dismissals doubled.' 92 In
the Ninth Circuit, previously a "hotbed" of securities litigation, the dismissal
rate nearly tripled.'93 An early study found that courts granted, at least in
part, 79% of defendants' motions to dismiss securities fraud class actions. 1 9 4
Another more recent study reported that courts had dismissed some 44% of
all post-PSLRA securities fraud complaints.'9 Furthermore, there is some
evidence that courts are dismissing an even higher fraction of cases since the
Court's 2005 Dura decision.'96
If plaintiffs' complaint survives defendants' motions to dismiss and the
trial court certifies the shareholder class, defendants almost always settle
rather than proceed to trial.' 97 But the defendant corporation and its insurer
See id. (manuscript at 15, 16, tbl.6). The authors found no written decisions in a breach
of fiduciary duty suit filed solely against non-director officers. Id (manuscript at 12 n.55).
190See Armour et al., supra note 186 (manuscript at 16 tbl.6).
9 11d. (manuscript at 16-17).
192Compare ELAINE BUCKBERG ET AL., RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION: ARE WORLDCOM AND ENRON THE NEW STANDARD? 3 (2005) (discussing courts'
dismissal of some 20.3% of securities class actions from 1991 through 1995), with RONALD I.
MILLER, RECENT TRENDS IN SHAREHOLDER CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: BEYOND THE MEGA-
SETILEMENTS, IS STABILIZATION AHEAD? 4 (2006) (explaining that from 1998 through 2003, the
dismissal rate in securities class actions was 40.3%).
'"See James D. Cox et al., Do Differences in Pleading Standards Cause Forum Shopping
in Securities Class Actions?: Doctrinal and Empirical Analyses, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 421, 442
(noting that dismissal rates for cases filed in the Ninth Circuit went from 20.8% just before PSLRA
to 34.9% by 2003 and 57.1% by 2005). An intriguing new empirical study suggests that the trend
may be diminishing, if not reversing somewhat. See Stephen J. Choi & Adam C. Pritchard, The
Supreme Court's Impact on Securities Class Actions: An Empirical Assessment 25 (NYU Ctr. for
Law, Econ. & Org., Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-34, 2009), avail-
able at http://ssm.com/abstract-1457085.
194See Stephen M. Bainbridge & G. Mitu Gulati, How Do Judges Maximize? (The Same
Way Everybody Else Does-Boundedly): Rules of Thumb in Securities Fraud Opinions, 51 EMORY
L.J. 83, 116 n.94 (2002) (reporting 72 of 91 motions to dismiss granted in full or in large part).
'"eStephanie Plancich & Svetlana Starykh, Recent Trends in Securities Class Action
Litigation: 2009 Mid-Year Update (NERA Econ. Consulting, New York, N.Y.), July 2009, at 15.
'"Id. at 2, 30 (inferring that plaintiffs have found it more challenging to meet their burden
of proof and show loss causation in their complaints).
'"See Black et al., supra note 184, at 1084.
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fund the settlements.198 Individual defendants rarely contribute funds out of
their own pockets to settle securities fraud litigation,'99 a fact that has led
many academics to question the deterrence value of securities class
actions.200 Plaintiffs seldom name outside directors as defendants in a
typical section 1 0(b)/Rule 1 Ob-5 lawsuit. When plaintiffs have sued outside
directors, 20 1 and those director-defendants actually contributed to the
settlements, the amounts paid by the directors were small compared to the
individuals' overall net worth, and trivial compared to the massive damages
(hundreds of billions of dollars) claimed by the defrauded shareholders. In
most cases, plaintiffs do not seek damages directly from culpable corporate
executives even if the executives personally profited from the fraud or their
conduct was egregious.
Part III has shown that public company managers are seldom held
accountable under civil law for breaching their fiduciary duties. As the
Citigroup decision illustrates, Delaware judges still insulate public company
directors from civil liability through resolute enforcement of the business
judgment rule, exculpatory charter provisions exonerating directors from
monetary damages, and generous indemnification rights.2 02 Shareholders do
not fare much better when they sue executives in federal court. Congress
and the United States Supreme Court have restricted shareholders' federal
remedies over the past three decades. On the civil side, then, the trend in the
law is against enforcement. From both a procedural and substantive per-
spective, fiduciary breaches by public company executives seem increasingly
likely to go unremedied under civil law. Yet, as I show next, corporate fidu-
ciaries face greater potential criminal liability under criminal law for
breaching these same state law duties.
'
9 See id at 1080.
199See id at 1068, 1084.
200See, e.g., John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on
Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534 (2006); James D. Cox, The Social
Meaning ofShareholder Suits, 65 BROOK. L. REV. 3, 38 (1999); cf Donald C. Langevoort, On
Leaving Corporate Executives "Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels": Corporate Fraud,
Equitable Remedies, and the Debate Over Entity Versus Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 627 (2007) (analyzing civil law remedies available to recover ill-gotten gains from executive
wrongdoers).
201See Thompson & Sale, supra note 159, at 896-97 (demonstrating that non-officer direc-
tors are rarely named as defendants in securities fraud actions).
202For more information, see supra Part U.B.
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IV. PROSECUTING BREACHES OF FIDUCIARY DUTY
AS CRIMINAL VIOLATIONS
Because shareholder litigation is an expensive but ineffective disci-
plinary device, civil enforcement of executives' fiduciary duties is deficient
in at least two important respects. First, such lawsuits do not seem to deter
opportunistic behavior and dishonesty by public company executives.
Second, the actions fail to provide incentives to outside directors to exercise
diligent monitoring that might detect, and even prevent, managerial
wrongdoing. Without any plausible threat of enforcement, liability rules
arguably cannot function, and certainly not optimally, to constrain fiduciary
opportunism. 203 Might criminal prosecutions against offending fiduciaries
fill this enforcement gap?
A. Prosecuting Corporate Executives for Honest Services Fraud
Federal prosecutors have used § 1346 to criminalize a progressively
wider range of conduct since its enactment in 1988. For the first decade, the
government employed the statute principally to prosecute public corruption,
indicting state legislators, political machine operatives, and, occasionally,
state governors. 204 Less common was prosecutors' use of § 1346 to combat
corporate fraud, self-dealing, or other unlawful activity arising in the purely
private sphere; 205 that is, until just after the turn of this century, when
206
Congress and the executive branch declared "war" on corporate crime.
Criminal indictments of public company executives increased at that time,
with prosecutors charging, among the myriad of other federal crimes,
violations of § 1346.207
203See supra Part M.D.
204FOr example, in April 2009, a federal grand jury indicted former Illinois Governor Rod
Blagojevich on eleven counts of wire fraud arising from an alleged scheme to deprive Illinois of his
honest services. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Former Illinois Gov. Rod R. Blagojevich,
His Brother, Two Former Top Aides and Two Businessmen Indicted on Federal Corruption Charges
Alleging Pervasive Fraud (Apr. 2, 2009), available at www.usdoj.gov/usao/iln/pr/chicago/2009/
pr04020l.pdf.
20 Research revealed few reported decisions charging corporate officers with honest services
fraud in the late 1990s. See United States v. Skeddle, 940 F. Supp. 1146, 1148 (N.D. Ohio 1996)
(charging senior officers ofLibbey-Owens-Ford Co. with alleged undisclosed self-dealing); United
States v. Brennan, 938 F. Supp. 1111, 1115, 1125 (E.D.N.Y. 1996) (prosecuting former president
and CEO of United States Aviation Underwriters, Inc. for mail fraud), rev'd, 183 F.3d 139 (2d Cir.
1999).
206See The Unlikeliest Scourge-Bush and Big Business, ECONOMIST, July 13, 2002, at 26.
2
oKathleen F. Brickey, From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After




The catalysts for more aggressive criminal enforcement were, of
course, Enron and WorldCom-or, more precisely, revelations of massive
financial frauds, shameful management self-dealing, and even outright
looting by executives of those corporations and other of the countrys largest
208
public companies. Enron collapsed first. Stock prices fell. WorldCom
failed six months later, and its bankruptcy, just six months after Enron's
failure, caused capital to flee the stock markets. Between the two then-
largest corporate bankruptcies in history came weekly, even daily, news that
yet another public company had discovered misstatements in its prior
financial reports and would have to file restatements. Some of those
companies include Adelphia, Xerox, Global Crossing, Lucent, Qwest, and
Rite Aid. Meanwhile, as Congress held hearings to dissect Enron's
fraudulent financial reporting and off-balance sheet entities, abusive execu-
tive loans, and other conflict-of-interest transactions, the media reported on
the gross misuse of corporate funds by top officers of other public com-
panies. Otherwise reputable corporate boards, comprised mostly of outside
directors, claimed that they, too, were deceived by corrupt CEOs, CFOs, and
other senior officers. Stock prices fell further. The public voiced outrage,
and commentators urged criminal prosecutions for those responsible. Even
Fortune magazine's cover declared: "They lie, they cheat, they steal and
they've been getting away with it for too long. "v209
In July 2002, with share prices and investors' confidence in a free fall
and mid-term elections fast approaching, Democrats and Republicans alike
called for the scalps of public company executives. Both the White House
and Congress, reacting quickly to WorldCom's devastating announcement,
developed and championed policies promoting the aggressive prosecution of
corrupt officers. Looking to distance himself from Enron and its former
chairman Kenneth Lay, a supporter and family friend, President George W.
Bush got out of the gate first.210 Vowing that his administration would "put
the bad guys in prison and take away their money," 2 1 1 the president
established the Corporate Fraud Task Force (CFTF) by executive order on
July 9, 2002.212 "[W]e will use the full weight of the law to expose and root
2081d
209 Clifton Leaf, Enough Is Enough, FORTUNE, Mar. 18, 2002, cover.
2 10See, e.g., The Unlikeliest Scourge, supra note 206, at 26 (referring to creation of DOJ
"financial-crimes SWAT team").21
'Paula Dwyer, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide, Bus. WK., Oct. 14, 2002, at 44
(quoting Deputy Attorney General Larry Thompson).
212See Exec. Order No. 13,271, 67 Fed. Reg. 46,091 (July 9, 2002).
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out corruption," he said that day.2 13 "My administration will do everything
in our power to end the days of cooking the books, shading the truth and
breaking our laws." 2 14 Notably, President Bush also called on Congress to
"give the Administration new powers to enforce corporate responsibility and
to improve oversight of corporate America" including, as its first request,
"[t]ough new criminal penalties for mail and wire fraud."2 15
Just two weeks after President Bush established the CFTF, Congress
passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX). 2 16 SOX boosted criminal
enforcement by creating new crimes punishing securities fraud (without
proof of technical elements otherwise required under the securities laws),
conspiracy to commit mail, wire, or securities fraud (without proof of an
217 218
overt act), obstruction of justice, and retaliation against whistle-
blowers.2 19 Following enactment of SOX, criminal penalties also could be
imposed on CEOs and CFOs who knowingly or willfully certified false
financial statements. 220 Additionally, Congress quadrupled the maximum
prison term for mail and wire fraud to twenty years,2 21 doubled (from ten to
twenty years) the maximum prison term for securities fraud, and directed the
U.S. Sentencing Commission to revise the sentencing guidelines to lengthen
sentences for public company officers and directors convicted of fraud.222
Importantly, Sarbanes-Oxley did almost nothing to enhance private
enforcement of fiduciaries' obligations.2 23 In the wake of Enron, WorldCom,
and the rest, Congress created no new civil rules or remedies to discipline
213President George W. Bush, Address Calling for New Era of Corporate Responsibility
(July 9, 2002), available at http://transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0207/09/se.02.html.
2 141d
2 
"White House Website, President's Ten-Point Plan, http://georgewbush-whitehouse.
archives.gov/infocus/corporateresponsibility/index2.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2009) (emphasis
added).
2 16Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered
sections of 15 and 18 U.S.C.). This article does not examine the corporate governance regulations
included in SOX.
2 171d § 902(a) (adding 18 U.S.C. § 1349, conspiracy and attempt).
21Id. § 805.
219Id § 1107.
220Sarbanes-Oxley Act §§ 302, 906.2211d. § 903.222Id. § 1104. When Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley, the "popular imagination" was that
"white-collar criminals spend a couple of years in a country-club jail and emerge, reborn, as earnest
philanthropists-like, say, Michael Milken, who was convicted during America's last big corporate
crime wave, in the 1980s, and spent just two years in jail." Bosses Behind Bars, ECONOMIST,
Sept. 21, 2004, at 1.
223The only reform directed to improving private enforcement was extending the statute of
limitations for securities fraud claims. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 804 (lengthening statute of limita-
tions from one to two years and the period of repose from three to five years).
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executives who breach their fiduciary duties.224 Public company fiduciaries
still faced little risk of civil liability, regardless of their culpability or harm to
the corporations they managed. Despite the recognized need to punish cor-
rupt acts and hold responsible executives more accountable, shareholder
litigation remained politically disfavored as a deterrent.225 In contrast, even




Although government lawyers suffered several embarrassing defeats,
the Justice Department recorded an unprecedented number of successful
227 hecv 'prosecutions of corporate executives. From the CFTF's inception through
January 6, 2009, federal prosecutors obtained nearly 1,300 corporate fraud
convictions,228 most of which (1,236) came in its first five years of operation.
Among the convicted felons were more than 200 chief executive officers and
presidents, more than 120 corporate vice presidents, and more than 50 chief
financial officers. In addition to jail terms, sentencing judges also imposed
substantial financial penalties on convicted executives, including criminal
fines, restitution, and forfeiture. Indeed, the DOJ obtained more than $1
billion in forfeitures from defendants convicted of financial offenses.229
While federal prosecutors have charged executives with a host of
230 * n
criminal violations, mail and wire fraud counts appeared in many, if not
most, indictments. To be sure, the vast majority of mail and wire counts
224See Lisa M. Fairfax, Spare the Rod, Spoil the Director? Revitalizing Directors
Fiduciary Duty Through Legal Liability, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 393, 395, 405-07 (2005).
225For the same reason, Delaware legislators and judges have taken almost no action to make
responsible directors and officers more accountable for breaching their fiduciary duties.
226At a press conference in July 2002, Chamber President Tom Donahue pounded his fist on
a table and demanded, "Put 'em in jail!" The Unlikeliest Scourge, supra note 206, at 26.
227See William Donaldson, Chairman, SEC & Larry Thompson, Deputy Attorney Gen.,
Press Briefing (July 22, 2003), available at http//www.justice.gov/dag/cftf/press/072203whitehouse
cfbriefing.htm ("Before the task force was created, . . . [the DOJ] didn't keep statistics with respect
to corporate fraud in a discreet [sic] manner. They were lumped in with other white collar criminal
activity.").
228Press Release, Dep't of Justice, President's Corporate Fraud Task Force Adds Six New
Member Agencies (Jan. 6, 2009), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opalpr/2009/January/09-odag-
003.html.2291d
230See id ("Prosecutors ... have brought charges for accounting fraud, securities fraud,
insider trading, market manipulation, wire fraud, obstruction of justice, false statements, money
laundering, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act violations, stock option backdating and conspiracy,
among things.").
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alleged deprivations of money and property. A number of indictments,
however, also included mail and wire fraud counts alleging deprivations of
honest services, including, most notably, many of the indictments charging
former Enron executives. It seems that government lawyers often allege
mail and wire frauds, including honest services fraud, because the statutes
are versatile, and the violations serve as predicate offenses for money
laundering and/or racketeering under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organization Act (RICO) charges. By indicting and convicting the corporate
executive for money laundering or RICO, prosecutors can seek criminal
forfeiture of the ill-gotten gains still in the executive's possession and
control.
Unfortunately, we can only estimate the number of corporate execu-
tives charged with honest services fraud. The DOJ's Statistics Bureau does
not treat honest services fraud as a crime separate from mail fraud and wire
fraud.2 31 Thus, government records do not distinguish indictments alleging
honest services deprivations under § 1346 from those relying solely on
money or property theories under §§ 1341 and 1343.232 Nonetheless, using
online resources,233 I developed a noncomprehensive catalog of the corporate
executives charged with honest services fraud after 2000. Available records
indicate that federal prosecutors charged at least 113 corporate officers,
directors, and other senior corporate officers with violating § 1346. Among
the indicted were at least twenty-five chief executive officers, about a third
of whom served as chairmen of the board. Also charged were at least six
non-chair directors, five presidents, four chief operating officers, fifteen
23
'Because § 1346 is a definitional provision that expanded the scope of mail and wire
fraud, information on the government's use of § 1346 is not captured systematically. Obtaining data
directly from district court dockets proved underinclusive as well; honest services fraud charges
often are omitted from docket entries due to inconsistent charging conventions and docketing prac-
tices. In the absence of a searchable public data base containing the texts of all federal indictments,
any comprehensive analysis of § 1346 usage is subject to error.
232See U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, Federal Justice Statistics, http://
www. ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/fed.htm (last visited Dec. 12, 2009).
233The listing of corporate executives charged with honest services fraud (and available from
the author) was compiled by searching a variety of online databases. Westlaw's docket database was
searched for federal dockets mentioning 18 U.S.C. § 1346 or "honest services." Next, the indict-
ments from potentially relevant dockets were cross-checked to identify defendants alleged to be
corporate executives. The results were incomplete, however, as many relevant dockets do not
explicitly reference § 1346 or honest services. The original listing then was supplemented with
additional prosecutions found on the CFTF webpage at the DOJ's website (especially its "Significant
Criminal Cases and Charging Documents" heading), the DOJ's media releases, and other major
media outlets. These resources also provided names of corporate executives charged with mail and
wire fraud and court filing information. Finally, indictments were accessed and reviewed to deter-
mine whether the charges included honest services fraud.
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chief financial officers, and twenty-six vice-presidents and executive vice-
presidents.234 Many of these defendants were former executives of com-
panies that were the subjects of well-publicized frauds, including Enron,
Adelphia, Rite Aid, AOL, and Qwest. In addition to Conrad Black2 35 and
Jeff Skilling,23 6 the defendants included other now well-known executives:
Enron's Andrew FastoW23 and Richard Causey,238 Adelphia's John Rigas,239
and HealthSouth's Richard Scrushy, 24 0 who was acquitted of all charges
following ajury trial in 2005. Also convicted of honest services fraud were
many professionals who advised top management, such as attorneys and
investment bankers. To the extent the charging documents identified a
specific duty breached, the indictments alleged breaches of the duty of
loyalty.
In 2006, federal prosecutors also began charging honest services fraud
in high-profile prosecutions of corporate executives accused of "backdating"
stock options. 24 ' Nonetheless, after President Bush's second term began, the
number of corporate executives charged with honest services fraud
declined, 24 2 in parallel with the reported decline in major corporate fraud
indictments overall.243 Since other evidence indicates that use of § 1346 for
public corruption remained high,2 " the observed decline likely reflects the
overall decline in corporate fraud prosecutions during the same period.245
234TIle remainder included at least six general counsel, one corporate treasurer, a chief
accounting officer, and various managers, owners, controllers, division directors, and other senior
personnel.
235United States v. Black, 526 F. Supp. 2d 870 (N.D. Ill. 2007), affd, 530 F.3d 596 (7th Cir.
2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2379 (U.S. May 18, 2009) (No. 08-876).
236United States v. Causey, No. H-04-025, 2004 WL 2414438 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 19, 2004),
affdsub. nom. United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2009), cert granted, 130 S. Ct. 393
(U.S. Oct. 13, 2009) (No. 08-1394).
23 7United States v. Fastow, No. H-02-0665 (S.D. Tex. filed Oct. 31, 2002).
238Causey, 2004 WL 2414438.
239United States v. Rigas, No. 02-CR-1236, 2004 WL 2434965 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2004),
affd, 583 F.3d 108 (2d Cir. 2009).
240United States v. Scrushy, No. CR-03-BE-0530-S (N.D. Ala. filed Oct. 29, 2003).
241See, e.g., United States v. Nicholas, No. SACR 08-00139,2008 WL 5233199 (C.D. Cal.
Dec. 15,2008). "Backdating" options refers to the practice of setting the grant dateretroactively to a
date when the stock traded at a lower price, thereby creating an instant paper gain for the recipient.
242From 2002 to 2005, the CFTF averaged over 119 indictments annually. From 2006 to
2007, the annual average appears to have dropped to approximately 13. See Daphne Eviatar, Case
Closed?, AM. LAW., Fall 2007, at 19, 21.
243Id. at 30 (reporting 2007 year-to-date number ofwhite-collar filings was 64% lower than
the 2006 number and 77% lower than the 2004 number).
244For example, a Westlaw search for federal dockets referencing honest services fraud or §
1346 returned 107 cases from 2008, up from 86 in 2007, and greater than the previous high of 95
from 2005. This number exceeds the 2002-2004 average of 86.7 cases per year. While the search
cannot be viewed as comprehensive, it does indicate that the decline in honest services fraud
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B. Procedural Advantages to Criminal Prosecution
For public company executives, the federal government's political
commitment to fight corporate fraud through aggressive criminal enforce-
ment is troubling enough. But political will aside, government lawyers have
significant procedural advantages in criminal cases that lead to sizeable
conviction rates. First, prosecutors have the authority to make charging
decisions. They determine not only whom to charge but whether and which
crimes to charge in any particular case. Government lawyers generally also
have the authority to negotiate plea agreements and accept pleas from
defendants. Through their authority over charges and dispositions, the law
gives prosecutors power to determine the defendant's likely punishment. As
they exercise this substantial discretion, prosecutors have the sprawling
federal criminal code at their disposal. Critics have long complained that the
federal criminal code arms prosecutors with a quasi-legislative, adminis-
trative license to brand as "criminal" a variety of non-violent conduct. This
prosecutorial power-and its potential for abuse-persists apart from the
lack of congressional specificity in drafting § 1346.
Furthermore, prosecutors receive near-total cooperation from grand
juries, which rarely refuse to return requested indictments.246 Commentators
attribute prosecutors' success rate to the grand juries' dependence on prose-
cutors. Grand juries largely have become passive bodies dependent on
government lawyers to provide relevant evidence. 24 7 Prosecutors, moreover,
need not present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury.248 As a result, "the
grand jury, having been conceived as a bulwark between the citizen and the
Government, is now a tool of the Executive."2 4 9  More colorfully, Sol
Wachtler, former chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals, once
indictments is best explained by an overall decline in corporate fraud prosecutions, rather than a
decline in the use of § 1346.
245See, e.g., Eviatar, supra note 242, at 21 (discussing decline in corporate fraud
prosecutions following President George W. Bush's re-election in 2004, reporting that "corporate
fraud indictments slowed to a trickle" by 2007).
246An analysis of the 785 federal grand juries impaneled in 1991 revealed that grand jurors
refused to return indictments in only 16 of 25,943 cases (less than 0.1%). Roger Roots, IfIt's Not a
Runaway, It's Not a Real Grand Jury, 33 CREIGHTON L. REV. 821, 827-28 (2000). A 1984 study
found only 68 rejections out of 17,419 cases (0.4%). Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do
Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 274-75 (1995).
1
47Geraldine Szott Moohr, Prosecutorial Power in an Adversarial System: Lessons from
Current White Collar Cases and the Inquisitorial Model, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 165, 203-04
(2004).
248Id at 204.
249United States v. Mara, 410 U.S. 19, 23 (1973) (Douglas, J., dissenting); see Kevin K.
Washburn, Restoring the Grand Jury, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 2333,2352 n.99 (2008) (detailing the
extent to which grand juries are viewed as "rubber stamps").
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suggested that prosecutors could convince a grand jury to indict a ham
sandwich.2 50
Motions to dismiss also pose little threat to prosecutors' criminal
charges. Unlike shareholder plaintiffs, who must plead fraud with height-
ened particularity in both state and federal court, prosecutors need only
provide a "plain, concise, and definite written statement of the essential facts
constituting the offense charged." 25 1 In contrast to the requirements under
Delaware law and the PSLRA, courts do not analyze the sufficiency of any
factual allegations, and scienter and causation need not be plead at all, much
less with great specificity. The government need not allege its theory of the
case or specify its supporting evidence,2 52 and no law requires that the
government plead or prove harm, loss, or damage to anyone. To survive
dismissal, the indictment need only (1) contain the elements of the offense
charged, (2) inform the defendant of the nature of the charges against him in
order to allow him to prepare an adequate defense, and (3) be specific
enough to preclude subsequent prosecutions for the same offense.253
Indictments very rarely fail this modest pleading standard. Thus, trial courts
routinely deny criminal defendants' motions to dismiss after relatively per-
254functory hearings.
Rather than proceeding to trial, however, most criminal cases con-
clude with the defendant pleading guilty to one or more charges. According
to government statistics, federal prosecutors obtained some sort of conviction
in 90% of all federal criminal cases closed from 2005 through 2007, and
nearly all of those convictions, 96%, were obtained through guilty pleas.255
250See Washburn, supra note 249, at 2352 & n.99.
251FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c)(1).
252See, e.g., United States v. Vega, 309 F. Supp. 2d 609, 616 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that
the government need not "disclos[e] the manner in which it will attempt to prove the charges, the
precise manner in which the defendant committed the crimes charged, or a preview of the
Government's evidence or legal theories").
253See, e.g., Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 117 (1974); United States v.
Hausmann, 345 F.3d 952, 955 (7th Cir. 2003); see also United States v. deVegter, 198 F.3d 1324,
1330 (11 th Cir. 1999) (finding honest services fraud indictment sufficient even when government
failed to allege defendant owed any fiduciary duty).
2540f the cases which charged § 1341 or § 1343 violations that closed from 2005 through
2007, 7.8% ended in dismissals (or nolle prosequi). See STATISTICS Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 81 tbl.D-4 (2007), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/stats/dec7/DO4DecG7.pdf; STATISTICS Div., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 81 tbl.D-4 (2006), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/stats/dec6/DO4DecO6.pdf; STATISTICS DIV., ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S.
COURTS, STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY 81 tbl.D-4 (2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/stats/dec05/DO4decG5.pdf.255See infra note 254.
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The numbers are even higher in cases charging mail and wire fraud;
prosecutors racked up a 91.4% conviction rate during that time.256
Federal prosecutors' substantial record of success underscores the
importance of the Supreme Court's upcoming review of § 1346 for corporate
fiduciaries. How might the Court narrow or even eliminate honest services
fraud as a substantive criminal offense? The next section addresses these
questions.
V. THE EVOLVING CRIME OF HONEST SERVICES FRAUD
Before analyzing the complex interpretive problems facing the
Supreme Court-puzzles that have confounded federal appellate courts for
two decades-Part V begins by exploring the statute's origins, including the
antecedent development of the intangible rights theory that preceded the
enactment of § 1346. As the lower federal courts have recognized, the
statute cannot be understood without reference to Congress's overall scheme
for prohibiting fraud through use of the mails and wires. 25 7
A. A Brief History of Honest Services Fraud.5
Although honest services fraud had an inauspicious beginning, the
doctrine unexpectedly grew "like a kudzu vine"25 9 in the late 1970s and the
1980s before the Supreme Court took action to prune it back in 1987. The
next year, however, Congress responded to the Supreme Court's decision to
eliminate honest services fraud by enacting § 1346. Since then, honest
services fraud has become increasingly prominent in prosecutions of both
public corruption and corporate crime.260
216See infra note 254.
257See United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 519 (5th Cir. 2006) ("[Section 1346] can be
understood only in the light of the long history of the mail- and wire-fraud statutes, which were
intentionally written broadly to protect the mail and, later, the wires from being used to initiate
fraudulent schemes.").
258See Casey, supra note 23, at 179-206 (describing the judicial and legislative history of
honest services fraud, including its mail and wire fraud antecedents, and citing background articles).
Class Action Criminality examines the DOJ's prosecution of the Milberg Weiss law firm and its four
senior partners for honest services fraud. The government indicted the defendants for sharing court-
awarded attorneys' fees with their clients who served as named plaintiffs in securities fraud class
actions. Because the indictments centered on alleged breaches of "fiduciary duties" not recognized
under state or federal law, the article concluded that government lawyers overreached by grounding
their prosecution on honest services fraud. Id. at 225-34.
...John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: The Restoration ofthe Public/Private Distinc-
tion, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 427, 427 (1998) (analogizing honest services fraud to the kudzu vine).26See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PUBLIC INTEGRrY SECTION, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE
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Initially, it is important to identify honest services fraud as a species of
mail and wire fraud.2 6' Indeed, some of the interpretive issues associated
with honest services fraud follow from the controversial features of the mail
26
and wire fraud statutes.262 The federal mail and wire fraud laws have gener-
ated disapproval and debate ever since Congress enacted the first such
statute in 1872,263 criminalizing fraudulent mail schemes apparently
perpetrated by urban "flimflam artists264 and "rapscallions" against "the
innocent people in the country." 26 5 Described as a "first line of defense" to
new frauds, the statute's broad language has been rationalized as "a stopgap
device to deal on a temporary basis with the new phenomenon, until
particularized legislation can be developed and passed to deal directly with
the evil."2 66 Nonetheless, the malleability of the mail and wire fraud statutes
has engendered significant criticism. Detractors have described the statutes
as creating "essentially element-free criminal liability," enabling prosecutors
to employ "virtually unbridled discretion" to combat "virtually every type of
untoward activity known to man."2 6 7
In the post-Watergate 1970s, government lawyers persuaded the
federal courts to extend the reach of the mail and wire fraud statutes to
prosecute public officials who allegedly had deprived the public, not of
money or property, but of the public's "intangible right" to the officials'
ACTIvITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION FOR 2007, at 18-19 (2007),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/pin; U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF
FEDERAL SENTENCING STATISTICS FOR 1998, at 22-23, 30 (1998), available at http://www.
ussc.gov/annrpts.htm (sentences under U.S.S.G. § 2C1.7 (2004)). Both sources separately track
only public corruption honest services fraud prosecutions. Nonetheless, the growing body of private
honest services fraud case law demonstrates a parallel, if not greater, trend in the private arena.
261See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2006) (mail fraud); id § 1343 (wire fraud). Sections 1341 and
1343 are construed to require (1) a scheme to defraud, (2) intent to deprive another of money or
property, and (3) use of the mails (or wires) in furtherance of that scheme. See, e.g., United States
v. Turner, 465 F.3d 667, 680 (6th Cir. 2006).
262Section 1346 "can be understood only in the light of the long history of the mail- and
wire-fraud statutes, which were intentionally written broadly to protect the mail and, later, the wires
from being used to initiate fraudulent schemes." Brown, 459 F.3d at 519.
263See Daniel W. Hurson, Comment, Mail Fraud, The Intangible Rights Doctrine, and the
Infusion ofState Law: A Bermuda Triangle ofSorts, 38 Hous. L. REv. 297, 302 (2001) (calling
"the mail fraud statute one of the most criticized yet utilized of federal criminal statutes").
264United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920, 931 (2d Cir. 1981) (Van Graafeiland, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he statute was originally aimed at flimflam artists who use the mails to defraud the
gullible."); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights Doctrine: Someone to
Watch Over Us, 31 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 158 (1994) (discussing original enactment of the mail
fraud statute to address sending counterfeit currency through the mail).
26 5McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 41st Cong.,
3d Sess. 35 (1870) (remarks of Rep. Farnsworth)).
266United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
267See, e.g., Daniel J. Hurson, Limiting the Federal Mail Fraud Statute-A Legislative
Approach, 20 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 423, 424-25, 436 (1983).
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"honest services." 26 8 Judicial opinions sanctioning this new theory often
used broad, aspirational language to describe the duties owed by an elected
official to her constituents.2 69 Courts largely agreed with Justice Department
prosecutors that the citizenry had the "right to conscientious, loyal, faithful,
disinterested and honest government."270 A scheme to defraud citizens of
those rights that involves "bribery and non-disclosure and concealment of
material information ... [then] may come within the purview of the federal
mail fraud statute even though no state or federal statute or common law is
transgressed in terms."271
Prosecutors gradually expanded the intangible rights theory of mail
fraud to cases beyond the public sphere-that is, to cases involving purely
private relationships. Grounding charges on breaches of the duty of loyalty,
prosecutors charged employees with honest services fraud,272 later adapting
the theory to other principal-agent relationships.273 Government prosecutors
found the statute useful particularly when a putative victim suffered no
financial or property loss; indeed, some victims were not even threatened
with such losses.274
By the early 1980s, the Justice Department had invoked the honest
services theory to charge private fiduciaries for failing to divulge their
conflicts of interest. Because fiduciary duty law is especially "soft-edged
and aspirational," 27 5 predicating criminal liability on fiduciary breaches-
268See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 591 F.2d 1347, 1362 (4thCir. 1979) (litigation against
governor of Maryland), vacated, 602 F.2d 653 (4th Cir. 1979) (en banc); United States v. Isaacs,
493 F.2d 1124, 1149-50 (7th Cir. 1974) (litigation against governor of Illinois).
269See, e.g., Mandel, 591 F.2d at 1361 (explaining that mail fraud statute could be used to
prosecute any "scheme involving deception that employs the mails in its execution that is contrary to
public policy and conflicts with accepted standards of moral uprightness, fundamental honesty, fair
play and right dealing").
270d at 1359.
2Id. at 1359-60 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
272See, e.g., United States v. Conner, 752 F.2d 566,569-72 (1Ith Cir. 1985); United States
v. George, 477 F.2d 508 (7th Cir. 1973); cf United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 519 (5th Cir.
2006) ("'Honest services are services owed to an employer under state law,' including fiduciary
duties defined by the employer-employee relationship." (quoting United States v. Caldwell, 302 F.3d
399,409 (5th Cir. 2002)).
23See, e.g., United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1981) (attorney-client
relationship).
274See, e.g., United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 121 (2d Cir. 1982) ("In the private
sector, it is now a commonplace that a breach of fiduciary duty in violation of the mail fraud statute
may be based on artifices which do not deprive any person of money or other forms of tangible
property.").
251john C. Coffee, Jr., Paradigms Lost: The Blurring of the Criminal and Civil Law
Models-And What Can Be Done About It, 101 YALE L.J. 1875, 1879 (1992); see also Margiotta,
688 F.2d at 142 (Winter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("The words fiduciary duty are
no more than a legal conclusion and the legal obligations actually imposed under that label vary
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and particularly on alleged failures to disclose conflicts of interest-greatly
expanded the reach of the mail and wire fraud laws. The honest services
theory threatened to morph the mail and wire fraud statutes into mandatory
conflict of interest disclosure laws with criminal sanctions for violation.276
The Supreme Court halted the government's expansion of the intan-
gible rights theory in 1987, if only briefly. In McNally v. United States,277 a
public corruption case, the Court held that the mail and wire fraud statutes
prohibited only deprivations of money or property, not the "intangible right
of the citizenry to good government." 2 78 There, federal prosecutors indicted
two Kentucky officials for directing that the Commonwealth buy insurance
through an agent who then shared his commissions with an agency partly
owned by one of the officials. 2 79 This undisclosed arrangement allowed the
owner-defendant to profit from the transactions, 2 8 0 although nothing in the
record suggested that Kentucky paid inflated premiums or received sub-
281
standard insurance. Without any claim involving the deprivation of prop-
282
erty or money, the Court reversed the defendants' convictions. Despite the
statute's historically broad construction, the Court concluded that § 1341 did
not criminalize deprivations of intangible rights to honest services.283
In reaching its conclusion, the Court reasoned:
[W]hen there are two rational readings of a criminal statute,
one harsher than the other, we are to choose the harsher only
when Congress has spoken in clear and definite language. As
the Court said in a mail fraud case years ago: "There are no
constructive offenses; and before one can be punished, it must
be shown that his case is plainly within the statute." Rather
than construe the statute in a manner that leaves its outer
boundaries ambiguous and involves the Federal Government in
greatly from relationship to relationship... . Partners, employees, trustees and corporate directors are
all fiduciaries, yet their legal obligations may be wholly dissimilar.").
276See, e.g., Hurson, supra note 267, at 429.
Almost any action undertaken by a fiduciary, agent, or employee which causes
detriment to his beneficiary, principal, or employer and which involves some
material deception, will likely trigger a responsibility to make disclosure. Failure to
disclose will be construed as a breach of fiduciary duty and subject the actor to
federal prosecution for mail fraud.
Id.
277483 U.S. 350 (1987).
2n1d. at 356.
2"Id. at 352-53.
280 d. at 360-61.




DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
setting standards of disclosure and good government for local
and state officials, we read § 1341 as limited in scope to the
protection of property rights. If Congress desires to go further,
it must speak more clearly than it has.284
In this brief paragraph, the McNally Court identified a number of interrelated
concerns about honest services fraud, including lenity, the need to clearly
define the criminalized conduct, fair notice, separation of powers, and re-
spect for federalism.
At the urging of the Justice Department, Congress responded to
285McNally by enacting § 1346 the next year. The statute reads, in its entire-
ty: "For the purposes of [mail and wire fraud], the term'scheme or artifice to
defraud' includes a scheme or artifice to deprive another of the intangible
right of honest services." 2 86 There is no reliable legislative history to guide
the courts as to the meaning of this language, and Congress has never
amended the statute. Thus, Congress left federal courts with numerous inter-
pretive questions. What is the "intangible right of honest services"? Whose
right is it? Where does the right come from, and must the right be recog-
nized under state law? Who must do the "depriving"? Must there be some
tangible harm to a victim or economic benefit to the defendant?
From its enactment and continuing through today, courts and com-
mentators have complained about the statute repeatedly. According to its
critics, § 1346 is too "vague and undefined," 2 87 "amorphous and open-
ended." 2 88 Because its language "provides no perimeters" 2 89 for prosecutors,
the statute, if read literally, could criminalize any dishonesty by an employ-
ee 2 90 Defendants, along with some jurists and academics, have argued that
these defects render the statute unconstitutional, although no appellate court
has struck down the statute. 2 9 1 Thus, while passage of § 1346 satisfied
284Id. at 359-60 (internal citations omitted).
285For more detail on the statute's limited legislative history, see Casey, supra note 23, at
186-88.
28618 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).287United States v. Urciuoli, 513 F.3d 290, 294 (1st Cir. 2008).
288United States v. Sorich, 523 F.3d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 2008).
289United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 519 (5th Cir. 2006).
29 United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 368 (6th Cir. 1997); see also United States v.
Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 940 (9th Cir. 2009) ("[R]ead literally, [§1346] would make a
crime of the nondisclosure of virtually every breach of any public or private employment
relationship-turning §1346 into a 'draconian personnel regulation' that transforms private and
governmental 'workplace violations into felonies"' (quoting Julie R. O'Sullivan, The Federal
Criminal "Code" is a Digrace: Obstruction Statutes as Case Study, 96 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOL-
OGY 643, 663 (2006))).
2 9
'Although a panel of the Second Circuit determined the law to be unconstitutional, United
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Congress's reflexive need to respond to the Court's invitation to "speak more
clearly," the statute actually did little to address the concerns that animated
McNally. Indeed, as I argue next, enactment of § 1346 actually jumbled
some pieces of the honest services puzzle.292
B. Private Honest Services Fraud
In the two decades since § 1346 became law, courts have grappled
with many of the same issues that confounded them before Congress enacted
the statute. Courts agree only that Congress intended to overturn the result
in McNally.29 3 They dispute how much pre-McNally case law-an inco-
herent body of decisions-was resurrected.294 And no courts have concurred
as to whether they should construe § 1346 as addressing the policy concerns
raised in McNally. Consequently, appellate courts have not only failed to
agree on the statute's scope, but the promulgation of § 1346 created even
more doctrinal disarray.
This part examines key pieces of the honest services fraud puzzle,
paying particular attention to how the issues likely will present themselves to
the Supreme Court in Black, Weyhrauch, and Skilling. Where applicable, I
also identify points of friction with Delaware corporate law. Finally, I con-
sider how specific interpretive problems-and their potential resolution by
the Court this Term-affect the standards of conduct applicable to public
company executives.
1. The Fiduciary Duty Requirement
Defendants who may have breached their fiduciary duties in purely
private transactions (and even defendants who transacted business with
them) confront acute complexity in ascertaining the breadth of § 1346.
States v. Handakas, 286 F.3d 92, 112 (2d Cir. 2002), overruled by United States v. Rybicki (Rybicki
II), 354 F.3d 124 (2d Cir. 2003) (en banc), the Second Circuit reviewed a similar challenge en banc
shortly thereafter and upheld the constitutionality of§ 1346. Rybicki ll, 354 F.3d at 144. Further-
more, other decisions have implied that the constitutional question is close. The Fifth Circuit
described decisions upholding the statute against vagueness challenges as having "divined [clarity]
from a jumble of disparate cases." Brown, 459 F.3d at 523.
292See Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d at 939-40. "'The 'intangible rights' theory [of honest
services fraud] has been a subject of controversy in the history of the federal mail and wire fraud
statutes,' and, we would add, it continues to cause controversy despite (or perhaps because of)
Congress's statutory abrogation of McNally." Id (quoting United States v. Williams, 441 F.3d 716,
721 (9th Cir. 2006)).
'
9 Rybicki II, 354 F.3d at 136.
294See Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d at 939 (listing the holdings of the different circuits
regarding the extent to which enactment of the statute resurrected pre-McNally case law).
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Courts generally concur that honest services fraud requires more than a
simple breach of contract, or even breach of the covenant of good faith
inherent in contractual relationships.29 5 Although § 1346 does not mention
fiduciaries, courts usually restrict honest services fraud to situations where
someone (but not always the defendant) owed a fiduciary duty to provide
honest services to the victim. 29 6 Many opinions also emphasize that not
every breach of fiduciary duty constitutes an honest services fraud.297 That
said, the courts have failed to reach consensus on the doctrinal boundary
between fiduciary breach and federal felony. Part of the difficulty arises
from using fiduciary duty as the benchmark for liability. Fiduciary relations,
and their attendant duties, are highly fact-sensitive associations. 29 8 However,
courts also have created confusion by applying a variety of approaches to the
basic statutory construction problem. Multiple methodologies have led to
irregular, and even conflicting, interpretations. This problem, of course, is
not unique to § 1346, or even statutory construction generally. In this con-
text, however, with the liberty of fiduciaries at stake, the courts' inconsistent
approaches raise acute concerns. A defendant's freedom should not depend
on the vagaries of geography or a potentially idiosyncratic application of
prosecutorial discretion.
To date, the seminal case construing § 1346 is the Second Circuit's en
banc decision in United States v. Rybicki. 299 While widely cited, the court's
opinion ultimately leaves a number of the most vexing interpretive issues-
issues especially important to corporate fiduciaries-unresolved. In fact, the
decision's analysis seems to have added further confusion to an already
convoluted jurisprudence.
The defendants in Rybicki, two law firm partners, secretly paid
insurance adjusters, encouraging them to process their clients' claims more
295See, e.g., Handakas, 286 F.3d at 106-07; United States v. deVetger, 198 F.3d 1324, 1328
(1 Ith Cir. 1999) ("Most private sector interactions do not involve duties of, or right to, the 'honest
services' of either party.").
296See, e.g., United States v. Turner, 465 F.3d 667, 675 (6th Cir. 2006) (noting that pre-
McNally case law also required the "finding of a fiduciary duty owed by the defendant to the
victim").
297See United States v. Carpenter, 791 F.2d 1024, 1035 (2d Cir. 1986), affd, 484 U.S. 19
(1987).
298See United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 142 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
2
"The case was originally heard by a panel in United States v. Rybicki (Rybicki 1), 287 F.3d
257 (2d Cir. 2002), but was later heard en banc in United States v. Rybicki (Rybicki II), 354 F.3d




quickly. 3 00 Prosecutors did not allege that the adjusters paid more on the
claims submitted by the defendants' clients, nor did they charge that the
defendants themselves breached any duties. Nonetheless, the government
indicted the two partners for honest services fraud on the theory that the
defendants' bribes deprived the insurance companies of the honest services
of their employee adjusters. 30 ' Affirming the defendants' convictions, the
court attempted to synthesize the extant (especially pre-McNally) private
honest services case law by dividing the earlier opinions into two categories:
(1) bribes or kickbacks; and (2) self-dealing.302
The bribery/kickback cases included prosecutions in which "a
defendant who has or seeks some sort of business relationship or transaction
with the victim secretly pays the victim's employee (or causes such a
payment to be made) in exchange for favored treatment."303 For this group,
the undisclosed bribery establishes the crime. By contrast, in self-dealing
cases, "the defendant typically causes his or her employer to do business
with a corporation or other enterprise in which the defendant has a secret
interest, undisclosed to the employer."4 The mere existence of a conflict of
interest, by itself, is not sufficient to support conviction. Instead, the defen-
dant's behavior also must harm or potentially harm the employer.
Regardless of whether the facts involve allegations of bribery/
kickbacks or self-dealing, the majority opinion described honest services
fraud as
a scheme or artifice to use the mails or wires to enable an
officer or employee of a private entity (or a person in a
relationship that gives rise to a duty of loyalty comparable to
that owed by employees to employers) purporting to act for and
in the interests of his or her employer (or of the person to
whom the duty ofloyalty is owed) secretly to act in his or her or
the defendant's own interests instead, accompanied by a
material misrepresentation made or omission of information
disclosed to the employer or other person.30 s




"Rybicki II, 354 F.3d at 140.305 d. at 141-42 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). With self-dealing, unlike bribery/
kickback cases, there was also "a requirement of proof that the conflict caused, or at least was
capable of causing, some detriment." Id at 142.
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Although the majority asserted that its interpretation did not leave "too much
uncontrolled discretion to police or prosecutors,"006 the dissenters sharply
disagreed.307 They criticized both the statute itself and the majority's
construction of § 1346.30s According to the dissent, § 1346 not only "flunks
the test for facial vagueness," but its text provides "insufficient constraint on
prosecutors, gives insufficient guidance to judges, and affords insufficient
notice to defendants."309 Specifically, the dissenters refuted the notion that
§ 1346 "has any settled or ascertainable meaning or that the offense it
describes has known contours.'310 As for the majority's now-seminal
opinion, the dissenters characterized it "as standardless as the statute
itself." 11  Indeed, the dissent argued that the majority's interpretation
effectively "criminaliz[ed] all material acts of dishonesty by employees or by
persons who owe analogous duties."3 12
While the dissent may have exaggerated the realistic impact of the
majority's construction, Rybicki II certainly muddied the doctrinal waters by
grounding § 1346 violations in breaches of the duty of loyalty313 without
even confronting the foundational question of what relationships give rise to
such a duty. In fact, the majority's analysis perpetuated (but, in fairness, did
not create) at least three controversies that have vexed courts.
First, the court failed to designate the body of law to which
prosecutors and subsequent courts should look for other "relationship[s] that
give[] rise to a duty of loyalty comparable to that owed by employees to
employers."3 14 Since the rights and duties governing employer-employee
relations generally arise under agency law, which is principally state law, it
might follow that prosecutors and courts should consult state law for
guidance on this question. But the Rybicki II majority left this question
unanswered.
Second, determining whether a person is "in a relationship that gives
rise to a duty of loyalty" is inherently fact-sensitive, creating imprecision and
serious complications when it is used to support criminal charges. As Judge
Winter emphasized before McNally, "The words fiduciary duty are no more
than a legal conclusion and the legal obligations actually imposed under that
3o.d. at 137 n.10.
307 d at 157-58 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).





31 Rybicki II, 354 F.3d at 164.
':'Id at 127 (majority opinion).
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label vary greatly from relationship to relationship.... Partners, employees,
trustees and corporate directors are all fiduciaries, yet their legal obligations
may be wholly dissimilar." 15  Yet, under current law, government
prosecutors can invoke the same statutory language (which, again, makes no
mention of fiduciaries or duties) to regulate not only relationships between
public officials and their constituents but also the myriad private relation-
ships that may give rise to a duty of loyalty.316 The text of § 1346 does not
differentiate between cases on the basis of their public or private context.
Finally, Rybicki Il enlarged liability for honest services fraud in a third
way. Without addressing the ramifications of doing so, the decision extend-
ed liability to persons who are not themselves fiduciaries to the fraud
victim.3 17 The Rybicki II defendants owed no fiduciary duties to the victim
deprived of honest services, i.e., the insurance carrier; rather, it was the
insurance adjuster employees who breached their duties by accepting the
bribes. In essence, the defendants aided and abetted the fiduciaries' breach
of loyalty.31 8 That the Second Circuit implicitly sanctioned this theory of
§ 1346 liability is highly problematic. Liability could extend to any person
who encouraged a fiduciary to breach her duties.
The Second Circuit's construction of § 1346 in Rybicki l, then, raises
the possibility, at least in theory, that "every violation of a fiduciary duty
becomes a federal crime."3 19 Worst yet, even transactions or relationships
with persons who violate their fiduciary duties can give rise to federal
felonies. 32 0  To avoid this result, other federal appellate courts have
attempted to cabin the statute's reach (and prosecutors' discretion) by
devising "limiting principles" for application of § 1346.321 For some jurists,
the creation of limiting principles also was compelled by their inclination to
315United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 142 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
316See Rybicki ll, 354 F.3d at 161-62 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
317See id.
3
"While not unheard of, there is little Delaware case law on this potential cause of action.
See Globis Partners, L.P. v. Plumtree Software, Inc., No. 1577-VCP, 2007 WL 4292024, at *15
(Del. Ch. Nov. 30, 2007) (holding that a claim requires proof of: "(1) the existence of a fiduciary
relationship; (2) the fiduciary breached its duty; (3) a defendant, who is not a fiduciary, knowingly
participated in a breach; and (4) damages to the plaintiff that resulted from the concerted action of
the fiduciary and the nonfiduciary").
3United States v. Sorich, 523 F.3d 702, 708 (7th Cir. 2008); see also United States v.
Rybicki (Rybicki 1), 287 F.3d 257, 264 (2d Cir. 2002) ("[B]ecause the statute does not define honest
services, the potential reach of § 1346 is virtually limitless.").
320See United States v. Kincaid-Chauncey, 556 F.3d 923, 940 (9th Cir. 2009).
32 1Id. ("Without some kind of limiting principle, honest services wire fraud could poten-
tially make relatively innocuous conduct subject to criminal sanctions."); Sorich, 523 F.3d at 707-08.
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"avoid the constitutional question" engendered by the statute's vagueness.
Regardless of the motivation for their creation, all of the limiting principles
announced by the lower federal courts over the past two decades have
generated considerable criticism, and none have been accepted universally.
2. What Law Applies? Where Does the Fiduciary Duty Come From?
Rybicki H did not specify the law applicable to its analysis-federal,
state, or some combination. Unfortunately, appellate courts have differed
widely in framing and answering choice of law questions. Some courts have
expressed the question as whether an independent violation of state law is
necessary for an honest services fraud conviction. Several circuits have
concluded that, at least when dealing with public honest services fraud, a
government official must have violated some state law to be convicted for
honest services fraud.323 Most circuits, however, have decided that proving
an independent violation of state law is not necessary for an honest services
324fraud conviction. In fact, in other circumstances, the Supreme Court ruled
that, "in the absence of a plain indication to the contrary, . . . Congress when
it enacts a statute is not making the application of the federal act dependent
on state law."3 2 5
This raises an antecedent question. Is state law even relevant to find-
ing that the honest services fraud statute has been violated? While some
courts have looked to state law to find the fiduciary duty whose breach is the
322See United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 534 (5th Cir. 2006) (DeMoss, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) ("Rather than address the larger constitutional problem with this
statute, which would provide clarity to Congress, prosecutors, and the lower courts, the circuit courts
have instead only clouded the meaning of § 1346 by repeatedly resolving the ambiguities of the
statute's text via judicially created definitions and limitations.").
323See, e.g., United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 734-35 (5th Cit. 1997) (en banc). The
Third Circuit's position is unclear. See United States v. Carbo, 527 F.3d I12, 117 n.4 (3d Cir. 2009)
(concluding that its prior decisions had only held that an independent violation of state law was
sufficient for an honest services fraud violation, but noting it had never expressly held it was
necessary).
324See United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1245 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129
S. Ct. 2863 (June 29, 2009) (No. 08-1196); Sorich, 523 F.3d at 712; United States v. Urciuoli, 513
F.3d 290, 294, 298-99 (1st Cir. 2008) (expressing concern that the statute might "embrace every
kind of legal or ethical abuse remotely connected to the holding of a governmental position"); United
States v. Walker, 490 F.3d 1282, 1299 (11th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1649 (2008);
United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 942 (4th Cir. 1995), abrogated by United States v. O'Hagan,
521 U.S. 642 (1997).325Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943) (construing the federal Bank Robbery
Act). According to the Court, this "assumption is based on the fact that the application of federal
legislation is nationwide ... and at times on the fact that the federal program would be impaired if
state law were to control." Id. Courts analyzing § 1346 have not applied Jerome, however.
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basis for a violation, others have relied on federal fiduciary doctrine, or some
unstated standard, instead. In many honest services fraud cases, the courts
cite no state law as support for the defendant's conviction. The Seventh
Circuit has justified such omissions, explaining:
[W]e have never held that only state law can supply a fiduciary
duty between public official and public or between employee
and employer in honest services cases. Indeed, our case law,
and the case law of the vast majority of circuits, shows that
other sources can create a fiduciary obligation."'
Indeed, to support this assertion, the court of appeals cited other federal
cases where employee handbooks or power of attorney agreements provided
327the sources of such obligations.
This legal indeterminacy has important implications for public
company managers. Since an employee handbook generally fails to create
even a contractual relationship, the idea that it could create a fiduciary
relationship supporting an honest services fraud conviction seems difficult to
justify from reading the statutory language itself. Moreover, this theory
certainly has no basis in Delaware fiduciary duty law. Nonetheless, the
government has constructed other honest services fraud charges on
violations of the purported fiduciary duty owed by corporate officers to the
company's employees. Most notably, prosecutors repeatedly argued to the
jury in closing argument that Jeff Skilling violated his duty of "loyalty to
[Enron's] employees and to investors."3 2 8 In addition, the prosecution main-
tained that Skilling committed honest services fraud by "expos[ing] Enron to
an irresponsible amount of long-term risk in exchange for a short-term stock-
price benefit" and even by violating his "duty to do [his] job .. . and do it
appropriately."3 29 Such claims would not give rise to civil liability under
326Sorich, 523 F.3d at 712 (citations omitted); see also United States v. Martin, 195 F.3d
961, 966 (7th Cir. 1999).
The fear that motivated the Brumley decision is that if federal courts are free to
devise fiduciary duties the breach of which violates the mail fraud statute, the
result will be the creation in effect of a class of federal common law crimes ....
Brumley, however, is contrary to the law in this circuit.
Id.
327Sorich, 523 F.3d at 712 (citing United States v. Williams, 441 F.3d 716, 724 (9th Cir.
2006) (power of attorney agreement); United States v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 514 n.7 (7th Cir.
1973) (employee handbook)).
328Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 3, Skilling v. United States, No. 08-1394 (U.S. Oct. 13,
2009) [hereinafter Skilling Petition] (citing R. at 14784, 14799-800, 29610-11).
329Id. at 3-4 (citing R. at 21239, 22848, 22843, 37065).
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state corporate law. Indeed, the Delaware Court of Chancery barred striking-
ly similar civil claims for breach of fiduciary duty from proceeding against
Citigroup's executives.
Most concerning to corporate executives, federal prosecutors appar-
ently can rely on fiduciary duties not found in state law (and, seemingly, also
not heretofore recognized in federal law) to support § 1346 prosecutions. As
the Ninth Circuit has explained, most circuits "have held that the meaning of
'honest services' is governed by a uniform federal standard inherent in§ 1346, although they have not uniformly defined the contours of that
standard." 3 0 Divining a uniform federal standard from the vague language
of a statute that the federal courts have not construed uniformly hardly
produces confidence in the development of coherent doctrine.
3. What Other Evidence Is Necessary for Conviction?
In addition to state law limiting principles, defendants have argued
for, and some courts have adopted, additional statutory glosses restricting
prosecutors' discretion and restraining the scope of § 1346.331 Several courts
focus on the result, or potential result, of the fiduciary breach, either from the
victim's perspective or the defendant's perspective. Viewing the breach from
the defendant's perspective, the Seventh Circuit has asked whether there was
an improper gain to the defendant (or another person) from the breach.
Viewing the breach from the victim's perspective, other courts have examin-
ed whether the fiduciary breach created a reasonably foreseeable economic
harm to the victim. 332 On some level, these inquiries represent two sides of
the same coin. In many instances of fraudulent conduct, the victim's loss is
the defendant's gain. This symmetry is not found in every case of fiduciary
breach, however. Sometimes, the defendant may gain without an obvious
corresponding loss to the victim, or the victim may suffer a loss even though
the defendant does not obtain an obvious gain. These asymmetric cases have
generated more attention and controversy. A third gloss focuses not on the
result of the fiduciary breach from the victim's perspective but instead on the
victim's perception of that result, a materiality inquiry. Importantly, none of
330United States v. Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1244 (9th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S.
Ct. 2863 (June 29, 2009) (No. 08-1196).
S31 ee, e.g., United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 138 F.3d 961, 973 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(stating that "federal criminal liability could metastasize" under § 1346 without limiting principles).332See United States v. Vinyard, 266 F.3d 320, 328 (4th Cir. 2001); Sun-Diamond, 138 F.3d
at 974; United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 368 (6th Cir. 1997) (absent reasonably foreseeable
economic harm, "[p]roofthat the employer simply suffered only the loss ofthe loyalty and fidelity of
the [employee] is insufficient to convict").
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these limiting principles have any textual basis. Indeed, none of the restrict-
tive rules appear to limit prosecutors' actual discretion or the scope of
conduct that courts may deem criminal.
a. Examining Improper Gain to Defendant (and Others) from
Conduct
The Seventh Circuit has used the improper gain that flows from the
fiduciary breach as the litmus test for honest services fraud. According to
that court, "Misuse of office (more broadly, misuse of position) for private
gain is the line that separates run of the mill violations of state-law fiduciary
duty .. . from federal crime."333 However, the meaning of this distinction is
not clear, and this limiting principle actually has evolved, expanding the
scope of "private gain" over time. In earlier cases, the defendant herself had
to receive some personal, financial gain because of the misuse of office or
position.334 Later, the Seventh Circuit recognized benefits from deprivations
beyond simply the defendant's gain. This doctrinal enlargement occurred
incrementally, beginning with the gain going to participants in the fraudulent
scheme other than the defendant.
Then, in United States v. Sorich,3 the court broadened its interpreta-
tion of "other participants" to mean not simply others complicit in the fraud
but third parties who appear to have known nothing about the defendants'
activities. Sorich began as yet another honest services fraud indictment
against a Chicago public official. Defendants included several officials from
Mayor Richard Daley's Office of Intergovernmental Affairs who engaged in
a "corrupt and far-reaching scheme" that "doled out thousands of city civil
service jobs based on political patronage and nepotism. "37 Among other
things, the defendants conducted sham interviews of potential job applicants,
falsified interview forms to ensure that those with political con-nections
received jobs, and ignored various merit evaluations. To hide the scheme,
the defendants purportedly misrepresented to city attorneys that the hires
were legitimate, and they attempted to destroy evidence to hide their
involvement once a governmental investigation began. Defendants engaged
in this behavior despite two federal consent decrees prohibiting the use of
3 3 United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 1998).
334See United States v. Hausmann, 345 F.3d 952, 956 (7th Cir. 2003).
335See United States v. Spano, 421 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 2005) ("A participant in a
scheme to defraud is guilty even if he is an altruist and all the benefits of the fraud accrue to other
participants.").
136523 F.3d 702 (7th Cir. 2008).
3 7 d. at 705.
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politics in hiring by the City of Chicago. 8 Following their convictions for
honest services fraud (and mail fraud), defendants' principal argument on
appeal was that their conduct did not violate § 1346 because they received
339no gain.
Despite many indicia of inappropriate behavior, the defendants did not
benefit financially, and there was no evidence that they harmed the entity to
which they owed their fiduciary duties (the City of Chicago). Furthermore,
prosecutors offered no proof that the "other participants" who received a
benefit had conspired with the defendants; according to the evidence, they
probably did not know that anything untoward had occurred. Nonetheless,
the court of appeals sustained the convictions because third parties
somewhere received jobs to which they otherwise may not have been
entitled. Opining that the "amorphous and open-ended nature of § 1346"
forced appellate courts to devise limiting principles,34 0 the court explained
that it had distinguished state law fiduciary breaches from federal crimes by
requiring '[m]isuse of office (more broadly, misuse of position) for private
gain."'341 However, "private gain" encompassed more than a defendant's
personal gain.342 According to the court:
These cases are the exception to a rule of human nature rather
than of law: usually someone up to no good will be out to
enrich himself, not others. . . . It is much less likely-but no
less culpable-that fraudulent schemers will share the proceeds
with third parties rather than amongst themselves.343
Nonetheless, provided that the scheme was somehow "illegitimate" and the
gain from the scheme flowed to someone-in this case, thousands of
unindicted city employees who received patronage jobs-it was sufficient to
"cabin[] zealous prosecutors by insuring that not every violation of a fidu-
ciary duty becomes a federal crime, [and] reduce[] the risk of creating feder-
al common law crimes."4 Indeed, a defendant could commit fraud "'even if
33 Id. at 706.
3391d at 706-08.
340 Sorich, 523 F.3d at 707.
3411d. (quoting United States v. Bloom, 149 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 1998)).
41d. at 708-11.
343Id. at 709.
3 Sorich, 523 A.2d at 707-08 (citing Bloom, 149 F.3d at 654-55); see also Bloom, 149 F.3d
at 654 (noting that "it is frightening to contemplate the prospect that the federal mail fraud statute
makes it a crime punishable by five years' imprisonment to misunderstand how a state court in future
years will delineate the extent of impermissible conflicts[,]" in which case "we would have a federal
common-law crime, a beastie that many decisions say cannot exist").
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he is an altruist and all the benefits of the fraud accrue to other partici-
pants."' 3
45
According to the court of appeals in Sorich, the "true purpose of the
private gain requirement-and one that does not depend on who gets the
spoils-is to prevent the conviction of individuals who have breached a
fiduciary duty to an employer or the public, but have not done so for illegiti-
mate gain."3 4 6 Yet, the boundary created by the private gain requirement is,
itself, indistinct; indeed, the demarcation seems visible only with the benefit
of hindsight. In the Seventh Circuit, for example, the line apparently falls
somewhere between Sorich and United States v. Thompson.34 7 In Thomp-
son, the Justice Department prosecuted a state employee for circumventing
the bidding process to award a government contract to a particular travel
agency because she thought the grant would please her boss. In that case,
however, the Seventh Circuit concluded that defendant's receipt of a bonus
in the ordinary course of her employment, along with the goodwill she
achieved with her boss, constituted insufficient personal gain to support her
conviction for honest services fraud.348
Under the appellate courts' decisions, then, state officials responsible
for rigging government contracts may or may not violate § 1346. Although
the defendant who tinkers with the bidding process for one relatively small
contract may appear less blameworthy than the defendant who creates a false
paper trail to enable the employment of perhaps hundreds of party loyalists,
the distinction between criminal bid rigging and non-criminal bid rigging
certainly cannot be quantitative. Nonetheless, the courts have failed to adopt
a uniform culpability standard providing public officials with reasonable
notice, ex ante, of what conduct constitutes a crime. Judicial efforts to dis-
tinguish between legal and illegal conduct instead have produced conflicting
outcomes, and the courts' decisions attempting to legislate the standard have
raised more questions than they have resolved. Most fundamentally, how, if
at all, does criminally culpable conduct differ substantively from any other
breach by an employee of her fiduciary duty of loyalty? 34 9 If the government
can satisfy the private gain requirement merely by pointing to any benefit
received by any person, regardless of the person's participation in or
knowledge of the scheme, all but the most isolated and self-contained loyalty
345Id. at 709 (quoting United States v. Spano, 421 F.3d 599, 603 (7th Cir. 2005)). Accord-
ing to the court, "Robin Hood may be a noble criminal, but he is still a criminal." Id. at 710.
"Id. at 710.
347484 F.3d 877 (7th Cir. 2007).
3481d. at 884.
3490ther circuits have criticized this approach. See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d
1081, 1107 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Panarella, 277 F.3d 678, 691-92 (3d Cir. 2002).
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breaches become punishable as crimes under § 1346. For all of these rea-
sons, the private gain rule seems ineffective as a limiting principle.
b. Examining Conduct's Potential Impact on Victim
Rather than adopting the Seventh Circuit's private gain requirement,
other circuits have focused on the potential harms resulting from the
fiduciary's breach. Some opinions evaluate the results from the victim's per-
spective, while others seem to appraise the outcomes objectively. Specif-
ically, several appellate courts have engrafted onto § 1346 the requirement
that the government prove that the defendant 'foresaw or reasonably should
have foreseen that his employer might suffer an economic harm as a result of
the breach."' 50 As an initial matter, this limiting principle (if taken serious-
ly) would merge § 1346 with §§ 1341 and 1343, provisions which similarly
require some deprivation or threatened deprivation of money or property."'
In practice, however, courts do not require proof of actual economic
loss or even proof of defendant's intent to cause economic loss. Instead,
many courts simply require evidence that the agent/employee "reasonably
fores[aw] that the breach would create 'an identifiable economic risk' for the
employer," which might include the risk of foregone potential future
business opportunities. 3 52 Conduct violative of § 1346 may extend beyond
conduct in contravention of § § 1341 or 1343 insofar as hypothetical eco-
nomic risk could sustain a conviction for honest services fraud. If the "pos-
sibility of a suboptimal outcome was reasonably foreseeable," a conviction
could stand under § 1346 regardless of whether the underlying business
transactions were "objectively fair."3 53
Other courts endorsing the application of limiting principles based on
evidence of economic harm have rejected the reasonable foreseeability
standard in favor of a materiality rule. Under this competing test, the fact-
finder must determine that the misrepresentation "'ha[d] the natural tendency
to influence or is capable of influencing the employer to change his
35 United States v. Sun-Diamond Growers, 138 F.3d 961, 974 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting
United States v. Frost, 125 F.3d 346, 368 (6th Cir. 1997)) (holding that one need not intend to cause
economic harm, just that it be a reasonably foreseeable consequence).
3 1See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343 (2006). Engrafting this limiting principle onto § 1346
might even conflate traditional mail and wire fraud with § 1346 so much that one could argue that
the conduct prosecuted in McNally, which spawned § 1346, might not be criminal under § 1346.
However, since this limiting principle appears to be satisfied sometimes by theoretical economic
harms, some distinction still remains.




behavior."'3 54 Although the inquiries are similar in many respects,'355 most
courts maintain that the analyses are distinct. Advocates of the "reasonably
foreseeable harm" test assert that their rule is more appropriate because it
"keeps the focus of the analysis on employee intent rather than on employer
response." 56 The test also purportedly avoids the possibility of criminal
liability based on an employer's overreaction to an "insignificant fraud" or an
employer's attempt to "avoid the mere appearance of impropriety.
Proponents of the materiality standard assert that their rule overlaps
with the reasonably foreseeable harm test insofar as misconduct giving rise
to the likelihood of reasonably foreseeable economic or pecuniary harm
presumably matters to victims. 3 58 However, the materiality test also extends
liability further by "captur[ing] some cases of non-economic, yet serious,
harm in the private sphere." 59 Moreover, courts adopting the materiality test
deride the competing analysis as "something of an ipse dixit designed simply
to limit the scope of [§] 1346.' 360
In the final analysis, both standards essentially restrict criminal
liability for fiduciary breaches by examining the potential impact of the
conduct on either the reasonable defendant or the reasonable victim. Both
tests would preclude criminal liability under § 1346 where the harm caused
by the breach of duty was not reasonably foreseeable, either by the defendant
or the victim.361 No appellate courts appear to have concluded that a breach
of fiduciary duty would support a conviction under one analysis but not the
other, so it remains to be seen whether this analytical distinction actually
makes a practical difference.
c. The Fifth Circuit's Contradictory Jurisprudence
The jurisprudence of the Fifth Circuit illustrates the fluctuation of
appellate honest services jurisprudence and the resulting uncertainty for
corporate fiduciaries. The Fifth Circuit extended the reach of § 1346 in
United States v. Skilling,3 62 the decision that the Supreme Court agreed to
354United States v. Rybicki (Rybickil), 354 F.3d 124, 145 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting Vinyard,
266 F.3d at 328).
31s Vinyard, 266 F.3d at 328.
3 5tSee Rybicki ll, 354 F.3d at 146.359 1d
36 1If it was not reasonably foreseeable to the victim that he could suffer harm from the
fiduciary breach, presumably he would not change his behavior if he learned of the conduct.
362554 F.3d 529 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 393 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2009) (No. 08-
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review most recently. While the Fifth Circuit's honest services fraud juris-
prudence seemed to be converging toward reasonable limits before Enron,
the court of appeals vacillated about the scope of § 1346 in a series of three
decisions arising from the government's indictments of Enron executives and
the financial professionals who advised them. The resulting case law evi-
dences both confusion and disagreement about the proper boundaries for
prosecuting corporate fiduciaries under § 1346.
In the first case, United States v. Brown, the Fifth Circuit reversed the
convictions of four former Merrill Lynch investment bankers retained in
connection with Enron's sale of Nigerian power barges.363 A federal jury
found the bankers guilty of depriving Enron of its employees' honest services
by causing Merrill Lynch to purchase the barges in order to inflate Enron's
earnings artificially.364 For its part, Merrill Lynch received an advisory fee
and a 15% annual return on the barges' investment.3 65 Prosecutors alleged-
and the defendant bankers denied-that Enron promised to repurchase the
barges if they could not find a third-party buyer for them in six months.3 6 6 If
Enron had made such a promise, the transaction would not have qualified as
a true sale, and the revenue generated from the transaction was improperly
accounted for as income to Enron.36 7
Although the government had no evidence of bribery, kickbacks, or
classic self-dealing, prosecutors argued that the Enron executives who
approved the transaction breached their fiduciary duties to disclose that the
deal was not a "true sale."3 68 Under Fifth Circuit precedent, a breach of
fiduciary duty violated § 1346 only if there was evidence of "some detriment
to the employer."3 6 9 According to the government, the sufficient detriment
to Enron was simply the failure to disclose the fact that the transaction was
not a "true sale." In other words, the failure to disclose was essentially both
the breach and the harm.370
The Fifth Circuit disagreed. Concerned that the government's
theory could "mak[e] every knowing fiduciary breach a federal crime,"3 7 2 the
Brown court opted for a more narrow interpretation of the honest services
fraud statute. According to its decision, § 1346 is not violated "where an
1394).
36 3United States v. Brown, 459 F.3d 509, 517 (5th Cir. 2006).
Id. at 515-17.
3 1Id. at 516.
36id at 515.
...Brown, 459 F.3d at 515-16.6 Id. at 520.
"Id at 519 (citing United States v. Ballard, 663 F.2d 534, 540 (5th Cir. 1981)).
37old. at 519, 522.
"




employer intentionally aligns the interests of the employee with a specified
corporate goal, where the employee perceives his pursuit of that goal as
mutually benefiting him and his employer, and where the employee's con-
duct is consistent with that perception of mutual interest."373 Based on the
evidence presented at trial, the court determined that the Merrill Lynch
defendants had not deprived Enron of its executives'honest services because
the Enron deal-makers believed they were furthering Enron's corporate
interests in addition to their own self-interests. Enron's incentive structure
tied employee compensation to corporate earnings targets and rewarded
employees for helping to attain those targets. Moreover, Enron's senior
management (e.g., then-CFO Andrew Fastow) was aware of, and approved
of, the transaction. 3 74 The court, therefore, concluded that the Enron em-
ployees should not have recognized that their failure to disclose (the pur-
ported breach) actually constituted a criminal breach of their fiduciary duty
to Enron.37
Because the Enron employees' behavior did not violate the statute, the
Merrill Lynch employees' conduct also did not violate the law. Thus, the
Fifth Circuit reversed the investment bankers' convictions under § 1346.
Rather than incrementally expand the statute, a law that the court deemed
"vague and amorphous on its face" and which "depends for its constitu-
tionality on the clarity divined from a jumble of disparate cases," the court
invoked the rule of lenity and interpreted § 1346 narrowly to exclude the
conduct.377
The Brown court's interpretation of § 1346 raised the possibility that
the Fifth Circuit also might reverse the conviction of former Enron CEO
Jeffrey Skilling. A jury found Skilling guilty of honest services fraud and
other crimes relating to his involvement in a number of allegedly fraudulent
transactions, including the Nigerian barges deal. 7  Skilling had testified that
he, too, had acted in what he believed were Enron's interests and to advance
Enron's corporate goals. Skilling also claimed that he did not participate in
the allegedly fraudulent transactions in secret. 37 9  Again, government
3731d.
"4Id. at 522 n.13.
375Brown, 459 F.3d at 522.
"
61d.
3771d at 523. The Fifth Circuit repeated this approach in United States v. Howard, 517 F.3d
731, 732, 735, 737 (5th Cir. 2008) (involving an Enron transaction similar to the Nigerian barge
deal).
United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 539-40, 542 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130
S. Ct. 393 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2009) (No. 08-1394).
31Id. at 545.
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prosecutors did not present evidence that Skilling bribed anyone or received
any kickbacks. 38 0  Before the Fifth Circuit's decision, then, some com-
mentators predicted that the Fifth Circuit would follow Brown's logic and,
again, construe the honest services fraud statute narrowly.
However, another Fifth Circuit panel limited Brown instead, opting to
expand the reach of § 1346. In Skilling, the court held that the analysis in
Brown applied only when a corporation's upper management (e.g., CFO
Fastow) expressly sanctioned lower-level employees' improper conduct to
meet corporate objectives.3 8' In other words, Skilling narrowed the holding
in Brown to its facts, interpreting Brown to have created an "I was only
following orders" exception to liability under § 1346. Skilling's conduct fell
outside the exception because "no [superior to Skilling] at Enron sanctioned
Skilling's improper conduct."3 82 According to the court, "Skilling [did] not
allege that the Board of Directors or any other decisionmaker specifically
directed the improper means that he undertook to achieve his goals," and
Skilling himself could not both sanction the scheme and then receive the
benefit of Brown's limited exception.8 The fact that Enron's board of direc-
tors knew of, and approved, some of the wrongful transactions was irrelevant
because the board did not "specifically direct" Skilling's "improper means"
of achieving Enron's corporate goals.3 84 According to the Skilling court, "[I]t
makes no difference that the Board of Directors knew of Skilling's conduct if
Enron (through the Board or its senior executives) did not actually direct
Skilling to undertake the fraudulent means to achieve his goals." 85
Lastly, and most significantly, the court summarized the elements of
honest services wire fraud as "(1) a material breach of a fiduciary duty
imposed under state law, including duties defined by the employer-employee
relationship, (2) that results in a detriment to the employer."3 86 The court
then held that "it is a sufficient detriment for an employee, contrary to his
duty of honesty, to withhold material information, i.e., information that he
38oSee Brown, 459 F.3d at 522 (noting that the Nigerian barges case was "a situation in
which the dishonest conduct is disassociated from bribery or self-dealing").
"'See Skilling, 554 F.3d at 545 ("Brown created an exception for honest-services fraud
where an employer not only aligns its interests with the interests of its employees but also sanctions
the fraudulent conduct, i.e., where the corporate decisionmakers, who supervised the employees
being prosecuted, specifically authorized the activity.").
..Id. at 546.
383Id. Requiring Skilling to "allege" the board's knowledge, rather than requiring that the
prosecution demonstrate the board's lack of knowledge, is curious, particularly since the Brown
exception was not established, much less discussed, by the Fifth Circuit until after Skilling's trial.
"Id at 546-47.
3
"Skilling, 554 F.3d at 546-47.386 d. at 547 (footnotes omitted).
66 [Vol. 35
TWENTY-EIGrr WORDS
had reason to believe would lead a reasonable employer to change its
conduct."087 The "detriment" to the employer, it would seem, is essentially
the breach of the duty of honesty itself. A fiduciary's failure to be honest
with his employer, then, can be both the material breach of a fiduciary duty
under state law388 and the detriment to the employer.389 Whether the detri-
ment element is simply a reformulation of the materiality standard, or
something different, is unclear. Regardless, the Fifth Circuit's test seems to
require little more than proof that the employee breached his duty to disclose
material information to his employer. Indeed, it seems that the Fifth Circuit
in Skilling has construed § 1346 as a "mandatory disclosure" statute, the pre-
McNally outer limits of liability for honest services fraud.
As the analysis in Part V.B has demonstrated, the courts' various
extratextual limiting principles have done little to restrict prosecutors'
discretion or the breadth of conduct criminalized by § 1346. What prosecu-
tors must prove beyond a breach of fiduciary duty (as defined perhaps by
state law, perhaps by something else) seems vestigial at best. In general, the
government need not prove, or even allege, any benefit to the duty-breaching
corporate executive or monetary harm to the corporation. Thus, if a corporate
manager breaches a fiduciary duty (presumably including the duty of candor
or "honesty" to the corporation) and then fails to disclose that breach, she
could be convicted of honest services fraud. So while there may be no
reason to believe that Congress enacted § 1346 in order "to grant carte
blanche to federal prosecutors, judges and juries to define 'honest services'
from case to case for themselves,"3 90 the law, as currently interpreted, may
allow precisely that result.
C. The Supreme Court's Upcoming Review off 1346
In light of the doctrinal conflicts that have arisen in the lower courts
since Congress enacted the statute, it is perhaps not surprising that the
Supreme Court has decided to interpret § 1346. More remarkable is that the
387 d
388However, the court did not find specifically that Skilling breached his fiduciary duty to
Enron under Oregon, Delaware, or any other state's law.
3"As discussed previously, the government argued at closing that Skilling breached his
"fiduciary duty" to Enron's employees and breached his duty to Enron and its investors to "do his job
and do it appropriately." See supra notes 328-29 and accompanying text, Neither of these purport-
ed duties is cognizable under Oregon (or Delaware) law as a basis for a shareholder derivative claim.
Indeed, recognition of such duties would expand corporate law dramatically in either jurisdiction.
3 9
"lnited States v. Rybicki (Rybicki fl), 354 F.3d 124, 138 (2d Cir. 2003).
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Court, having declined so many previous opportunities to construe § 1346,
granted three petitions for writs of certiorari, raising multiple questions about
the scope and constitutionality of the statute in the same Term. Justice
Scalia's trenchant dissent in Sorich apparently paved the way for the Court's
review of Weyhrauch, Black, and Skilling,39 1 underscoring many of the most
salient criticisms of the statute and its use by the Justice Department to
prosecute corporate fraud.392 Since Justice Scalia's opinion provides a road-
map to the issues before the Court, several points about the Sorich dissent
are worth noting.
1. Justice Scalia's Dissent in Sorich
First, Justice Scalia apparently found no guideposts for interpretation
in the statutory text itself.393 Instead, his dissent mentioned several of the
limiting principles created by the lower federal courts of appeal. In particu-
lar, Justice Scalia referenced the Fifth Circuit's state law limiting principle
and the Seventh Circuit's private gain limitation as two attempts by the lower
courts to cabin the reach of the statute, conceding that each rule also had
appellate court detractors. "Without some coherent limiting principle to
define what 'the intangible right of honest services is' . . . and how it is
violated," Justice Scalia expressed concern that the "expansive phrase invites
abuse by headline-grabbing prosecutors in pursuit of local officials, state
legislators, and corporate CEOs who engage in any manner of unappealing
or ethically questionable conduct."3 9 4
Also significant is Justice Scalia's assertion that Congress's enactment
of § 1346 failed to resolve two of the principal concerns animating the
McNally Court's decision to abolish the "common law" of honest services.
The first concern was respect for federalism. States' rights could be
39
'See Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari).
392The dissent from the Seventh Circuits denial of rehearing en banc flagged several of
these issues. See United States v. Sorich, 531 F.3d 501 (7th Cir. 2008) (Kanne, J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc). This dissent questioned whether: (1) a federal consent decree, rather
than state law, could create a fiduciary duty which, if violated, could give rise to an honest services
fraud prosecution, id. at 503-04, and (2) the Seventh Circuit's "private gain" requirement had been
diluted out of existence. Id. at 503.
...See Sorich, 129 S. Ct. at 1310 (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (remarking
that "what principle it is that separates the criminal breaches, conflicts and misstatements from the
obnoxious but lawful ones, remains entirely unspecified"). As a jurist who often applies a textualist
approach to statutory interpretation, his agreement with those who find little meaning in the text




significantly impinged if the Court permitted federal prosecutors and courts
to create ethical rules and disclosure obligations regulating state and local
governmental officials.395 The second concern was that the law provide con-
stitutionally "fair warning of the conduct that it makes a crime." 96 Accord-
ing to Justice Scalia, § 1346, as written, is "nothing more than an invitation
for federal courts to develop a common-law crime of unethical conduct."3 97
Finally, for Justice Scalia, the statutory construction problem impli-
cates the constitutionality of § 1346. Describing the questions raised in
Sorich as concerning "both the meaning and the constitutionality of § 1346,"
Justice Scalia urged the Court to decide (1) whether the crime of honest
services fraud requires a "predicate violation of state law," (2) whether it
requires "the defendant's acquisition of some sort of private gain," and (3)
whether the void for vagueness and/or due process concerns undermined the
constitutionality of the statute.9 Justice Scalia apparently would vote to
strike down the statute as unconstitutionally vague.
With this kind of blueprint, it is little wonder that within a few months
of its publication, the Supreme Court received multiple petitions challenging
honest services convictions and raising the same issues, each relying on
Justice Scalia's dissent. Weyhrauch asked whether a state law violation was
a mandatory predicate in the petition he filed scarcely a month later
(March 25, 2009).'99 In his May 11 petition, Skilling asked the Court to
decide the constitutionality of the statute and whether the government must
prove that the defendant received an improper private gain.400 And although
Black's petition actually pre-dated Justice Scalia's dissent, Black wisely
relied quite heavily on its reasoning in his April 27 reply brief.401
2. Weyhrauch and the State Law Limiting Doctrine
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Weyhrauch to address the
state law limiting doctrine.402 Weyhrauch served as a state representative in
396Id. (quoting Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347, 350 (1964)).
97Soich, 129 S. Ct. at 1310.
39 Id. at 1310-11.
"Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Weyhrauch v. United States, No. 08-1196 (U.S. filed
Mar. 25, 2009) [hereinafter Weybrauch Petition].
4 Skilling Petition, supra note 328, at i.
401See Reply Brief of Petitioners at 2, Black v. United States, No. 08-876 (U.S. filed Apr.
27, 2009).
402Tle specific question presented in Weyhrauch is "whether a federal honest services mail
fraud prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1346 requires proof that the conduct at issue also
violated an applicable state law." United States v. Weybrauch, 548 F.3d 1237, 1239 (9th Cir. 2008),
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Alaska as lawmakers considered legislation to alter the taxation of oil
production. Having decided that he would not run for reelection, but before
his term expired, Weyhrauch contacted an oil services company (VECO) to
solicit legal work. Weyhrauch had multiple communications with VECO
seeking new work while the Alaska legislature continued to draft and
consider new statutes affecting VECO. VECO purportedly never compen-
sated Weyhrauch, nor did VECO offer work to Weyhrauch. Nonetheless,
federal prosecutors charged Weyhrauch with honest services fraud under the
theory that his discussions with VECO constituted a conflict of interest, a
conflict that Weyhrauch failed to disclose. Importantly, Alaska law did not
require legislators to disclose their employment negotiations, and Alaska's
Ethics Code mandated disclosure only if a legislator received more than
$1,000 in compensation for personal services. Although the state's law made
no mention of potential or future conflicts of interest, prosecutors argued that
a state legislator commits honest services fraud by failing to disclose a
potential conflict of interest contrary to federal standards of good govern-
ment. Weyhrauch moved to dismiss the indictment, urging that federal
common law cannot provide the requisite duty supporting a conviction for
honest services fraud.403
The district court excluded evidence of various state ethics
publications and ethics training that lacked the force of law which, the
government claimed, supported its position that Weyhrauch's conduct was
discouraged, if not somehow prohibited. According to prosecutors, the evi-
dence supported the government's argument for a "uniform standard for
'honest services' that governs every public official," regardless of any inde-
pendent violation of state law.4 04 Following this evidentiary ruling, the trial
court dismissed the indictment.
The government appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed. While
acknowledging that states logically should have sole control over the ethical
standards of their public officials (or, at a minimum, state law should
establish the bounds of acceptable conduct), the appellate court declined to
"adopt the state law limiting principle." 40 5 Part of the court's rationale is
fairly weak and could as easily support the opposite conclusion. The court
reasoned that its pre-McNally decisions did not derive their content solely
cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2863, 2863 (U.S. June 29, 2009) (No. 08-1196). The Ninth Circuit
distinguished Weyhrauch, a public honest services fraud case, and honest services fraud prosecu-
tions in the private context, about which the court offered no opinion. Id at 1245 n.5. Nonetheless,
the Supreme Court's analysis in Weyhrauch likely will impact both public and private honest
services fraud cases.





from state law (actually, the prior decisions did not address the issue either
way), and that neither the text nor legislative history of § 1346 conditioned
the meaning of the statute on state law (again, however, the statute and the
legislative history are silent).4 06
The more persuasive rationale focused on the federal interest furthered
by a federal, rather than state, standard. The criminality of an official's
conduct under federal law, the court opined, should not depend on "geo-
graphy." 40 7 Congress had a legitimate federal interest in ensuring that state
action impacting federal priorities was not improperly influenced by state
lawmakers nor state-specific policy, and that federal law did not vary on a
state-by-state basis. The court concluded that, because Congress regulated
industries having national and global scope, federal regulation-and even a
federal standard-was appropriate. That such an approach "intrudes on state
interests" is not improper, and indeed is permissible, under the Supremacy
Clause.408
Thus, the Ninth Circuit rejected Weyhrauch's argument that his con-
duct must violate state law in order to run afoul of § 1346. The court instead
held that § 1346 established "a uniform standard for 'honest services' that
governs every public official" and, therefore, does not require proof of an
independent violation of state law.4 09 As alleged by prosecutors, Weyhrauch
may have voted or taken official legislative actions at VECO's direction,
potentially in return for future legal work. This conduct, at a minimum, con-
stituted an undisclosed conflict of interest and might support a more serious
vote-buying charge. The court, therefore, held that the prosecution could
proceed.
The question for review in Weyhrauch logically should precede the
question raised in Black. Weyhrauch asks
[w]hether, to convict a state official for depriving the public of
its right to the defendant's honest services through the non-
disclosure of material information, in violation of the mail-
fraud statute (18 U.S.C. § 1341 and § 1346), the government
must prove that the defendant violated a disclosure duty im-
posed by state law.4 10
406 Weyhrauch, 548 F.3d at 1244-45.
4"'Id. at 1246.408 d. (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).
409Id. at 1248.
41oWeyhrauch v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 2863, 2863 (2009).
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The decision as to whether state law limits the scope of § 1346 will affect
both the propriety of, and need for, additional limiting principles.
3. Black and the Economic Harm Doctrine
Black asks the Supreme Court to decide whether an honest services
fraud conviction requires proof of a 'reasonably contemplated identifiable
economic harm' to the party to whom honest services are owed."4 1' During
Black's trial in the Seventh Circuit, the trial judge refused to instruct the jury
on this limiting principle. Instead, the district court instructed the jury to
consider whether Black had received an improper private gain.412 Black
argues that, had the trial court instructed the jury on the "reasonably
contemplated identifiable economic harm" standard, the jury would not have
convicted him for violating § 1346.413
Like most financial fraud prosecutions, the essential facts in Black are
complex. Black and several other persons owned a controlling interest in
Hollinger, a newspaper conglomerate, through their controlling interest in a
privately-held Canadian company called Ravelston. Rather than Black
drawing a salary from Hollinger, Hollinger paid management fees to
Ravelston for Black's services. Over time, as Hollinger sold many of its
newspaper assets, Black orchestrated a scheme whereby management fees
Hollinger owed Ravelston were recharacterized as payments by the various
divested newspapers to Black in consideration for Black's agreement not to
compete with the publications going forward. According to Black, the deals
were structured to take advantage of Canadian law excluding from taxable
income payments received pursuant non-compete agreements. Rather than
Hollinger paying Ravelston management fees owing (taxable income), the
newspapers instead paid Black not to compete with them (non-taxable
income). However, Black failed to disclose to Hollinger's board of directors
that these arrangements generated a significant benefit to him.4 14
Black asserted that Hollinger suffered no economic harm from the
subject dealings because the monies he received were disclosed to, and even
approved by, Hollinger's board of directors. He argued further that the pri-
vate gain he received from the transaction was not extracted from Hollinger
411Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Black v. United States, No. 08-876 (U.S. filed Jan. 9,
2009) [hereinafter Black Petition].
412United States v. Black, 530 F.3d 596,600 (7th Cir. 2008), cert. granted, 129 S. Ct. 2379
(U.S. May 18, 2009) (No. 08-876).
4 13See Black Petition, supra note 411, at 22.
414Black, 530 F.3d at 599.
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but, rather, from Canada, in the form of a tax benefit.4 15 On appeal, how-
ever, the Seventh Circuit rejected both arguments. Describing the question
as whether Black received an improper private gain from Hollinger, not
whether Hollinger suffered economic harm, the court analogized Black's
receipt of an improper gain to the "straightforward" prosecution of a judge
for accepting a bribe. Even if a third party paid the bribe, the judge still
breached his fiduciary duty to the public and committed honest services
fraud. Indeed, the judge would violate § 1346 even if he claimed not to
benefit the third party. Similarly, even if Black received the private gain
from a third party (Canada), he nonetheless deprived Hollinger ofhis honest
services as well.4 16 The court also held that Black's failure to disclose the
Canadian tax benefit to Hollinger's board of directors harmed Hollinger,
reasoning that an informed employer could reduce its compensation to Black
in order to share in the economic rent created by the Canadian tax benefit.417
In his petition for writ of certiorari, Black argued to the Supreme
Court that the Seventh Circuit erred by failing to require proof of some
"reasonably contemplated identifiable economic harm." According to Black,
the "only obstacle to converting every violation of corporate governance or
company rules into federal crimes would seem to be the moment-to-moment
whims of federal prosecutors." 4 18 Black's assertion that honest services fraud
potentially criminalizes trivial breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate
executives, rather than by public officials, distinguished his appeal from the
appeal filed by Sorich with the Court just a few months earlier. Both cases
otherwise raised substantially the same questions regarding the difference
between the Seventh Circuit's private gain requirement and the economic
harm rule adopted in other circuits. Yet, only Justice Scalia opted to hear the
arguments when Sorich presented them.
415See Black Petition, supra note 411, at 19 ("[I]n the Seventh Circuit a private individual
who receives a lawful tax benefit but fails to disclose it to his employer may safely be compared with
a state judge who takes bribes."); see also Black, 530 F.3d at 600-01.
416Black, 530 F.3d at 601.
417Id. at 602. Another theory, not addressed sufficiently in the appellate decision, is the
impact ofBlack's failure to disclose on Hollinger's publicly-filed financial statements. The Seventh
Circuit mentioned that Hollinger's characterization of the management fees it paid to Black as
"payments for non-compete agreements" effectively resulted in the filing of a "false 10-K" with the
SEC which may have given rise to an SEC investigation. Id. at 600, 602. This misrepresentation
probably decreased the value of Hollinger's shares and increased Hollinger's cost of raising addi-
tional capital, both causing reasonably contemplated economic harm to Hollinger.
4 18Black Petition, supra note 411, at 22. Black's Petition also argued that the case merits
Supreme Court review because it highlighted disagreements over "core issues" of federal criminal
law, such as (1) "the balance between matters of state and federal concern"; (2) "the rule against a
common law of federal crimes"; and (3) "the threat to due process posed by broadly and vaguely
worded criminal statutes." Id. at 32.
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4. Skilling and the Constitutionality of § 1346
Skilling's petition advanced the counterpoint to Black's petition.
Skilling asked the Supreme Court to determine whether § 1346 "requires the
government to prove that the defendant's conduct was intended to achieve
'private gain' rather than to advance the employer's interests." 4 19 Indeed,
Skilling argued that he would not have been convicted of violating § 1346 in
the Seventh Circuit under its private gain rule 42 0 because he received only
compensation from his employer, not bribes or kickbacks from third parties.
Given the similarity of the issues raised by Black and Skilling, however, the
Court may have granted Skilling's petition because the former Enron CEO
also included a direct challenge to the constitutionality of § 1346. Repeating
many of the arguments raised by Justice Scalia in his Sorich dissent, Skilling
argued on appeal that § 1346 is void for vagueness.42 1 Skilling claimed, too,
that § 1346 offends the prohibition against the creation of federal common
law crimes, intrudes on areas of traditional state regulation, and fails to
provide adequate notice to defendants.422 Finally, Skilling's petition empha-
sized the Justice Department's increasing use of the honest services fraud
statute, asserting that § 1346 criminalizes any fiduciary breaches that federal
prosecutors seek to punish.4 23
Having examined the questions before the Supreme Court, the final
part of this article analyzes the discordant risks to corporate executives who
breach their fiduciary duties under current law. The Supreme Court's up-
coming decisions may help resolve some of the friction between state and
federal liability standards, but the Court's decisions also could exacerbate the
tensions that this paper has revealed. Whether or not the Justices strike
down § 1346 as unconstitutional, Congress should take action to harmonize
civil and criminal liability for executives who breach their fiduciary duties.
419Skilling Petition, supra note 328, at i.
420See id. at 20-21. Skilling asserts that the Second Circuit (in Rybicki II) and the Sixth
Circuit have also adopted a personal gain requirement. Id. at 19.
4211d at 23.
4221d. at 23-24.
423Skilling Petition, supra note 328, at 22-23.
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VI. FUTURE ENFORCEMENT OF FIDUCIARY DUTIES
THROUGH CRIMINAL PROSECUTION
OF HONEST SERVICES FRAUD
The litany of recent scandals-from financial reporting frauds to CEO
looting scandals; from stock options backdating to the recent collapses and
government rescues of "too-big-to-fail" financial institutions-has focused
the public's attention once again on wrongdoing by corporate executives.424
Fraud and other unlawful conduct by public company management damages
not only the firm's stockholders; revelation of disloyal schemes perpetrated
by senior officers also "erodes public confidence in the corporate community
at large" and, "if left unchecked, ha[s] a negative impact on the stock mar-
kets and capital raising, which will in turn have a negative impact throughout
the U.S. economy." 4 25 Insofar as executives may have breached their fidu-
ciary duties to companies that received federal stimulus funding, monies
from the country's taxpayers, the government has a heightened enforcement
interest. In order to restore investor confidence, experts argue that two
things must happen.4 26 First, the public must see corporate wrongdoers
punished for their illegal acts.427 Second, investors must see changes in the
system designed to preclude future bad behavior.42 8 Like its constituents,
Congress has come to expect that the Justice Department will prosecute even
the most senior executives responsible for wrongdoing.4 29
A. The Federal Interest in Prosecution
Although the government's war on corporate crime seemed to lag
during the final years of the Bush Administration, the financial meltdown of
2008, the election of a new president, and his installation of a new attorney
general promised renewed enforcement efforts. Even without the recent
turnover in the executive branch, the collapse of financial institutions, cor-
responding losses in the stock market, and diminished investor confidence
revived congressional demand for aggressive criminal investigations of
corporate activities. Public anger became more pronounced when it was
424See JOHN NOFSINGER & KENNETH KIM, INFECTIOUs GREED: RESTORING CONFIDENCE
IN AMERICA'S COMPANIES 1 (2003).
425FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, FBI STRATEGIC PLAN 2004-2009 § II.H (2009),
available at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/strategicplan/stategicplantext.htm#message.





DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
revealed that financial industry executives received and continued to be
awarded oversized performance bonuses and other questionable compensa-
tion despite their firms' failures or near failures. Congress intensified its
pressure on the DOJ and the SEC to prosecute corporate actors who have
broken the law. On several occasions in late 2008 and in 2009, legislators
called senior officials from these agencies, along with the FBI, to Capitol
Hill to testify about their efforts to hold accountable those persons who, in
the minds of many, caused the economic crisis.4 30 For their part, lawmakers
expressed bipartisan support for criminal prosecutions, urging that the 'full
might of federal law enforcement [be brought] against the people who
illegally profited or destroyed companies at the expense of our country."'
431
In the spring of 2009, federal lawmakers made good on their promises
of support by passing new legislation, the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery
Act of 2009 (FERA), to encourage criminal prosecutions. FERA, like
SOX, amended the mail and wire fraud laws to facilitate prosecutors' use of
the statutes.433 This time, Congress supplemented the definition of"financial
institution" in 18 U.S.C., a term referenced in both the mail and wire fraud
statutes, to expand the reach of the laws.434 In addition, FERA designated
$165 million in new funding for the DOJ to hire additional investigators and
other necessary personnel.435 And, unlike SOX, FERA created a separate
investigatory body to conduct a full scale investigation of the financial crisis.
FERA established the bipartisan Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission
(FCIC) to conduct a fifteen-month investigation of the causes of the
upheaval. 43 6 Congress appropriated $8 million for work of the ten-member
Commission, an amount roughly equivalent to the yearly budget of a major
congressional committee, but FCIC can seek additional appropriations if
430See, e.g., Testimony Concerning Investigations and Examinations by the Securities
Exchange Commission and Issues Raised by the BernardL. Madofflnvestment Securities Matter:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 11Ith Cong. (2009)
(statement of Linda Chatman Thomsen, Director, Division of Enforcement, SEC) (discussing the
culpability of Bernard Madoff in connection with his alleged Ponzi scheme).
431Eric Lichtblau et al., F.B.I. Struggling to Handle Wave ofFinance Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 19, 2008, at Al (quoting FBI Director Robert S. Mueller III).
432Pub. L. No. 111-21, 123 Stat. 1617.
433See id § 2(f) (amending portions of 18 U.S.C. § 1957).
434
,d § 2(a)-(b) (expanding the definition of "financial institution" to include "an
organization which finances or refinances any debt secured by an interest in real estate, including
private mortgage companies and any subsidiaries" whose activities affect interstate or foreign com-
merce). The definition also includes "any person or entity that makes in whole or in part a federally
related mortgage loan as defined in section 3 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974."
Id. § 2(a)(3).
411Id § 3(a)(1).
436Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act § 5.
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necessary.437 Modeled (somewhat) after the 9/11 Commission, the FCIC's
broad investigatory mandate directs it to consider twenty-two enumerated
potential causes of the current financial and economic crisis in the United
States, including, first and foremost, "fraud and abuse in the financial
sector."4 38 Congress specifically instructed FCIC to make referrals to the
U.S. attorney general (and any appropriate state attorney general) of any
person that it concludes may have violated federal laws in relation to the
financial crisis. 4 39 For these reasons, too, it is reasonable to predict that the
DOJ ultimately will institute criminal proceedings against executives of
failed, or nearly-failed, financial institutions." 0
Most recently, President Obama signed an executive order establish-
ing an interagency Financial Fraud Enforcement Task Force, replacing the
Bush Administration's Corporate Fraud Task Force." 1 Responding to pres-
sure from Congress and mounting criticism that the Obama Administration
had done little to prosecute significant financial crimes relating to the 2008
crisis, Attorney General Holder also reiterated the Justice Department's
commitment to "wage an aggressive, coordinated, and proactive effort" to
investigate corporate wrongdoing and "to bring charges, where appropriate,
for criminal misconduct on the part of businesses and business execu-
tives.""42
B. Civil Law and Criminal Law Trending in Opposite Directions
Fraud and wrongdoing by corporate executives probably did not cause
or even contribute to the losses suffered by most investors during the recent
economic crisis. More likely, lack of understanding, poor judgment, and
inappropriate risk taking led to many of the bank failures over the past year.
Unfortunately, as the financial crisis illustrates, reliance on management self-
interest to protect shareholders has failed dismally. Under these circum-
stances, failure of the civil enforcement system to impose any liability on
corporate executives-and, relatedly, the public's perception that there are no
437FERA authorizes appropriations of "such sums as are necessary to cover the costs of the
Commission." Id. § 5(j).438Id. § 5(c)(1)(A).
4391d. § 5(c)(4).
440Besides enlarging executives' exposure to criminal liability, FCIC's investigation also
could lead the SEC or other regulators to institute enforcement actions against them.
"'See Exec. Order No. 13,519, 74 Fed. Reg. 60,123 (Nov. 17, 2009).
442Eric Holder, U.S. Attorney Gen., Remarks at the Financial Fraud Enforcement Task
Force Press Conference (Nov. 17, 2009), available at httpi/www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-
speech-091117.html.
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consequences to corporate executives for malfeasance much less mis-
feasance-creates pressure on the federal government to "do something" to
restore investor confidence.
Developments in Delaware corporate law and federal securities law
have created an enforcement gap, a space in which many breaches of
fiduciary duty by corporate executives and their advisors will go unrem-
edied, and a space where executives who engage in significant wrongdoing
are fairly insulated from potential liability, at least civilly. Corporate execu-
tives are not likely to pay damages for breaching their fiduciary duties.
Worse yet for investor confidence, executives may leave the employ of failed
companies with substantial assets, even judgment-proof wealth. Professor
Fairfax said it well: "[O]ur [civil] legal system appears to lack the will to
hold corporate executives personally liable for dereliction of their duties."
But nature abhors a vacuum. Because of the strong federal interest in
disciplining corporate fiduciaries-an interest repeatedly expressed by both
the executive and legislative branches-criminal law is creeping into the
regulatory space ceded by the civil law. With the enactment of SOX and the
creation of the CFTF in 2002, criminal enforcement became the corporate
fiduciary accountability mechanism of choice. Absent intervention by the
Supreme Court, the trend in the law on the criminal side favors enforcement,
and the prospect of criminal liability has increased significantly for public
company executives.4 Government lawyers have prosecuted and success-
fully convicted senior executives found to have breached their fiduciary
duties, and honest services fraud has become a more important weapon in
the DOJ's war against corporate fraud. Importantly, it is a crusade autho-
rized and financed by Congress. Federal lawmakers made clear in 2002 and
again in 2009 that fighting frauds perpetrated by public companies and their
executives should be a high priority for the DOJ. Through its legislative
efforts-SOX and, more recently, FERA-Congress has expressed a strong
federal interest in prosecuting managers criminally in order to deter future
wrongdoing and restore investor confidence in public companies and our
financial system.
With liability under civil law and criminal law trending in opposite
directions and the Supreme Court poised to construe § 1346, we have
reached a defining moment in the enforcement of corporate executives'
fiduciary duties. The DOJ has prosecuted and convicted corporate execu-
tives, as well as financial professionals and lawyers, for failing to disclose
4 3 Fairfax, supra note 224, at 440.
44See supra Part V.
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that they breached their fiduciary duties or otherwise had conflicts of
interest. Until now, the progression of the law has favored broad application
of § 1346, as I demonstrated in Part V.445 Despite lip service to the contrary,
it seems that most breaches of fiduciary duty are-or at least can be-
criminalized, and in many jurisdictions, federal prosecutors may indict
public company executives for breaching duties not even recognized under
state corporate law. Furthermore, it may well be easier for the government
to convict miscreant corporate executives for acts that breach their fiduciary
duties than it is for shareholders to obtain discovery about those acts, much
less hold corporate executives accountable for them in civil litigation
alleging the same illegal conduct." 6
C. Potential Ramifications of Weyhrauch, Black, and Skilling
The Supreme Court's decisions in Weyhrauch, Black, and Skilling
undoubtedly will influence whether honest services fraud prosecutions
continue to play a role in filling the enforcement function ceded by civil law.
By granting certiorari in all three cases, the Court can settle many of the
thorniest interpretive issues concerning § 1346. Although the Court still
could resolve the questions raised in the three cases separately, its determi-
nation to hear the cases together could signal its intention to eschew piece-
meal construction of § 1346 in favor of a unified theory of interpretation.
Then, too, the Court's decision to hear Skilling, after granting certiorari in
Black and Weyhrauch, suggests some likelihood that the justices will strike
down the statute as unconstitutional.
Unless a majority concludes that the statute is unconstitutionally
vague, the Supreme Court likely will decide whether state law is the only
"
5 See supra Part V.
"
6 See, e.g., In re Refco, Inc. Sec. Litig., 609 F. Supp. 2d 304, 318 n.15 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
The court stated that
[i]t is perhaps dismaying that participants in a fraudulent scheme who may
even have committed criminal acts are not answerable in damages to the
victims of the fraud. However, as the Court noted in Stoneridge, the fact that
the plaintiff-investors have no claim is the result of a policy choice by
Congress. . . .This choice may be ripe for legislative re examination.
Id. Section 10(b) claims against attorneys who assisted Refco in perpetrating its fraud were
dismissed even though they had been indicted for the same conduct (and subsequently convicted).
47The Court on occasion has handed down two opinions interpreting the same statute or
federal rule on the same day. See, e.g., Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994) (construing
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965); Holder v. Hall, 512 U.S. 874 (1994) (same); Celotex
Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317 (1986) (construing FED. R. CIV. P. 56); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242 (1986) (same). Research has not, however, located situations in which three
decisions construing the same statute were delivered on the same date.
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source of the duties whose breach gives rise to criminal liability under
§ 1346, the question raised by Weyhrauch. Depending on the source or
sources of fiduciary duties giving rise to the intangible right of honest
services, the Court may or may not identify other elements necessary to
sustain a conviction under § 1346. For example, if the Court decides that
state fiduciary law exclusively governs the scope of the duties enforceable
under the statute, it may not endorse any additional limiting principles.
Conversely, if state law provides but one potential source for the duties that,
if breached, could give rise to an honest services prosecution, the Court
presumably would need to adopt some other limitation(s) on the potential
breadth of the statute in order to save the law from constitutional challenge.
A decision by the Court rejecting any state law limiting principle and
affirming Weyhrauch, while most consistent with the case law developed by
the circuit courts over the past two decades, could exacerbate other tensions
that this paper has revealed. A federal standard for honest services-
essentially a federal set of fiduciary duties unmoored to any specific body of
state law-invites prosecutorial enlargement, if not whole-cloth creation, of
a defendant's legal duties, including the fiduciary duties owed by corporate
executives to their firms. The extent to which federal law duties coincide
with, conflict with, or even supplant, state law fiduciary duties are questions
of considerable importance for corporate managers and, more broadly, for
corporate governance.
Thus, while Weyhrauch concerns the prosecution of a former elected
state representative rather than a corporate fiduciary, the outcome of his
appeal is critically important to corporate executives. Should the govern-
ment prevail against Weyhrauch, corporate executives could face criminal
liability for breaches of fiduciary duty that simply do not exist under state
law. At a minimum, executives of public companies would face substantial
uncertainty were the Supreme Court to decide that their fiduciary duties
include any duties recognized outside extant state corporate law at the urging
of federal prosecutors." 8 Without a state law limiting principle, honest
services fraud jurisprudence-and by extension, fiduciary duty juris-
prudence-will develop nationwide through decisions issued in federal
criminal cases, potentially subjecting corporate executives to an array of
8If the Supreme Court endorses the state law limiting principle, state fiduciary duty law
arguably will continue to develop primarily in the state courts, especially given the federal courts'
traditional reluctance to create, as opposed to simply interpret, state law. See Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 80 (1938). If, instead, the Court permits federal prosecutors and courts to




varying and even conflicting fiduciary duties, including fiduciary duties not
recognized under the law of the state of incorporation." 9 Federal fiduciary
law could supplement, if not eventually supplant, Delaware and other states'
corporate fiduciary doctrine. The Justice Department's more expansive use
of § 1346 to prosecute defendants over the past decade suggests even greater
confusion and controversy in the future should the Court reject the state law
limiting principle.
A decision by the Court reversing Weyhrauch not only reduces the
likelihood that corporate fiduciaries will become subject to conflicting
obligations under state and federal law, but such a ruling also enables corpo-
rate managers to gauge the propriety of their behavior by reference to a
single body of law, that is, the fiduciary duty law of the firm's state of incur-
450
poration.
The counterweight to this rationale is the Supreme Court's 1943
decision in Jerome v. United States. Jerome created the presumption that
Congress does not enact federal criminal legislation incorporating or relying
upon state law without clearly expressing that intent.4 5 1 The state-federal
friction here is difficult to avoid. In enacting § 1346, Congress either
impliedly federalized some portion of fiduciary or corporate law, which
traditionally is regulated by the states, or it left the application and inter-
pretation of federal criminal law to be governed by potentially inconsistent
state laws. In either case, Congress usually makes its intent known.
Furthermore, unless the Supreme Court sanctions honest services
fraud prosecutions based on some non-state law, its examination of other
limiting principles, as urged by Black and Skilling, could become largely
superfluous. In fact, it would be improper under Delaware law to engraft
any additional limiting principles onto § 1346 if the statute truly is pre-
dicated on state law because such limiting principles are foreign to classical
"
9Skilling provides one such example. In that case, prosecutors argued that Skilling breach-
ed his fiduciary duty to Enron's employees, a duty not recognized under either Delaware or Oregon
state law. United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 545 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct. 393
(U.S. Oct. 13, 2009) (No. 08-1394).
450MOSt courts recognize the so-called "internal affairs" doctrine, which requires application
of the state law of incorporation in adjudication of intracorporate claims, including claims against
directors and officers for breach of their fiduciary duties.
4 51See Jerome v. United States, 318 U.S. 101, 104 (1943).
[W]e must generally assume, in the absence of a plain indication to the contrary,
that Congress when it enacts a statute is not making the application of the federal
act dependent on state law. That assumption is based on the fact that the applica-
tion of federal legislation is nationwide . .. and at times on the fact that the federal
program would be impaired if state law were to control.
Id. (citations omitted).
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fiduciary duty doctrine. Traditional fiduciary duty law resembles a strict
liability regime. In the absence of consent, the fiduciary has the burden to
justify her self-dealing transaction. Because the law entitles the principal to
rely on its fiduciary's trustworthiness, the principal need not prove that she
relied in fact on the fiduciary. A breaching fiduciary is liable to her principal
regardless of whether the fiduciary received an improper personal gain,
provided the principal suffered harm. The breaching fiduciary also is liable
to her principal to disgorge any personal gain that she received, even if her
principal suffered no harm. The types of limiting principles under review in
Black and Skilling-requiring some manner of economic harm to the
principal or gain to the fiduciary-generally are foreign to classical fiduciary
jurisprudence; as a result, incorporating those requirements into Delaware's
fiduciary duty regime runs afoul of state law principles. It would undermine
any conclusion that state law alone provides the fiduciary principles defining
honest services fraud.
If sources in addition to state law or wholly independent of state law
supply the requisite fiduciary obligations, it becomes more likely that the
Court will sanction some limiting principles already engrafted onto § 1346
by the lower courts. Without such limitations, the statute becomes complete-
ly untethered and, thus, more vulnerable to constitutional challenge.
1. Doctrinal Support for Construing § 1346 Narrowly
The Supreme Court's prior decisions provide doctrinal support for
interpreting § 1346 narrowly. Insofar as a broad construction of the statute
could penetrate Delaware's traditional corporate governance domain and,
potentially, undermine it, the Court could construe § 1346 more narrowly by
applying the extrastatutory principles that guided its prior decisions in Santa
Fe and Stoneridge. In both cases, the Court focused on the impact that its
statutory construction would have on the balance between federal and state
interests, expressing concern that interpreting section 10(b) expansively (i.e.,
by reading a "federal fiduciary principle" into the statute or applying the
statute to govern contractual relationships) would "federalize" the regulation
of relationships already well-regulated under state law.452 Characterizing
452See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,479 (1977) (avoiding "federaliz[ing] the
substantial portion of the law of corporations that deal with transactions in securities, particularly
where established state policies of corporate regulation would be overridden"). In Stoneridge, the
Court read section 10(b) narrowly to avoid the risk "that the federal power would be used to invite
litigation beyond the immediate sphere of securities litigation and in areas already governed by
functioning and effective state-law guarantees." Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta,
Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 161 (2008).
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corporations as "creatures of state law," the Santa Fe decision also presumed
that "'state law will govern the internal affairs of the corporation"' unless
federal law 'expressly requires"' otherwise.453
The Court's opinions interpreting section 10(b) also are grounded in
the notion that separation of powers theory constrains the power ofthe courts
to construe federal statutes. Because federal courts, not Congress, created
section 10(b)'s private remedy, the Court declined to expand the scope of
investors' remedies under the statute without express congressional action.4 S4
In the absence of express language in the statute evidencing congressional
purpose, the Court usually has decided against the party proffering the more
expansive interpretation of the right of action. This preference is evocative
of the Court's admonition in McNally that "[i]f Congress desires to go
further, it must speak more clearly than it has." 45 5
In addition, the Supreme Court's Santa Fe and Stoneridge opinions
considered the impact that its statutory interpretation could have on persons
regulated by the law. In Santa Fe, for example, the Court noted that expand-
ing federal law would impose potentially new and contradictory duties on
corporate executives. By its very nature, any "federal fiduciary principle"
would depart from state fiduciary standards to the extent necessary to
"ensure uniformity within the federal system." 4 56 State law and federal law
would provide overlapping-and, necessarily, confusing and contradictory-
standards of conduct for corporate fiduciaries; indeed, federal law could
"impose a stricter standard of fiduciary duty than that required by the law of
some States." 45 7
Lastly, the majority's opinions in Santa Fe and Stoneridge reflect con-
cern for the practical ramifications of the Court's decisions. Both opinions
reference the presence of other enforcement mechanisms and regimes
capable of addressing the same misconduct without the need for federal
intervention.45 8 The Santa Fe majority opined that Delaware corporate law
adequately protected shareholders, and the majority in Stoneridge deter-
mined that state contract law covered the disputed transaction. Thus, in both
cases, the Supreme Court concluded not only that there was no need for
453Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 84 (1975) (emphasis in
Santa Fe)).
454See id. at 477; see also Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 164-65.
455McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 360 (1987).
456Santa Fe, 430 U.S. at 479.
4 571d at 479 n.16.
458See id at 477; see also Stoneridge, 552 U.S. at 166 (noting that the SEC's "enforcement
power is not toothless").
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additional federal regulation but that to hold otherwise would unsettle the
existing state law regime.
Borrowing these lenses from Santa Fe and Stoneridge, the Supreme
Court could opt for a narrow (state law based) interpretation of the honest
services statute. As in Santa Fe, expanding the predicate for honest services
fraud prosecutions beyond extant state fiduciary duty law will lead,
inevitably, to the federalization of relations traditionally governed by state
law. In addition, this construction could run afoul of the principle that there
is no "federal common law of crimes."459 Permitting a parallel statutory
regime that impinges on the state's corporate regulatory scheme will alter the
current scheme, perhaps profoundly or in unforeseen ways.460 Predictability
and certainty is a hallmark, or at least the goal, of the current corporate
regulatory regime.4 Predictability promotes commerce. Subjecting public
company executives to potentially conflicting substantive duties under state
and federal law will likely be, at a minimum, expensive and confusing.
To be sure, federal law has made increasingly significant incursions
into the regulation of corporate duties and relationships since the Court
decided Santa Fe in 1977. After SOX, for example, federal law dictates the
composition of public company audit committees and prohibits public
462
companies from making loans to its officers and directors. Yes, state law
generally governs the fiduciary duties of corporate officers and directors.
But even in that context, there is an exception. Federal law has regulated
insider trading, a paradigmatic breach of a corporate employee's duty of
loyalty, for decades, both civilly and criminally. So, although the recog-
nition of federal fiduciary standards would represent a new incursion into
state law's traditional territory, the invasion is hardly unique.
Still, the separation of powers constraint provokes concern. Neither a
broad nor a narrow interpretation of § 1346 is well-anchored in the statute's
opaque language. Other than simply overturning McNally, Congress's
459Central Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 U.S. 164,
181 (1994).
4See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69,90(1987) ("This beneficial free
market system depends at its core upon the fact that a corporation--except in the rarest situations-
is organized under, and governed by, the law of a single jurisdiction, traditionally the corporate law
of the State of its incorporation.").
46 1Deborah A. DeMott, Perspectives on Choice of Law for Corporate Internal Affairs, 48
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 161, 161 (1985) ("Convenience and predictability of application, it is
said, dictate that one body of corporate law govern internal affairs, while the most plausible state to
supply that law is the state of incorporation, to whose legislative grace the corporation owes its legal
existence." (footnote omitted)).
462See generally Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making ofQuack Cor-
porate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521 (2005).
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statutory purpose is not clear from the almost nonexistent legislative history,
much less from the text. Nor has twenty years of post-enactment legislative
neglect served to elucidate the statute's meaning. Congress has not spoken
clearly about the source of the predicate fiduciary duty (or even said that that
is the touchstone), and federal legislators have not considered any limiting
principles. 463 Since § 1346 is a criminal statute, this indeterminacy also
triggers fair notice problems,464 potential constitutional infirmities sometimes
avoided by invoking lenity principles, as Justice Scalia previously noted.
As for the presence of an alternative enforcement regime, the evidence
is mixed. Certainly state law, particularly Delaware law, has developed an
extensive, if not wholly coherent, fiduciary jurisprudence. This state law
regime imposes duties on corporate executives that, in theory, should protect
the corporation from their abuse and misuse of power. State law also
provides a host of potential sanctions available to the corporation whose
executives breached their duties. Yet, enforcement of those fiduciary duties
is infrequent at best, as I have demonstrated. For public company executives
especially, the risk of liability for fiduciary breach is quite small. Liability
for even blatant self-dealing has become uncertain. Even if more vigorously
enforced, civil liability probably will not deter fiduciares' wrongdoing; they
perceive a low risk of detection and view potential sanctions as a cost of
doing business. Arguments that the mere threat of civil sanctions serves to
effectively deter serious malfeasance for reputationally-conscious executives
seems naive, if not disingenuous, in light of the recurring frauds and
scandals witnessed this decade. What is unquestionably true is that
Congress and the executive branch perceive the need for aggressive criminal
enforcement against public company executives in order to deter future
wrongdoing, recover ill-gotten gains, restore investor confidence, and benefit
the economy.
2. The Federal Interest in Enforcing Corporate Fiduciaries' Duties
Offsetting concerns about federalizing corporate fiduciary law is the
federal government's interest in taking enforcement action against disloyal
public company executives and other corporate fiduciaries who breach their
duties to their firms. Grounding the reach of § 1346 in state law could
"
3As Justice Scalia stated, whether § 1346 "qualifies as speaking 'more clearly' or in any
way lessens the vagueness and federalism concerns that produced ... McNally is another matter."
Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1309 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial of certio-
rari).
464See United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 348 (1971).
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neuter the statute's potential effectiveness as an enforcement weapon;
Delaware (and other states') corporate law affords numerous protections for
executives and other corporate fiduciaries, as I have shown. Is the federal
government's interest sufficiently strong to override state sovereignty and
federalism concerns? Nationwide uniformity of fiduciary regulation, at least
with respect to public company executives, might be justified. Although
incorporated in one state, many public companies transact business across
the country, if not the world. Corporate managers' activities obviously im-
pact their company's shareholders, who also are geographically dispersed.
Likewise, managers' decisions, including their determinations to adhere to
their fiduciary duties, can have profound financial and other consequences
for investors throughout the nation and globally. It seems reasonable, there-
fore, to consider whether the incorporating state's local interest should
monopolize the regulation of the firm's fiduciaries, much less thwart their
conformity with national and international standards of honest and loyal
behavior.
The events of the past year reinforce this view. The destruction of
perhaps another $10 trillion of shareholder wealth created another crisis of
investor confidence. Confidence is less likely to be restored without impos-
ing some liability on corporate executives who filched secret profits, diverted
assets through undisclosed self-dealing, and looted their corporations on
their way out the door. As in 2002, Delaware has done nothing to revise the
procedural rules and substantive doctrines that shield executives from civil
liability. What has happened instead, as in the immediate post-Enron period,
is that Congress and the executive branch have reacted to discipline
corporate managers whose wrongdoing contributed to the demise of their
firms and helped push the nation into the worst financial crisis since the
Great Depression. By enacting FERA, Congress endorsed the DOJ's efforts
to indict culpable executives under the mail and wire fraud statutes, as it did
by enacting SOX. Congress's active encouragement of such enforcement
provides some evidence of a strong federal interest prosecuting public
company executives who breach their fiduciary duties. Whether this interest
is strong enough may well be decided soon.
D. The Civil Liability--Criminal Liability Paradigm
Turned Upside Down
Stepping back for a moment, it also makes sense to consider the
impact of the enforcement anomaly that I have identified on our normative
expectations about civil and criminal liability. The courts' concern with liti-
gation costs has created a situation where it is easier to indict and convict a
defendant of honest services fraud for "breaching" a fiduciary duty than it is
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to successfully assert a civil claim for breach of fiduciary duty against that
defendant. This development reverses our traditional notions about the
relative culpability and blameworthiness of civil violations and criminal
violations. Classically, conduct violative of the criminal law is a subset of
the conduct that violates civil law. Again, however, as the enforcement
anomaly has developed, conduct (breach of fiduciary duties by corporate
executives) no longer violative of civil law nonetheless violates criminal law
(if prosecuted as honest services fraud). This phenomenon represents a shift
in the traditional civil liability-criminal liability paradigm, a change with
potentially far-reaching and unanticipated ramifications. Among the conse-
quences are the blurring of the distinction between civil and criminal law
and the threat of overcriminalization.
1. Blurring the Civil-Criminal Distinction
A robust literature explores how the enlargement of federal criminal
law, an expansion that began in the mid-twentieth century, if not earlier, has
blurred the traditional distinctions between civil law and criminal law.
Whereas the objective of civil tort law is to have the defendant internalize
the social costs of her conduct, the objective of criminal law is to blame and
punish the defendant.46 5 Arguably, we should reserve criminal law to punish
"the most damaging wrongs and the most culpable defendants" 4 66 for
conduct that society believes lacks any social utility. For conduct that has
positive social utility, but imposes externalities on others, civil damages
and/or penalties should be used to deter (or "price") the behavior.467 Almost
twenty years ago, Professor Coffee pointed to honest services fraud as an
example of the "collapsing" line between civil and criminal penalties, a
reduction he found highly problematic for several reasons. First, the lack
of precision inherent in fiduciary doctrine makes the crime difficult to define
with sufficient specificity ex ante. This lack of specificity conflicts with the
bedrock principle that the legislature must define crimes with sufficient
465Coffee, supra note 275, at 1878.
466Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions: The MiddlegroundBetween Criminal and Civil
Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1863 (1992); see also Coffee, supra note 275, at 1890 ("[T]he criminal
law should be confined 'to areas of clearly egregious behavior in which severely punitive civil
monetary sanctions are ineffective."' (quoting Mann, supra, at 1802)).
467Coffee, supra note 275, at 1876. Traditionally, criminal law is also legislatively created
and publicly enforced, whereas civil law is principally judge-made and privately enforced. Id at
1878.
468See id at 1875.
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specificity to satisfy due process notice concems.469 Second, criminalizing
conduct proscribed under civil law can distort civil law. Courts may become
increasingly cautious in their explications of fiduciary duties, lest their
rhetoric become the basis for later criminal prosecutions. Courts also may
hesitate to create new fiduciary duties to avoid subjecting additional conduct
to potential criminal sanction.47 0 Third, the difficulty in setting clear bound-
aries for criminal breaches of fiduciary duty creates risk that more citizens
will unwittingly cross the line into criminal behavior in their ordinary pro-
fessional lives.4 7 1
The three concerns Professor Coffee identified have the greatest force
as directed to criminalizing breaches of the corporate fiduciaries' duty of
care. Criminalizing vague aspirational standards which, by definition, "can
never be fully realized," raises the specter of overcriminalization.472 More
specifically, the risk is that corporate fiduciaries will suffer criminal sanc-
tions for making bad judgments, penalizing them for ordinary negligence-
or, more appropriately, for gross negligence.4 73 The lack of moral certainty,
in many instances, makes civil regulation via pricing or taxing misbehavior
more appropriate than harsh criminal sanctions, which are best reserved for
conduct that society never tolerates and outright prohibits.474 The policies
supporting the business judgment rule seem relevant here, too. The law pro-
tects corporate fiduciaries from ex post judicial review of their business
judgments to encourage optimal risk taking and service on corporate boards.
Threatening more severe sanctions for careless judgments seems particularly
unwise. Breach of the duty of care, without more, should not give rise to
criminal liability.4 75 To date, it appears that the DOJ agrees. As discussed
earlier,476 prosecutors have not used honest services fraud to enforce
469See, e.g., United States v. Santos, 128 S. Ct. 2020,2025 (2008) ("[Nlo citizen should be
held accountable for a violation of a statute whose commands are uncertain, or subjected to punish-
ment that is not clearly prescribed."). Justice Scalia has invoked this principle repeatedly when
advocating that "[t]he rule of lenity requires ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of
the defendants subjected to them." Id.; see also Moskal v. United States, 498 U.S. 103, 131 (1990)
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ("' [B]efore a man can be punished as a criminal under the federal law his
case must be plainly and unmistakably within the provisions of some statute."' (quoting United
States v. Gradwell, 243 U.S. 476, 485 (1917))).
4 70See Coffee, supra note 275, at 1876 ("When the criminal law is used to enforce civil law
norms that are aspirational in character and deliberately soft-edged, the result may distort the civil
law.").
4
nSee id. at 1881.
472Id. at 1879.
473 See id.
4 74 Coffee, supra note 275, at 1886-87.
..Id. at 1879.
...See supra Part IV.A.2.
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corporate fiduciaries' duty of care (although the government did argue in
closing that Skilling took inappropriate risks and failed to perform his job
appropriately).
Imposing criminal sanctions for abuse of loyalty is comparatively
easier to justify and enforce. These breaches are significantly more blame-
worthy and properly treated as serious crimes. Still, the lack of precision
inherent in fiduciary doctrine makes the boundaries of the crime difficult to
identify. Indeed, appellate courts have struggled for decades to define those
perimeters, without success. Although the courts generally adhere to the
duty limitation, I have shown that this principle generates a host of follow-on
problems.477 For private honest services fraud prosecutions in particular, the
difficulty arises, in no small part, because fiduciary proscriptions remain
supple and contextually-dependent.
Prosecutions of corporate executives for honest services fraud,
assuming they continue, upset executives' enforcement expectations. These
prosecutions, too, will generate some set of default standards delimiting their
conduct. We can predict that default standards will develop because execu-
tives rationally will behave such that they avoid the vastly more severe
penalties associated with honest services fraud. What we cannot predict is
what default standards will take form. Among other factors, the develop-
ment will depend on how frequently prosecutors charge executives and
executives' advisors with honest services fraud and how closely government
lawyers adhere to (and are made by the courts to respect) state fiduciary
doctrine. 4 78 Also unknowable is the extent to which the default standards
arising from honest services prosecutions will displace, as opposed to
augment, state law fiduciary standards.
As government prosecutors employ the honest services statute more
frequently over time, the risk of spill-over distorting civil standards becomes
more acute, even though Delaware (and other states') courts rarely impose
liability on corporate executives for breaching their duties. Why? Because
the courts still exhort managers to carry out their duties, lest they be
adjudged liable in the future. Whether these threats effectively deter execu-
tives is certainly dubious, but there is good evidence that the opinions estab-
lish influential social norms. The point is that Delaware judges have estab-
lished aspirational standards-such as the directive from Guth v. Loft that
"undivided and unselfish loyalty to the corporation demands that there shall
47 7See supra Part V.B.l.
478Whether defendant executives plead guilty to honest services fraud and whether juries
convict executives for honest services fraud will also impact the development of fiduciary standards
under criminal law.
2010] 89
DELAWARE JOURNAL OF CORPORATE LAW
be no conflict between duty and self-interest"479-that public company
fiduciaries come to know. They believe, too, that if they follow good pro-
cess, they will not incur personal liability for violating the lofty standards.
Potential criminal liability for failing to achieve these aspirational objectives
changes that dynamic significantly.
2. The Threat of Overcriminalization
Commentators critical of the federal government's criminal
enforcement policies argue that they threaten overcriminalization. Professor
Ribstein, for example, has disapproved of the Enron prosecutions, arguing
that the actions "criminaliz[e] agency costs."4 80 In his view, prosecutors
indicted Jeff Skilling and other Enron executives for "subtle" conduct that
the board approved implicitly, if not explicitly-conduct that did not
"deserve[] society's severest condemnation." 48 1 Using criminal law to
discipline executives for governance failures "dissipates the moral force of
the criminal law," creates the danger of selective prosecution, and even
tempts prosecutors into misconduct as they search out wrongdoing to satisfy
the public's demand for retribution and, perhaps, even to benefit their own
-482career aspirations.
The honest services fraud provision-and, indeed, the entire mail and
wire fraud statutory scheme-has come under similar attack. Justice Scalia
impliedly addressed one aspect of the concern in his Sorich dissent when he
quipped that § 1346 "would seemingly cover a salaried employee's phoning
in sick to go to a ball game." 4 8 3 Prosecutors and other supporters counter
that the open-textured nature of § 1346 is both intentional and necessary.
Indeed, fraud doctrine has "traditionally been understood to be one of the
most open-ended concepts in law."4 84 Were the law to proscribe fraud with
too much specificity, the offender could structure her conduct in such a way
479Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (Del. 1939); see also Coffee, supra note 275, at 1879
(referencing the "punctilio" language in Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928)
(Cardozo, C.J.)).
480Larry E. Ribstein, The Perils of Criminalizing Agency Costs, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 59,
63-64 (2007).
481Id at 59, 69 (arguing that prosecutors criminalized agency costs by charging Enron
executives for engaging in complex transactions that "differed only marginally from what was
generally considered at the time legal business behavior" and for making statements obscuring the
company's financial health in a desperate attempt to keep it afloat).
4821d at 60, 62.
483Sorich v. United States, 129 S. Ct. 1308, 1309 (2009) (Scalia, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari).
484Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 345, 374.
90 [Vol. 35
TWENTY-EIGiHT WORDS
as to "frustrate[] efforts to punish ex post what in substance is fraud (or,
more precisely, what is just as blameworthy or undesirable as what the law
previously has specified as fraud.)" 485 Furthermore, the imprecision of the
fraud laws may enable the government to deter more conduct than its limited
resources could punish.4 86
Analytically, overcriminalization takes several forms, and § 1346
487
arguably raises each of the various concerns. First, overcriminalization
can mean criminalizing behavior that should not be criminalized, either
because the conduct is something that most of society does not deem
sanction-worthy 4 88 or because the conduct is better left to the more nuanced
"pricing" mechanism of tort law. Threatening the strongest possible sanc-
tion, imprisonment under the criminal law, is not justified simply because
the community prefers that corporate fiduciaries abide by their duties.489
Again, one could argue that criminalizing an executive's breach of the duty
of care, without more, exemplifies this form of overcriminalization. In
contrast, the public clearly does condemn many breaches of loyalty by
corporate fiduciaries as morally wrong and blameworthy, particularly where
the fiduciary has acted deceptively and there is a large financial benefit to the
fiduciary or substantial harm to the firm. Although social norms do not
support criminalizing all breaches of duty by corporate fiduciaries, it does
not follow necessarily that civil liability adequately addresses the harms
caused by their failures. Part of the tension arises from Delaware's lack of
robust support for civil enforcement actions. On some level, the public's
interest in criminal sanctions will persist so long as Delaware courts continue
to dismiss most shareholder actions alleging breach by corporate executives.
A second form of overcriminalization describes the enforcement of
vague laws that prohibit not only culpable wrongdoing but also similar
conduct that is not morally blameworthy. The obvious danger with this form
of overcriminalization is prosecutors' largely unchecked discretion to choose
which individuals to prosecute among the many whose conduct could fall
within the language of the statute.4 Insofar as the honest services statute
485Samuel W. Buell, Novel Criminal Fraud, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1971, 1973-74 (2006).
486See Samuel W. Buell, The Upside of Overbreadth, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1491, 1499
(2008).
4 87For a more complete discussion of the potential issues related to overcriminalization, see
generally Sara Sun Beale, The Many Faces of Overcriminalization: From Morals and Mattress
Tags to Overfederalization, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 747 (2005).
488See United States v. Thompson, 484 F.3d 877, 884 (7th Cir. 2007) (reversing conviction
"of a civil servant for conduct that ... was designed to pursue the public interest as the employee
understood it").
489See Coffee, supra note 275, at 1879 (characterizing such a view as "simplistic").
490See Beale, supra note 487, at 766.
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criminalizes both loyalty breaches involving significant self-dealing (like
Black), and less blameworthy breaches, such as failures to disclose a conflict
of interest (like Bronston or Rybicki l), this criticism of § 1346 seems well-
taken.
Black, involving significant self-dealing and, according to the govern-
ment, deceit, is an inferior case to raise this overcriminalization concern. If
there is a heartland of § 1346, Black's conduct would seem to fall squarely
within it. Indeed, the circumstances in Black seem closest to McNally inso-
far as government prosecutors in both cases alleged that the defendant
received financial benefits without making disclosures to, much less
obtaining the consent of, his principal. That Congress enacted § 1346 to
criminalize (at least) such opportunistic behavior makes it more probable
that, absent a wholesale invalidation of the statute, the Court would affirm
Black's conviction. Skilling may raise this overcriminalization argument
more persuasively, but even there, Skilling's convictions on numerous other
counts (including securities fraud and insider trading) also make his case a
poor example of the potential pitfalls associated with a criminal statute that
sweeps too broadly.
Perhaps more applicable to Skilling's case is the final aspect of
overcriminalization, redundancy. When indicting corporate executives for
securities fraud, federal prosecutors have multiple potential charging options
because the defendant's alleged conduct, if proven, will violate several
criminal statutes requiring distinct proofs and providing various maximum
punishments. Prosecutors may select the proof required and the punishment
(at least the maximum punishment) by choosing among the options. This
ability undoubtedly provides government lawyers with significant leverage
over criminal defendants; for example, prosecutors can threaten to charge a
defendant with a more serious crime if the defendant insists on putting the
prosecutor to her proof at trial.
Section 1346, like many federal statutes, criminalizes conduct that
already is made illegal by other criminal statutes (either federal or state).491
For corporate fiduciaries, much of the conduct criminalized by § 1346 is also
criminal under the securities fraud statutes.492 Prosecutors appear to indict
executives under § 1346 to trigger potential liability under other statutes with
491Id. at 763-64 (arguing that most federal statutes largely duplicate state law but have much
higher sentences); see also Sara Sun Beale, Is Corporate Criminal Liability Unique, 44 AM. CRIM.
L. REv. 1503, 1509 (2007) (citing Sara Sun Beale, Too Many and yet Too Few: New Principles to
Define the Proper Limits for Federal Criminal Jurisdiction, 46 HASTINGS L.J. 979, 996-1004
(1995)).
492See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2006); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2009).
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even more excessive penalties, like RICO, and to threaten the defendant with
asset forfeitures. Faced with these most severe of consequences, prosecutors
can force executives into plea bargains.49 3 Redundancy, then, elevates the
risk of prosecutorial abuse. To be sure, evidence that government lawyers
increasingly choose to indict corporate executives for honest services fraud
does not prove that prosecutors are abusing their discretion. The potential
for abuse, however, remains a valid concern.
E. Criminalizing Breaches of the Duty of Candor to the Board
The Supreme Court has an array of interpretive resolutions to choose
among as it addresses the challenge of construing § 1346 this Term. The
Court could take a cleaver to the extant case law and, perhaps, find the
statute unconstitutionally vague. Alternatively, the Court could use a scal-
pel, tinkering around the edges by relying on traditional fiduciary law and
possibly other sources as support for adopting limiting principles and carving
some discernible outer boundary to the statute's reach. Or, the Court could
approve the broadest interpretation of the statute (perhaps like the Fifth
Circuit's construction in Skilling), affirm all three appellate court decisions,
and criminalize, potentially, any breach of fiduciary duty. All of these reso-
lutions, and more, are possible.
Of course, the Court might approach these questions more conser-
vatively than Justice Scalia perhaps envisioned by interpreting § 1346 only
to the extent necessary to decide the cases before it. A narrow, more case-
specific approach could permit the Court to develop and refine its honest
services fraud jurisprudence over time, adding nuances as required by the
specific factual and legal circumstances presented. For instance, if the Court
agrees with the Seventh Circuit that, whatever its outer limits, Black's
conduct violated the federal wire fraud prohibition, it simply could affirm the
judgments of conviction. In other words, the Court would approve the use
of § 1346 to criminalize only certain breaches of fiduciary duty by corporate
executives-specifically, the breaches committed by Black. Black's convic-
tion for honest services wire fraud relates to the charge that he violated his
duty of loyalty. The duty of loyalty is the most important fiduciary duty of
corporate executives, "the one accepted constant," and the duty that func-
tions distinctively to control managers' opportunism.494
493Darryl K. Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization: Thoughts on Political Dynamics
and a Doctrinal Response, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 453, 453 (2009).
494 Flannigan, supra note 31, at 428.
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Such an approach offers several advantages. First, the Court would
provide greater certainty for corporate fiduciaries that not every lapse will
subject them to criminal prosecution; the relevant duty is a fiduciary duty,
and specifically the duty of loyalty, rather than the duty of care. Second, the
Justices would avoid (or at least defer) delineating the statute's outer bound-
aries, preserving the law enforcement advantages of § 1346 in fighting novel
frauds by corporate executives. That Congress twice amended the mail and
wire fraud laws to encourage their use in fighting corporate crime-and
never amended them to restrict their application-demonstrates the federal
interest in maintaining the laws' adaptability. By sanctioning the use of
§ 1346 to criminalize breaches such as Black's, § 1346 still may function as
a foundation for a more expansive federal role in regulating corporate
governance, as Congress has suggested, in order to instill greater investor
confidence.
How the Court addresses Skilling likely will prove more complicated,
since that case provides the only vehicle for the Justices to examine the
statute's constitutional issues. Unlike Black, however, the Fifth Circuit's
decision in Skilling did not rest on any perceived benefit received by Skilling
from his fiduciary breach. This is not to say that the trial court record is
devoid of evidence of such benefits; the jury also convicted Skilling of
multiple counts of securities fraud and even insider trading. But absent
some selective reexamination of the record, the Justices might perceive that
the government's honest services charge in Skilling departs somewhat from
the core conduct that Congress intended to criminalize by enacting § 1346.
Skilling also adds a further wrinkle to the Court's analysis insofar as
the harm to Enron was not strictly economic or financial in nature; were the
harm viewed so narrowly, the conduct charged presumably would fall within
the scope of the traditional mail or wire fraud statutes. Instead, the Fifth
Circuit perceived the harm to Enron as Skilling's failure to make adequate
disclosures to Enron's board about the fraudulent nature of the transactions
and not that those transactions, in and of themselves, harmed Enron
financially. 495 Yet, because state law traditionally regulates the internal
affairs of the corporation, construing § 1346 to police the communications
between the corporate executive and his board would require the Court to
engraft meaning onto the statute's text without even a basis in prior judge-
made law. Although such an interpretation of § 1346 offers important public
495United States v. Skilling, 554 F.3d 529, 546-47 (5th Cir. 2009), cert. granted, 130 S. Ct.
393 (U.S. Oct. 13, 2009) (No. 08-1394).
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policy benefits, congressional amendment of the statute is preferable, as
discussed below.
An incrementalist approach also enables the Court to avoid the
perilous prospect of either establishing a one-size-fits-all limiting principle
or crafting distinguishing rules unsupported by the statute's language or
legislative history. Considerations that give rise to well-reasoned limiting
principles for public corruption cases do not apply to corporate crimes, and
vice versa, but Congress did not distinguish between public sector frauds
and private sector frauds when it enacted § 1346. The text of the statute
simply provides no basis for the creation of distinct limiting principles.
Judicial interpretations cabining the scope of § 1346 are, in any event,
a second-best solution. The best solution is to fix the enforcement problem
legislatively. So long as public company fiduciaries cause or threaten to
cause serious economic harm by breaching their duties but still remain
protected from civil liability, there will be pressure for criminal law to fill
that enforcement void. On the other hand, when criminal prosecutors
respond to the need without sufficient statutory guidance, there is the danger
of overcriminalization.
Regardless of how the Supreme Court decides the cases before it,
Congress can and should address these competing concems by amending the
honest services fraud statute. (Of course, new legislation will become neces-
sary if the Court invalidates § 1346 or restricts its scope to any significant
degree.) To advance the federal enforcement interest that I have identified,
while minimizing the harms associated with overcriminalization, Congress
could specifically criminalize frauds (breaches of the duty of candor)
perpetrated by senior officers and other executives on corporate boards of
directors. The facts in Black and (especially) in Skilling-indeed, in most of
the criminal prosecutions of top public company executives over the past
decade-evidence such frauds. Black failed to disclose to Hollinger's board
that substantial tax benefits motivated his self-dealing transactions. Skilling
and his fellow officers deceived Enron's directors to gain the board's
approval of the fraudulent transactions, including certain self-dealing
transactions. Although these deceptions warrant criminal sanctions, "intra-
firm frauds" are not necessarily actionable as criminal securities fraud if they
do not involve the making of false disclosures to the public. Yet, current
corporate governance theory and practice emphasize the importance of a
monitoring board of directors, comprised primarily of vigilant, informed
outside directors. In order to monitor management effectively, the board
must receive full and accurate information about the financial condition of
the corporation from executive management. Without candid disclosure by
senior corporate managers to the firms' directors, boards simply cannot per-
form their essential functions. Criminalizing fraudulent misrepresentations
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made by officers and their advisors to the firm's directors will increase
attention on the potential for such deception, both in the boardroom and in
the courtroom.
VII. CONCLUSION
Congress, federal prosecutors, and the courts (both Delaware and
federal) all have contributed to the current controversy concerning criminal
enforcement of corporate fiduciary duties, and each has a potential role to
play in bringing more coherence to the law. Most obviously, Congress could
amend § 1346 and clarify its intent. For its part, Delaware could reduce the
procedural obstacles impeding effective private enforcement of corporate
executives for breaching their duties of loyalty and candor. The Justice
Department could act voluntarily to limit prosecutions of executives and
other public company fiduciaries under § 1346, charging such violations
only in cases involving serious breaches of loyalty (such as self-dealing
transactions, usurping corporate opportunities, or misappropriating inside
information) that also implicate the fiduciary's duty of candor.
However, it seems more likely that the Supreme Court will take the
lead in attempting to rationalize the law by restricting, or even eliminating,
the government's ability to use § 1346 as a weapon of enforcement. Should
the Court so rule, Congress may have no choice but to enact a new criminal
statute to advance the federal interest in prosecuting disloyal and dishonest
corporate fiduciaries.
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